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ABSTRACT 
The neoclassical "sources-oj-growth" approach is applied to derive total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth measures for manufacturing industries in South Africa. Although South Africa's 
recorded industrial TFP growth measures have been persistently low in absolute terms, this 
performance is not significantly worse than the industrial TFP growth performance of other 
developing countries. In some periods there is evidence of a significant variability in TFP 
performance across industries. The measures also indicate that TFP growth has worsened in 
the I980s, particularly in the intermediate-capital intensive and labour intensive industries. 
However, there are various problems with interpreting neoclassical TFP growth measures as 
indicators of production efficiency. In fact, as TFP growth is derived as a residual, it may 
measure many factors besides production efficiency. Alternative growth theories are used to 
assess the fundamental determinants of productivity growth. These provide a more plausible 
conceptualisation of the process by which productivity growth is generated than the 
neoclassical growth theory does. However, this analysis also provides little empirical evidence 
of which underlying factors have had the most influence on productivity growth in South 
African manufacturing. Hence, the relative importance of possible candidates can only really 
be assessed qualitatively and on the basis of micro evidence. However, these assessments, and 
the assumptions underlying the postulated causal connections (between the identified factors 
and productivity growth), have a major impact on policy design. In this respect, 011 the basis 
of the framework provided by the evolutionary and other recent growth theories, various 
policy implications are drawn, and these are contrasted with the policy proposals of other 
South African analysts. This thesis concludes that policies need to be designed with the 
central objective of enhancing the technological capabilities 'of South African firms. Trade 
policies will not be sufficient for achieving this objective. Education and training policies, 
technology, competition and labour market policies are also crucial. However, since the 
fundamental causes of productivity growth remain somewhat of a mystery, there is a need to 
be sceptical of simple policy prescriptions. In this respect, this thesis is highly critical of the 
World Bank's position that productivity gains will be reaped from the exposure of firms to 
international competition that trade liberalisation policies entail. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Basic Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part of the thesis, consisting of chapters one to 
three, aims to assess the productivity performance of South African manufacturing industries 
since World War 2. This assessment is undertaken by comparing South Africa's performance 
with that in other countries and against the background of earlier studies of South Africa's 
industrial productivity growth. The second part of this thesis, consisting of chapters four and 
five, aims to enhance our understanding of the causes of South Africa's productivity growth 
performance. Finally, in chapter six, conclusions are reached, various policy implications are 
inferred and the existing South African debate on industrial policy and productivity growth 
is addressed. 
1.2 Assessing the Productivity Growth Performance of South African Manufacturing 
For the purpose of assessing the productivity growth performance of South African 
manufacturing industries, the following issues will be addressed in the first three chapters: 
(1) What production efficiency improvements have been achieved by manufacturing 
industries in South Africa since World War 2 ? 
(2) Has this growth been poor in comparison with other countries, and what countries 
could South African industries have realistically expected to outperform? 
(3) Do the achievements of aggregate manufacturing reflect the performance of individual 
industries, and if not, which industries have performed well and which badly? 
These issues are addressed by deriving productivity growth estimates for the 26 industries in 
manufacturing in 5 sub-periods in the interval 1945-90 using the conventional neoclassical 
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growth accounting approach. The productivity growth estimates derived using this method 
are contrasted with existing estimates by other authors. It is emphasised though, that with any 
method of estimating productivity growth certain theoretical and empirical limitations arise. 
These issues are discussed in some detail because of their important bearing on the 
interpretation of productivity growth estimates as indicators of production efficiency changes. 
In a recent World Bank assessment of the South African economy Belli et al. (1993 : 73) 
point out that several groups have reached the following conclusion: 
"It is a striking feature of the performance of manufacturing industry in 
South Africa that productivity has been stagnant for the past 20 years." 
Using neoclassical total factor productivity measures, Belli et al. (1993) estimate productivity 
growth for manufacturing as a whole at 0.05% per annum in the period 1972-83 followed by 
a TFP growth rate of 0.55% per annllm in the 1983-90 period'. Also using TFP meaSllres, 
but different data sources, Moll (1990) estimates productivity growth for manufacturing as 
a whole at -0.8%, 1.9%, 1.0%, 0.7% and -1.9% per annum for the periods 1948-54, 1954-63, 
1963-74, 1974-81 and 1981 -90 respectively. Like Belli et al. (1993), Moll 's estimates indicate 
low absolute productivity growth, but in addition suggest that the recent TFP growth 
performance has not been significantly worse in the last twenty years than in previous 
periods'. 
'However, it is also important to note that a closer look al Belli ci ai 's TFP measures reveals considerable variation 
across industries which is not reflected in these aggregate figures . 
2 Estimates by the NPI (J 990) and Joffe et al. (1993) also lead them 10 conclude Ihatthe TFP pcrfonnanee of South 
African Manufacturing has been poor. See Appendix A, which shows the estimales made by different authors. 
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In addition to productivity growth comparisons over time and across industries, this thesis 
derives a new set of estimates and stresses the importance of comparing South Africa's 
productivity growth record with the achievements of other countries that are in a similar 
situation to South Africa. 
However, having derived TFP growth measures there is a need for careful interpretation since 
there are many empirical and conceptual problems with this estimate of productivity growth. 
In the light of this, the present study tries to assess the usefulness of this measure as an 
indicator of changes in production efficiency. It is concluded that the TFP measure can be 
useful as an indicator of trends in production efficiency so long as its limitations are 
appreciated. 
1.3 Currellt Perspectives 011 the Causes of ProdllctiJ'ity Growth and the Role of the State 
The main purpose of the second part of the thesis is to understand the causes of productivity 
growth trends. This will be addressed by focusing on the following issues: 
(1) What have been the fundamental determinants of the productivity growth perfonnance 
in the South African manufacturing sector? ; 
(2) What role has the state played in facilitating or hindering productivity growth 111 
manufacturing? ; 
(3) Have the major productivity influences changed over time? ; and, 
(4) To what extent are these key factors specific to South Africa? 
Having put South Africa ' s industrial productivity growth performance in context, the issues 
considered here are important for ensuring that an accurate diagnosis of this performance is 
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made. The nature of this diagnosis has important impl ications for the growth and efficiency 
prospects of South African industry. Such a diagnosis should also provide a useful basis for 
designing policies to enhance South Africa's industrial productivity growth. 
However, many of the determinants of productivity growth are qualitative, and therefore 
cannot be empirically proven. As such, the current state of the ideological debate on the role 
of industrial policy will in practice be the main guide to policy. Hence, the prevailing 
dominant wisdom on the State ' s role in industrialization and the perceived link between state 
intervention and productivity growth is very relevant to an analysis of the causes of 
productivity growth. Thus, in the final part of the thesis, some of the dominant views on the 
causes of South Africa's poor industrial productivity growth will be discussed critically. 
The role of the state in the growth and industrialization of the economy is an important issue 
in South Africa, given the political transition underway, the high expectations accompanying 
it, and the current state of the economy. However, the nature and extent of the state's role is 
a highly contentious issue. Internationally this issue has been receiving much attention from 
economists. In South Africa it has also become a focal point of discussion among economists, 
in their quest to attribute blame for the poor recent performance of the economy. 
Many liberals are convinced that the issue has essentially been resolved. In short, they see 
limited state intervention and liberal trade policies as sufricient for ensuling sustainable 
growth and industrialisation. The poor economic pelfonnance of many developing countries, 
which attempted to encourage industrialization through intervention and protection, is regarded 
as ample proof of the myopia of active state involvement. In this respect, Holden (1992) 
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regards the liberalisation policy trends in Eastern Europe. Latin America, and in parts of 
Africa, as nothing short of an "economic revolution". However, there is no doubt that the 
conditionality of IMF and World Bank loans provided a strong inducement to liberalise for 
many countries facing severe debt problems. Rodrik (1992) also argues that the severity of 
the macroeconomic crises experienced in many Latin American and East European countries 
set the stage for the introduction of what would have previously have been regarded as very 
radical liberal political and economic refomls . In the light of these issues, Rodrik (1992) 
argues that it would be wrong to interpret these policy reversals as indicative of a growing 
acceptance of the efficacy of liberal policies. Indeed, despite the popular dominance of this 
dogma, the economic theory and empirical evidence used to support the case for liberalisation 
is open to considerable debate (Rodrik, 1992)3. 
More pragmatic economists have abandoned the distinction between state and market as a 
guide to policy, acknowledging the possibility of both market failure and government failure. 
Insights from micro-based organisational and institutional theories suggest that the nature, 
design and implementation of state intervention is far more important than its extent. From 
this perspective, the state is seen as an important facilitator of an institutional environment 
where organisational efficiency is rewarded and inefficiency is penalised. Further, it is 
recognised that the state can playa vital role in correcting for market failures where the 
prospect of government failure is not probable (Ranis, 1989; Nabli and Nugent, 1989). 
) Also see Dornbusch (1992) for an alternative perspective and tile local reviews of this debate in Bell (1992) and 
Holden (1992). 
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South Africa, like many other countries, has begun to liberalise its economy. It is clear that 
the whole issue of productivity has become deeply enmeshed in the debate surrounding the 
efficacy of liberalisation, with unfavourable productivity growth trends being cited as 
"evidence" of the consequences of state 'intervention. The failure of any movement towards 
consensus in the light of productivity "evidence", is partly due to the nature of the 
productivity concept itself (see below), and partly due to the inability to establish robust 
correlations between productivity growth and various indicators of state intervention. As 
such, despite claims to the contrary by various authors, it is generally acknowledged that 
economists have been unable to establish conclusive evidence of causality between 
hypothesised factors and productivity growth. This is highlighted by what has come to be 
known as the "productivity puzzle". Despite almost two decades (and a great deal of 
research) since the worldwide productivity slowdown in the early 1970s, its causes still 
remain elusive to economists (Denison, 1984). Much research has also focused on the link 
between trade orientation and productivity growth, but again the results appear inconclusive 
(Havrylyshyn, 1990, Nishimizu and Robinson , 1984, Helleiner, 19934). 
In South Africa many authorss have attributed a large portion of the blame for the poor 
economic performance of the South African economy, particularly its productivity growth 
performance, to state intervention. In general, the system of apartheid is seen as having had 
an "ossifying" effect on South Africa's output and productivity growth performance (Moll, 
1990). In particular, state intervention in the fom1 of misguided trade and industrial policies, 
4 However, see Edwards (J 991) who believes there is conclusive evidence of a positive correlation bel ween degree 
of opermess and productivity growth (see section 5.3.3 for a fuller discussion of this). In the South African context 
see Belli ct a!. (1993) who also infer a similarrelationship as Edwards (1991). Note however that Belli et a!. (1993) 
do not appear to interpret their findings as carefully as NlShimizu and Roninson (1984) rccommend (also see 5.3.3). 
'Becker and Pollard (1990), Moll (1990), Relli ct al. (199.1), Holden (1992). 
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economically irrational labour market and long term educational policies are regarded as being 
amongst the key factors undermining South Africa's productivity growth performance. With 
regard to trade policy, Moll (1990) notes some of the conventional liberal arguments for the 
inferiority of the import substituting indusuialisation strategy pursued in South Africa, while 
Becker and Pollard (1990), amongst others, suggest that this trade strategy adopted by the 
nationalist government was partly strategic, and not purely economic, since it represented an 
attempt to guard against the perceived threat of sanctions and disinvestment. 
Other factors (where the state is not explicitly blamed) which have been regarded as 
underlying the productivity growth perfomlance of the South African economy include: 
deficiencies in the education and training system with resulting technical and managerial skill 
deficiencies of the workforce (NPI, 1990); weakness in the research institutions and a general 
underinvestment in research and development by private firms, coupled with the packaged 
nature of foreign technology, its inappropriateness and relatively slow application in South 
Africa (NPI, 1990; Moll, T, 1990; du Plooy, R, 1988, Joffe et aI., 1993); the effects of 
sanctions and disinvestment, in reducing trade and undelmining technological development 
(NPI, 1990; du Plooy, 1988); low rates of investment undermining technological embodiment 
as well as the inappropriately capital-intensive nature of investment (Joffe et aI., 1993); and 
even, a "Iack of awareness of productivity" (NPI, 1990). 
This thesis seeks to isolate the key productivity determinants from amongst this long list of 
plausible factors influencing South Africa's productivity growth performance. More 
importantly though, the thesis aims to clarify the causal mechanisms through which these 
factors influence productivity growth and, in so doing, to make clear why they are important. 
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As such, the last section of this thesis will try to isolate the key causes of South Africa's 
industrial productivity performance. Furthermore, the thesis will emphasise how these findings 
differ from the various existing interpretations of the determinants of productivity growth in 
South Africa. 
Productivity can be a fruitful concept for understanding what factors are most fundamental 
to the long term growth prospects of the South African manufacturing sector, and what sort 
of industrial policy can enhance these prospects. However, it is all too easy for productivity 
measures to be inappropriately used for ideological purposes. Nevertheless, with a thorough 
understanding of the nature and limitations of the productivity concept a careful interpretation 
of productivity measures can provide useful insights for policy. 
1.4 Definillg Productivity Gl'Owth as a Long Term Concept 
Before a serious analysis can be made of the productivity growth performance of the 
manufacturing sector it is crucial to have a clear understanding of what is meant by the 
concept of productivity. Unfortunately, there is no unanimity on how this concept should be 
defined. Different people have taken it to mean different things. Generally, productivity 
growth should be equated with a rising output/input ratio. In other words, a society with 
given human and natural resources is able to produce a higher rate of output over time. 
However, it is not this general definition of productivity that presents a problem. It is the 
process by which inputs are transformed into outputs that presents the valuation, measurement 
and relational problems in providing an operational definition of productivity growth. In this 
thesis productivity growth is regarded as a long term concept and will be denoted by 'to At 
the macro level then, productivity growth should indicate the increase in wealth achieved by 
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a society in a particular period - if a society is able to produce more output from its fixed 
resources it will have become wealthier. At the level of the individual firm, the welfare of 
producers and consumers will be optimised when production is carried out as efficiently as 
possible - so that the fewest possible inputs are used to produce a given output. Having 
defined 't as an ideal measure of productivity growth , estimates of productivity growth will 
be evaluated against this benchmark; i.e., insofar as their theoretical design and empirical 
application do measure rising production efficiency. 
It has already been pointed out that productivity growth is best understood as a long run 
concept since it underlies a nation's long run growth and wealth. A simple distinction 
between the short run and long run should help emphasise the long term nature of the 
productivity concept as well as indicating the scope of the present thesis. A simple 
macroeconomiC aggregate demand and supply analysis is sufficient for this purpose. As 
Figure 1.1 (3) illustrates, short-run macroeconomics IS usually concerned with the gap 
between actual output (Y) and potential output (y'), where Y' indicates the economy's 
capacity for production and is normally taken as given. In general, most economists have 
devoted their attention to the short term gap between aggregate demand and long-run 
aggregate supply6. In contrast, the present thesis is concerned with those factors influencing 
Y. Figure 1.1 (b) helps illustrate that it is long-run supply side forces which underlie the 
expansion of an economy's capacity for production from Yo' to Y,·. It is argued in this thesis 
that these long term supply side determinants of productivity growth must be considered in 
6 This inLerest stems from a concern with the inherent short-run stahility or the economy and the hope that policy 
can be devised to dampen nUCLU31ions around the given potential output. 
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order to gain a better understanding of South Africa's current economic performance', 
p LRAS p LRAS LRAS' 
SRAS SRAS 
AD AD 
y y. y y. y* y 
(a) The Short Run (b) The Long Run 
Figure 1,1: Aggregate [Jemand-Supply Analysis and ,he Short-Run tong-Run Distinction 
1.5 Stmctul'e of the Thesis 
The thesis is broken down into six chapters. Chapter two derives estimates of productivity 
growth in manufacturing by adopting the conventional neoclassical approach. This method is 
applied for manufacturing as a whole and for individual industries. The role of resource 
reallocation is also considered. The rationale for such an approach is that the productivity 
performance of manufacturing as a whole needs to be understood in the light of the 
performance of individual industries and changes in the structure of the manufacturing sector. 
Chapter three considers the most appropriate way to interpret these productivity estimates, As 
such, this chapter takes a closer look at the "proximate sources" of output growth. In 
1 Of course Lhis simple depiction of a sharp distinction between the short-run and long-run is unrealistic. Many 
short-run influences will have long-term consequences, and a fuller trcatmc11l or South Africa's productivity growth 
performance should try to analyze these links. This analysis has not considered short-run links in the interest of 
keeping to a manageable area of enquiry and because economic theory provides us with little inSight into these links. 
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particular, it is emphasised that an adjustment needs to be made for the utilisation of factors 
since fuller utilisation should not be regarded as an improvement in production efficency. In 
this chapter it is also pointed out that the neoclassical model is fraught with other definitional 
and measurement problems which affect the interpretation of TFP growth measures. 
Chapter four is theoretical. Firstly, an assessment is made of the importance of theoretical and 
empirical problems involved in the neoclassical TFP measure. This assessment suggests that 
there is a need to question the usefulness of TFP measures as indicators of production 
efficiency. In the light of these issues some recent advances in the theory of economic growth 
and technical change are considered. In particular, Romer (1990) has developed a model 
which significantly enhances the neoclassical model by making technological change 
endogenous like other factors. In contrast, Scott (1989) argues that growth cannot be 
adequately analyzed by modifying the neoclassical model. In Scott ' s model investment is the 
key force driving growth and it cannot be separated from the process of technological change. 
Scott argues that what should be assessed is the "efficiency of investment". This chapter also 
considers some of the insights from the "evolutionary" theorists, Nelson and Winter (1982) 
and Lall" (1992), who emphasise the processes by which firms evolve and acquire the 
necessary technological capabilities for survival and growth. While little progress has been 
made in operationalizing these theories, they do highlight a multitude of factors that affect 
productivity growth. However, given such a multitude of factors, a cynic might despairingly 
conclude that "everything" determines productivity growth. While these sentiments are 
understandable, it is argued that it is possible to build up a coherent framework for assessing 
• Lall (1992) essentially extends and deepens Nelson and Winter's (1982) analysis into the developing country 
context. Also see Dosi et al. (1988) which provides a fairly comprehensive coverage of recent tneoretical 
developments, of an evolulionary nature, in the field of economic growth and technical change. 
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the key determinants of productivity growth from the insights of these recent theories. 
Chapter five then applies this framework to South African manufacturing. On the basis of 
this framework, various inferences are· made about the fundamental causes of the past 
productivity growth perfonnance of South African manufacturing. This framework also 
suggests the need to be sceptical of simplistic and general policy prescriptions given the 
complex nature of the processes by which production efficiency improvements are generated. 
Finally, chapter six summarises the essential findings of the thesis and reaches some overall 
conclusions. In addition to drawing some tentative policy inferences for improving South 
Africa's industrial productivity growth, a critical assessment is made of the policy 
prescriptions advanced by other economists in South Africa. 
Chapter 2 
The Productivity Growth Performance of South African Manufacturing 
2.1 M elhodology - Deril'illg Neoclassical Tolal F aclor rroduclivily (TF Pi Measures 
Typically the neoclassical sources·of-growth analysis has heen applied to measure productivity 
growth in South African manufacturing'. This analysi s suggests that a society"s welfare 
depends on the resources (capital, labour - skilled and un skilled, land and natural resources) 
it has at its disposaL as well as how productively it utilizes these resources. Thlls. growth 
accounting decomposes output growth into two sources: that attributable to the growth of 
factor inputs, and that attributable to 'Total Factor Produc tivit y' (TFP) growth. As such, one 
country grows faster (over time and/or relative to other countries) either beca use of an 
increase in the resources at its disposaL or because it uses them more productively: 
(2.1 ) 
This approach decomposes value added growth (G,.) into three "proximate sources" of growth: 
Capital growth (GK), labour growth (G,.J and residual TFP growth (G.".,,). The latter is 
typically labelled technological progress. Here, 0: is the elasticity of output with respect to 
capital, while B is the elasticity of output with respect tn lahour. Therefore, 0: indicates the 
impact on output of a unit increase in capitaL while 1.\ indicates the impact on output of a unit 
increase in labour. The production function underlying this specification usually assumes 
constant returns to scale2 and neutral tcchnoil'gica l progress'" TFP growth is derived as a 
, Moll (t990); Fouric (t97H): NPt (199(l). Rolli 01 al. 11')')2). .lolk 01 al. 119').1). 
2 ex. == av . K ; B == aV . L Since the simple IIcoL'lassil'al 1l1o(kl i1SSUI1l(',\ perfect t ompclilioll and raliollal 
dK \I (J[-V 
optimising behaviour, marginal products should ('qual 1:ll'lor relurn ... HClll"l' : (Y :; SK: U::::: SI \\here SK and S) arc 
respeclively U1C shares or lahour and capital ill output. 1Il'I ICe 5K + Sr. = I therefore a. + l\ = " liJercfOlC' n:: I ' · B. 
3 This follows from the assumption lilal a and B remiliu l'OIlSI<l l1 l 0\ l'r Ihe period or the analysis. 
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residual once the contribution of input growth to output growth has been accounted for: 
(2.2) 
Equation 2.1 can be rewritten as follows4 : 
(2.3) 
This alternative fonnulation decomposes labour product ivity into the contribution of capital 
deepening, that is, increases in the capital labour ratio. and a residual. In this formulation 
then, there are two "proximate sources" of labour productivity I,!rowth: the growth in the 
amount of capital per worker and the residual TFP grow th. 
2.2 The PI'oducti"ity CI'owth Pe,!ol'mal1ce {!( M{/I11~({/clll/'illg as a Whole 
The above fonnulation is applied to South African nHIIllIi'actliring. and the resultinl,! measures 
are shown in Table 2.1. It is clear from this tabl e th at Illcasured TFP growth contributed 
little to labour productivity growth in all periods and that its contribution was in fact negative 
in the period immediately after the war (1945-54) and in the most recent period (1981-90). 
The most alarming feature of these measu res is the labour productivity growth slowdown 
between 1974-8 I and 1981 -90 from 2.3 to 0 .2'(,- per annUlll. which is associated with a 
slowdown in both capital deepening and TFP growth twhich actually is negative in the 1981-
90 period) . These estimates appear reasonably l'Clnsistent with est imates by other authors'-
4 This folh~ws from: C!V =_ aUt< + ql. ~ n(!L + (i11 -1 ' 
.. Gv - 01. - atC'K - (' I. ) + (' lW 
.. GV/L :::: aG KIl . + 0.11'1> 
S Sec Appendix A for a compariso11 of estimates by different iltllhor". 
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Table 2.1: A I'erage Allllual Produclh-ily GrowlII ill Soulll ,\.fi"icall Mallll(aclu,.illg 1945 - 1990. (0/,) 
1945-54 1954-1>3 1963-7 4 197 4-81 1981 - 90 
(1) La bou r Productivity" 0.8 2 . 5 2 . 7 2.3 0 . 2 
(2) Ca p ital Deepen ing!' 2 . 0 1. 5 2 . 4 2 . 0 0.7 
(3 ) Total Factor Productivity -1 . 2 1.0 0 . 3 0 . 3 - 0.5 
(4 ) GHP/G VIL rl 40% 11% 13% 
Sources: 
For the p er i ods 1 945-1 4 Kok (1981); for the peri ods 1974-90 IDe Jt1i1nufacturlng da t a ba~le (January 
1 992). Kok's seri es are in constant 1970 prices and t he IDC series a re in constant 19QO prices. 
Notes: 
~ Growth In va l ue added per worker (G . j 
b The contr i b u tion of the growth In the c apital labo ur tCltlo to labour productivity g.!"owth CtGr 1l , 
" De rived as a residua l: Ro w (1) - ROI.;' (2) 
d This shows the contribution o f TFF growth to labo'H p od\l':t lvi': y grol.,rt h: Ro w(3) / Rol.,r(1) as a 'L 
The notes to Appendix D e laborate on " the method usad t.C ' dAr t·'l e ( I . 
A thorough assessment of the petfonnance of Sou(h African manufacturing requtres a 
comparative analysis of the performance of other countries. Tahle 2.2 provides a comparison 
over the periods 1960-73 and 1973-81 between Sou(h ,\frica and OECD countries. Clearly, 
South Africa 's labour productivity and TFP grow(h ra(es are It,wer than those of the OECD 
countries, in bo(h periods shown . This should come as no surpri se however, as it is fairly weli 
established by now that the major source of OU(put grow(h in industrialising countries, as 
opposed to developed countries, is the growth of factors. rather than productivity growth'. 
It appears from these estimates that South Africa experienced a similar TFP slowdown 
between the periods 1960-73 and 1973-8 I to these countries. but that South Africa' s labour 
productivity slowdown was milder'. While the OECD countries do comprise our major 
trading partners, thi s does not mean (hat they are the most suitable benchmark against which 
to compare South Africa 's produc(ivity growth perfllllllance. Ilowever, the OECD estimates 
'Sce Pack (19RR : :152). wllO 1I0tes that: 
"A major· difference between the LDCs and ncs Sel'11lS tn he that J!rowth in the former is 
largely accounted for by the accumulatiol1 of inputs ,""Ithft" 01<111 the growing efficienfY in 
their deplovrnenL" 
Sec Figure 2.1 , which provides some support ror tlli s gClll'nll fil1ti illg " 
, Similar comparative data for the 19ROs is 1101 avai)able for tile OECD. HOll e,"cr data frool OEC!) Outlook 
provides such data on productivity ror the whole hllSil1cs~ SCL" tor (l1ot just Illilllufat:luring). See Appcndix B which 
helps indicate that although mos.t economics did not improve their prodllL"th"jty perf'orn1Clllcc in Ihe 19ROs thcy did 
not experience funher productivity gf(w.'Ih deteriorations as appcars to hc the cast' ill South African mallufacturing. 
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are useful because they highlight the effect of international factors on the productivity growth 
performance of the advanced industrialised countries. Indeed, in the 1973-81 period the 
advanced industriali sed economies expe rienced a ma jor recession, with poor perfonnance 
being recorded in all spheres of ecoll(imic acti vit )' including productivity growth. This 
evidence clearly conflicts with conventional theory wh ich suggests that productivity growth 
(production efficiency improvements) performance is independent of macroeconomic 
performance. As such , it has remained a pu zzle as to why productivity growth (especially 
TFP) should have been so adversely affected in th is period of poor macroeconomic 
perfonnance. The productivity growth trends of the OECD countries are therefore relevant to 
understanding productivity trends in the South African manufacturing sec tor as South Africa 
was exposed to the same international macroeconomic disturbances in the 1970s. 
Table 2.2: Manuracturing Prnducth'ity Growth romparisoT1s : SOllth Afrira..."{ OEe» countries. 1960-1981 
1960-73 1973-81 Change 
Soulll Africa 
( 1 ) Labour Productivity 3 . 2 2.1 -l. 1 
( 2 ) Capital Deepening l.9 2 .0 0.1 
( 3 ) Total Factor Productivity 1.2 0.2 - l. 0 
OEC/) 
(1 ) Labour Productivity 5 . 9 3 . 3 - 2 . 5 
( 2) Capital Deepening 3 . 0 1. 5 -1. 4 
(3) Total Factor Productivity ~ . 9 l.B - l.1 
Japan 
9 . 9 4. 6 -5 . 3 (1) Labour Pro ductivity 
( 2 ) Capital Deepening ~). 7 2 . 7 -3 . 0 
( 3 ) Total Facto r Productiv ity 4 . 2 l.9 - 2.3 
United Siaies 3 . 8 2 . 1 -l.7 ( 1 ) Labour Productivity 2 . 7 1 .0 -l. 7 (2 ) Capital Deepening 1. ;2 1. 2 0.0 (3) Total Factor Productivity 
Notes and Sources: south Africa: as f or Table 2.1. OECll cou nt: ry ast'. l mates: from Abe rg (1982) in 
Lindbec k (1983: Tabl e 1 ) . Aberg uses c apital service~ rathpr t han capital stock (as used to 
derive the estimates for South Africa) t o determi ne thp g r o l<l t: h of the capital labour 1:atl0. Note 
the South African growth rates differ from TablE! 2 . 1 bi'l r~au~O tho:. p~riods differ s119htly. 
However, it is the perfonnance of countries at a similar stage of development, with similar 
attributes, in terms of size, resource endowments and demographic factors, which provide a 
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more relevant benchmark with which to assess the TFP performance of South African 
manufacturing". The East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) pose a clear source 
of international competition, while other developing countries. such as Argentina, India, Brazil 
and Mexico, exhibit some similar features to South Africa. Having said this. estimates of 
manufacturing TFP growth in many developing countries are often crude or non-existent'. 
Nevertheless, Page (1990) provides data on a broader cross-section of countries, since, in 
addition to data on the industrialised countries he also includes data for thirteen developing 
countries. Figure 2.1 shows this data which provides more comprehensive evidence with 
which to assess the performance of the South African manufacturing sector'". This figure 
shows the relative importance of TFP growth and Total Factor Input (TFI) growth in 
industrial output growth , and appears to support the observation that developing countries tend 
to rely more on input growth ("intensive growth") than on productivity growth as a generator 
of output growth. Hence, South Africa's modest TFP growth but quite rapid input growth, 
while no cause for congratulation, should not be regarded as particularly abnorl1lal given the 
fact that South Africa is essentially a developing coulltry. As such. Figure 2.1 indicates that 
South African manufacturing TFP growth. TFI growth and output growth is not markedly 
different from the industrial growth records of Mexico. Japan. Yugoslavia or India. However, 
8 See Mohr (1993) for a good discussion 01" which cOUlmies South Africa should he compared willl ami what can 
be learned from their expenences. 
'This can partly be attributable (0 the lack of rcliah!c capital stork Illeasures for many LDCs. Some estimates of 
TFP growth for earlier periods arc available al the CL'OllOIll\'-widc level for OJ selection of Latin America countries: 
see Elias (1978); Bruton (J967). However Havrylys)"n d9l)O) I)Oillts !o discrepancies in Bruton's and Elias's 
productivity growth measures for similar periods ill Argcntina aot t1H?U(,S tilat: 
"Ttie wide differences in the output growth rale and the shm'e of the residual. and even the 
inconsistency in the direction of change between nne period to the next. are also found for 
other countries and periods of the studies." tHan-,rt,rs,rn.199t1:7J 
Chenery (1983) and Chcncry and Syrquin (19R6) provide more rC(Clll estima!es, htl! again ol1ly at the e('ollomy ~wide 
level. Pack (1988:352) points !o other studies tilal have becn undertakell ['or i1ldividual COUll tries. 
10 This analysis is based on data asscmbled hy Nishimii'u and Page (llJX7) for industrial activities at the l\Vo~digil 
ISle level. The authors note Lhat the measurement methodologies arc rcasOlmhly comparable among ('oulllries, but 
thal the periods vary across countries, falling withiTllhe years"" 1956 to 1t)~ 2 . 
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Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey record much better growth in all three (TFP. TFI and 
output growth), while Argentina, Chile, Hungary and Egypt record better TFP growth, but 
worse TFI and output growth. Likewise South Africa outpelforJns the Philippines and Zambia 
(and India) in TFP growth , but records lower TFI and output growth. 
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period 19(,0-75. This period was chosen for its rehllivl.:ly clusL' l'Oll'C,"POT1llelll'L' III the periods llnaly."cd in other collnlri~s. 
However, the productivity growth estimates for total manufacturing do not tell the whole 
story. Rather, the productivity performance of manufacturing as a whole should be understood 
in the light of the productivity growth perfonnallce of individual industries (See Figure 2.2) . 
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Noles :md Snun:cs: See Appendix D. 
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2.3 The Productivity Growth Pe'!Qrmallce Withill Mmll!facfllrillg 
Figure 2.2 shows the productivity growth pelformance of four categories of industries within 
the manufacturing sector, distinguished according to capital intensity, for five sub-periods 
between 1945 and 1990. Industries were ranked in order of capital intensity" in 1990 and 
grouped into capital-intensive, intermediate-capital-intensive. labour-intensive and 
agriculturally-based industries. Although the dividing line between these groups is somewhat 
arbitrary, their ranking has remained fairly stable over time and the classification does provide 
a useful way of analysing the performance of different types of industries". 
This figure suggests that the intermediate capital - intensive and labour-intensive industries 
provide the most typical picture of productivity growth trends in manufacturing. Capital-
deepening was the dominant source of labour productivity growth for these categories of 
industries for the three periods between 1945 and 1974. While TFP growth was more 
significant in the 1963-74 period, it was even more significant in the period 1974-81, where 
it was virtually the only source of labour productivity growth. as capital-deepening was almost 
absent in this period. While capital-deepening did pick up a little in the 1981 -90 period, 
substantial declines in TFP, labour productivity and value added were experienced in these 
categories of industries. For the other industrial categories the picture is not as c\earcut. While 
the TFP growth performance of the agri<.:ulturally-based industries was poor in the 1945-54 
period, and recorded a lull in growth in the 1963-74 period. the other periods indicate a fairly 
steady TFP growth performance. The productivity growth performance of the capital-intensive 
industries however, indicates significant variations between periods. This significant variation 
11 See Appendix C. 
IZ Appendix D provides a more delailed pit:lurc. showing the pcrl"Ortlltllll,;C of individual industries. 
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across industrial categories makes generalisations from aggregate manufacturing productivity 
measures misleading as to the productivity perfollllunce within manufacturing. 
Within industry categories (see Append'ix 0) there are sume notable exceptions to general 
trends of these categories just as there are important differences between the perfomlunce of 
industry categories and manufacturing as a whole (see Figure 2.2 and Appendix D). For 
example, in the period 1945-54, the relatively poor performance of industrial chemicals 
(which recorded a TFP dec line of 1.3 percent per annum) and non-ferrous metals (TFP 
decline of 2.4 percent per annum) masked the relatively good perfollnance of iron and steel 
(TFP growth of 4.4 percent per annum) . Another notable feature of this period is the 
exceptionally poor TFP performance of Motor Vehicles (TFP decline of 3.R percent per 
annum) and Electrical Machinery (TFP decline of 5.3 percent per annum) which is largely 
responsible for the poor TFP performance for the intermediate capital-intensive category as 
a whole. By contrast, the TFP performance of manufacturing as a whole in the 1954-63 period 
does provide a good summary of the pelformance of individual industries and categories of 
industries, with the notable exception of motor vehicles which continued to regi ster poor TFP 
perfollnance (declining by 2.7 percent per annum). lIowever. in both the 1963-74 period and 
the 1974-81 period the intermediate capital-intensive and labour-intensive categories of 
industries, and most of the industries within them. recorded much better TFP perfollnance 
than is indicated by the TFP growth measure for manufacturing as a whole in these periods. 
This is largely due to the poor perfOll11anCe of the capital-intensive category in both periods. 
However, the individual industries responsible for the poor pelfonnance of this category as 
a whole differ markedly. In the 1963-74 period, even though industrial chemicals recorded 
a good TFP growth performance of 3.5 percent per annum, this was overshadowed by the 
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poor performance of both iron and steel and non-ferrous metals. which recorded a TFP 
decline of 2.7 and 3.0 percent per annum respectively. However, these trends were reversed 
in the 1974-81 period with industrial chemicals experiencing a massive TFP decl ine of 12.1 
percent per an num, which offset the impressive TFP growth performance of iron and steel and 
non-ferrous metals of 5.3 and 5.5 percent per annU111 respectively. In the most recent period 
(1981 -90) however, the TFP growth measure for manufacturing as a whole does not show the 
extent of the poor TFP petformance of almost all industries in the intermediate capital-
intensive and labour-intensive categories, as the capital - intensive industries all recorded 
relatively good TFP growth. The deterioration in the productivity growth performance in this 
period is most alarming in its extent (with both labour productivity and TFP growth slowing 
down considerably from the 1974-81 period) given the pe.rvasiveness of this deterioration 
across industries outside of the capital-intens ive industry category. 
Data availability limits an analysis of South Africa's comparative performance within 
manufacturing. Nevertheless, Nishimizu alld Robinson (19R4) provide a useful disaggregated 
study of TFP growth within manufacturing for Korea. Turkey, Yugoslavia and Japan, while 
Ahluwahlia (1985) has undertaken a similar stud y for India . Using these measures, Table 2.3 
presents bilateral comparisons of the productivity measures of each country with those of 
South Africa, for the period analyzed in each coulltry". This table shows similar trends to 
those in Figure 2.1 for manufacturing as a whole but ill addition emphasises the comparative 
performance of individual industries. 
1] Note that il has 110t always been possi hle 10 derivl' ~sti lllaic s ror SOUlll AfriL'a lhal match tile period for which 
lhc forcjg~ ~ou~llry cSlimalc~ rclat~ . Sec notes to Ta~l~ 23 for dad I)' 0.1' iI~\I~ill periods CSli!l~atcd and methods used. 
Cornparabll lly IS a problem III so lar as the prodUCtlVII)' measure" for I11dl\,ldual South AlncHn industries are quite 
sensitive to the chOIce of pcriod. Bilateral comparisons arc made ill an allcmpl [0 reduce tllC severity oj" this problclll. 
23 
Table 2.3: Manufacturillg TFP growlh comparisons: SOli/it Africa and other industrialising countries. 
Food Processing 
Beverages 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Footwear 
Wood products 
Furniture 
Paper 
Print & Publish 
Leather 
Rubber 
Chemi cals 
Petroleum 
Non- metallic mlns 
Basic metal 
Metal products 
NonElectric mach 
Electrical mach 
Tran sport equip 
Miscellaneous 
1960 80" 
India SA 
-3 .6 
-3.1 
-3.6 
1.0 
0.7 
-3.0 
2.1 
0.1 
0.5 
-2.4 
- 5.5 
-1. 3 
-5.6 
-1.2 
-0 . 9 
-2.2 
-1.1 
-0 .2 
0.1 
-4.9 
1.0 
-0.1 
0.4 
2.2 
2.7 
1.3 
3.0 
2.1 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 
0.7 
-1. 3 
loB 
- 0.6 
0.9 
1.2 
2 . 3 
0.0 
-0.7 
Tot Manufacturing -0.6 0.7 
1960 77 ' 
Korea SA 
5.3 
4.5 
1.6 
5 .6 
4.9 
4. 5 
2.B 
5.9 
4.5 
0. 7 
1.9 
6.0 
5 . 7 
7.2 
5.1 
3.7 
O.B 
-1.2 
1.2 
0. 4 
1.3 
0.5 
1.7 
1.0 
0.7 
1. 0 
-0.1 
0.2 
2.1 
1.7 
-1. 9 
1.3 
1.1 
2.9 
-0.2 
0.6 
1 963-76 
Tu rkey SA 
1.9 
1.4 
2.7 
-1.2 
3.2 
1.4 
-1. a 
5.B 
1.6 
0.4 
0.9 
1.5 
1.3 
I.B 
3.3 
1.3 
-0 .2 
- 1.1 
0.0 
0. 4 
1.4 
-0 . 7 
1.4 
0.6 
- 0.3 
O.B 
- 1.0 
-1.4 
1 . 1 
1.1 
-2.9 
0 .7 
0.7 
2 .B 
- 0 .2 
0. 0 
1965-18<1 
Yugoslavi a SA 
- 0 .6 
-1. 7 
-0.2 
-0.6 
0.1 
-0.1 
2.3 
0 . 1 
0.2 
1. 7 
-0.6 
-0.6 
-0.3 
0. 5 
O.B 
- 2.5 
- 1. 3 
O.B 
1.4 
0.0 
1.4 
0 .6 
0.7 
0.7 
-0.8 
-0 .5 
0.9 
1.0 
- 1. 9 
0.5 
1.0 
2.3 
-0.1 
0 .2 
1955 13 
Ja?an SA 
,£.2 
1.7 
1.9 
1.1 
-0.1 
1.6 
0.9 
- 1.2 
L.5 
- 0 .4 
1.0 
O.B 
~ .1 
4. 4 
2.5 
:;: .0 
1.5 
- 0.3 
3.0 
2.4 
O.B 
0.3 
0.7 
0.3 
2.1 
2.3 
-1.1 
0.1 
3.4 
2.4 
- 0.6 
2.0 
1.7 
3.1 
-1. 6 
1.4 
Sources: For Korea, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Japan estimates are draloln from Nl s himizu and Robinson 
(1984) and for India from Ahluwahlia (1 985 ). All these estimates (e:{cept for South Africa) are 
also presented in Bruton (1989 ) . For South Afrir.a see no tp.~ to Table 1 and Appendix O. 
Notes: since t he south African data series in Kok (1981) o nly go u p to 1975 it was i mpos s ibl e to 
estImate TFP for periods that precisely matched t h e pp.riods us",rl 1n oth er countr ies. Hence: 
/I For the per i od 1960-80 TFF growth rates '''ere dgri v e>d [rom Kok. for 1960- 75, while TfF grOl"th 
from 1975-80 wa s derived from the IDC data. The TFF gl'o wth rat€' shown is the equivalent constant 
exponential growth rate per annum for the wholp. peri n d . 
h The peri o d 1960-75 was used for Sout h Afrir.a. The ppt10d lQ6 J - 75 '''as u sed for SOIlth Africa. 
d The p eriod 1965-75 was used for South Africa. 
For South Africa i ndustry categories are as 1n Append! ;.: D e:·:cE>pl. for: Chemicals which comprises 
(12) Industrial Chemicals and (13) other Chemic<tls; Non me t alJ i e minerals which coml'rises (l6) 
Pottery, Chi na and Earthenware, (17) Glass and Glas~ Pr;0d uct!" and (18) Other non metal.l ic mineral 
products; Basic Metals comprisQs (19 ) Iron and S teel cHId (20) Non Ferrous metals. 
In comparison to India, South Africa recorded positi ve and significantly superior productivity 
growth perfonnance in virtually every industry in the period I 960-R0I4. Although the TFP 
growth perfonnance of South African manufacturing. as a whole, is slightly worse than 
Yugoslavia, most industries in fact performed substantially better than in Yugoslavia. The 
exceptions were: basic metal s, where South Africa recorded poor TFP growth: and mbber, 
where Yugoslavia's TFP measure was particularly good. However, compared to Korea, South 
Africa's 1FP growth perfonnance is very poor for manufacturing as a whole, as well as for 
virtually all industries. Compared to Turkey and Japan though, while South Africa's total 
14 See the note to Table 23 concemillg the metllOd used 10 eSli mate TFP growth ill Soulh Arrica for tIle whole 
period 1960-80. 
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manufacturing performance is relatively poor, at the industry level some industries 
outperformed or achieved similar TFP growth, to those in Turkey and Japan, while the 
performance of many other industries was not substantiall y worse than in Turkey and Japan. 
For the agriculturally-based industries of food. beverages and tobacco, for which comparisons 
can be made, South Africa ' s TFP measures were nOI lI1uch worse than other countries with 
the exception of Korea. For most of the labour-intensive industries South Africa ' s TFP 
performance was reasonably good. In textiles and apparel. South Africa's TFP growth 
measures were as good as. if not beller than recorded in India. Yugoslavia and Japan, and not 
significantly worse than measures in Turkey and Korea. Similarly for wood, South Africa's 
TFP measures compare favourably with almost all countries. with the exception of Korea. The 
same is true for metal products and electrical machinery. However, the relative TFP 
performance of the South African basic metals industry was very poor in comparison to all 
countries shown, except for India where it recorded slightly better performance. In contrast 
the performance of the other capital-intensive industry, chemicals, appears to have performed 
relatively favourably in comparison with these countries''. 
In sum then, available international evidence sugges ts that, for manufacturing as a whole, 
South Africa's TFP performance has been relatively poor. However, this international 
evidence does not support such a conclusion for individual industries within manufacturing. 
Some South African industries have recorded relatively good TFP growth in comparison to 
other countries, while the TFP performance of other industries has been comparatively very 
IS An anomaly here is the perrormance of Soulh Afri ca's chemiL'als industry compared with India. A closeT look 
at Appendix D (period 1974-81) above SllOUld c1ariry Ihal chcmic ils as a whole did pcrroml well during most of the 
periods prior to 1975. In the period I Q74-RI however. the TFP pcr f'nnn.mcc or tile 1I1dustriul chemical" industry on 
Its own deteriorated substantially. recording a TFP decline of' 12.1 cft. per i\1I11111l1. 
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poor. A more definitive assessment of the TFP growth performance of South African 
manufacturing is limited by the availability of pertinent international comparisons. The 
evidence considered in Table 2.3 only relates to a single period for each country with which 
South Africa is compared. This prevents 'an analysi s of how South Africa 's comparative TFP 
perfonnance has changed over time and makes it hard to assess the significance of the poor 
absolute TFP growth performance in 19R 1-90 period, 
2.4. Measuring the Role of S/mcturai Change 
An empirical estimate of the importance of resource reallocation can be determined by 
weighting the productivity growth rates of individual industries according to their shares in 
total manufacturing value added, summing these weighted TFP measures across industries and 
comparing them with the TFP growth for total manufacturing"'. The total reallocation effect 
(TRE) thus measures the difference (residual) between total TFP growth and the weighted 
average of the TFP growth rates of individual industries: 
TFP, = L TFP; w; + TREA (2.4) 
Therefore: (2.5) 
where the weight, w; is the share of value added of industry i in total manufacturing value 
added 17. 
Hence, TREA will show the total gains/losses resulting from the reallocation of resources 
between industries with different levels of productivity. As equation 2.4 shows, TFP, can be 
" See Syrquin ( 1984) ror a more detailed descriplion or the procedure , 
17 Sec Appendix E. wl1crc the OUlput (and emplo)'tllellt) shares or individual industries and groups of industries 
arc presented. These shares arc calculated as the cllmulnli\'(' average over Iht~ rc spcl.:livc period (ie; w. = rrv /LVJ. 
This Appendix al~() helps 10 show Wllich industries and industrial groups have heclI expanding and which ha~e been 
contracLmg over lime. 
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decomposed into ' pure' productivity growth generated from increased efficiency within an 
industry (L TFP; Wi) and productivity growth generated from the reallocation of resources 
between industries (TRE). Hence, a positive TRE indicates the productivity gain , that have 
arisen from the process of resource reallocation where high productivity industries expand and 
low productivity industries contract. These reallocation effects can be further decomposed 
into the contribution of the reallocation between industries in a given group and the 
reallocation between groups, classified according to capital intensity, as follows: 
TREA = LTREj + TREII 
where j = 1 to 4, and refers to the four groupings of industries according to capital intensity. 
Hence, TREII will show the total gains/losses resulting from the reallocation of resources 
between high and low level productivity industry categories. 
Table 2.4 provides an indicator of the extent to which the reallocation of resources 
contributed to TFP growth in various periods. The only significant differences between 
productivity growth within industries (LTFP;) and aggregate TFP for manufacturing as a 
whole occurred in the 1945-54 period, and to a limited extent in the 1963-74 and 1974-81 
periods. In the 1945-54 period, the gains from reallocating resources meant that the sum of 
productivity growth within industries was worse (- 1.7% per annum) than the actual TFP 
l' This follows from: 
TFP, ~ TRE" + t ll(TREj) \V) + 
~ TRE" + L W j I (TREjll + 
SubslilUting in equation 6 gives: 
l: TFPi) "" ,tl ,.1 
L TFP, .,1 
L TFP, w, + TREA ~ TRE" + L \V j TREj + L TFP, "', 
Therefore TREA ~ TRE" + L w, TRE, 
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measure for total manufacturing (-1.2% per annum). The fact that the TRER of 0.5% per 
annum is approximately equal to TREA means that most of this resource reallocation was 
between industry categories rather than between industries within these categories". In the 
1974-81 period, there were some small gains from resource reallocation , since the weighted 
sum of individual industry 's TFP growth was lower ((l.1 '7r per annum) than indicated by the 
TFP measure for total manufacturing (0.3% per annum). However, in this case, the almost 
zero TRE" indicates that most of the reallocation affec t was due to the movement of resources 
among industries within their categories. In contrast. the effect of resource reallocation in the 
1963-74 period was to reduce the TFP growth measures for manufacturing as a whole by 
0 .2% per annum. Most of this resource reallocation was between industrial categories rather 
than within them. 
Table 2.4: Tile Role oj Stl'uctural Cllallge ill TI'P GI'owtll ill Soutll A.fi'ieall Mallujactul'illg 1945-1990. (%) 
Total Factor Productivity" 
LTFP 1Wl 
h 
Total Reallocation 
LTRE ,wj , 
Total Reallocation 
Sources: 
See Table 2.l. 
Notes: 
Effect 
Effect 
(TRE. ) , 
(TRE,,)f' 
r-:rfi? Growth for manufacturing as a \oIhole. 
1945-54 19 .5 4-63 1963-74 1974-81 1981-90 
-1. 20 0.97 0.28 0.31 -0.50 
- 1.73 0.92 0.50 0.08 -0.56 
0.53 0.05 - 0.22 0 .24 0.06 
0 . 03 0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.04 
0.50 -0 . 02 0 .16 0.04 0.02 
b The sum of TF'P growth rates of individual industrie:=:. where each industry (i) 1s 't!eighted by 
its value added share in total manufacturing during that period (see Appe ndix E for shares) . 
C TRE" Is derived as the difference between TFF' growt.h fO I manufact uring as a whole and the 
weighted sum of the TFP growth rates of individual indllsttlc>s: Pow (1) - Row (2). 
d The sum of TRE growth rates of individual IndustriE>$ within an i ndus t ry category, where each 
industry category (j) is weighted by its value added s hare 1n total manufacturing . 
.. TREJl is derived as the difference between TRE ..  gro wth for: manufacturing as a whole and the 
weighted sum of the TRE growth rates of industry catego ries; Ro w (3) - Row (4). 
I' See Appendix E, which shows lhat inthc 1945-54 period the capil:ll-i1l1cllsivc and intcrmcdiatc capital-intcnsivc 
categories. increa,ed t1lCir share in tolal manufacturing value atllit't1 bel ween Ihe periods 1945·54 and 1')54·6) at Ihc 
expense of thc labour-intensive and agricuJturally-hascd categories. This SUpp0rlS 1he notiollthat in general the morc 
capilal-intensive industrics arc likely to be 1hc highcr productivity industries. 
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It appears from these estimates that structural change within manufacturing has not had a 
significant influence on TFP growth. This appears surprising given the importance economists, 
such as Chenery (1983) and Syrquin (1984), have attached to structural change in the growth 
process. However, theory and evidence · does suggest that the biggest gains from resource 
reallocation lie in the movement of resources between major sectors (particularly from 
agriculture to manufacturing and/or services) rather than from resource reallocations within 
such sectors. It should also be pointed out that TRE is not a perfect measure of resource 
reallocation. In the first case, the TRE analysis assumes input homogeneity across industries, 
so in fact TRE may be partly capturing differences in returns to capital and labour across 
industries because factors are more productive in some industries as opposed to others and 
not because of disequilibrium. Secondly, TRE is essentially a static and partial measure. 
Hence, there is no scope for considering the dynamic effects of resource reallocation. In this 
respect it is quite possible that resource shifts may in fact facilitate or trigger higher 
productivity growth, and that at the same time these resource shifts may not be possible 
without higher investment and income growth rates. 
2.5 SUllllllmy 
For manufacturing as a whole, the clearest trends that emerge are that while total factor 
productivity growth was fairly steady over the three sub-periods from 1954-81, a substantial 
TFP and labour productivity growth decline was experienced between 1974-81 and 1981-90. 
The extent of this recent slowdown and its pervasiveness across industries outside of the 
capital intensive category, is a striking feature of the productivity growth performance of 
South African manufacturing. In 1110st industries it has been accompanied by an absolute 
decline in output, value added and employment. while the growth of capital stock slowed 
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considerably (to 1.1 % per annum in the 1981-90 period for manufacturing as a whole in 
comparison to the 8.1 % per annum growth in the 1974-8 1 period). 
However, before an adequate interpretation of these measures can be made, differences across 
industries, over time, and in comparison with other countries need consideration. 
The intermediate capital-intensive and labour-intensive industries provide the most typical 
picture of productivity growth trends in manufacturing. In these groups capital-deepening was 
the dominant source of labour productivity growth for the three periods between 1945 and 
1974. While TFP growth was more significant in the 1963-74 period, it was even more 
significant in the period 1974-81, where it was virtually the only source of labour productivity 
growth, as capital -deepening was almost absent in this period. While capital-deepening did 
pick up a bit in the 1981 -90 period, substantial declines in TFP, labour productivity and value 
added were experienced in these categories of industries. For the other industrial categories 
the picture is not as clearcut. While the TFP growth rerfonnance of the agriculturally-based 
industries was poor in the 1945-54 period, and recorded a lull in growth in the 1963-74 
period, the other periods indicate a fairly steady TFP growth pelformance. The productivity 
growth performance of the capital-intensive industries indicate significant variations between 
periods. This significant variation across industrial categories makes generalisations from 
aggregate manufacturing productivity measures of the productivity performance within 
manufacturing misleading. For example, the extremely poor TFP measure for industrial 
chemicals in the 1974-81 period disguises the significant TFP growth improvements of other 
capital-intensive industries, the agriculturally-based industries and many of the intermediate-
capital-intensive and labour-intensive industries. Similarly, in the most recent period of 1981-
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90, the aggregate TFP growth measure for total manufacturing does not show the extent of 
the poor TFP perfomlance of almost all industries in the intennediate capital-intensive and 
labour-intensive categories since the capital-intensive industries recorded relatively good TFP 
growth. The reallocation of resources between high and low productivity industries does not 
appear to have played an important role in the growth process except in the earlier period 
1945-54. 
Available international evidence suggests that. for manufacturing as a whole, South Africa's 
TFP performance has been relatively poor. However, this international evidence does not 
support such a conclusion for individual industries within manufacturing. Some South 
African industries have recorded relatively good TFP growth in comparison to other countries, 
while the TFP perfol1nance of other industries have been comparatively very poor. This 
variation across industries in comparative productivity growth performance suggests the need 
for care in attributing too much importance to those factors that have an economy wide effect 
on productivity growth. In other words it appears that industry specific factors have been 
important determinants of productivity growth within manufacturing. It should be emphasised 
though, that a more definitive assessment of the TFP growth performance of South African 
manufacturing is limited by the availabi lity of pertinent international comparison,. 
Having evaluated the TFP growth record of South African manufacturing it is necessary to 
consider what these TFP measures actually indicate. This is important for facilitating an 
evaluation of the long term growth prospects of South African manufacturing. 
Chapter 3 
Interpreting Neoclassical TFP Growth Measures 
3.1 Illtroduction : A closer look at the "Proximate Sources" of Crowth 
Having evaluated the TFP growth record of South African manufacturing it is necessary to 
consider how these TFP measures should be interpreted. In essence. the last chapter 
considered the "proximate sources" of labour producti vity growth. over time. across industries 
and in comparison with other countries. This chapter looks at these proximate sources more 
closely and argues that various adjustments need to be made to the measures before they can 
be usefully interpreted as indicating production efficiency trends. 
[n theory. productivity growth should record the process whereby resources are combined in 
increasingly more effective ways. The crucial question is how well this TFP residual records 
such a process? [n order to answer this question it is necessa ry to consider the many 
analytical problems that emerge when an attempt is made to measure (or value) inputs and 
relate them to output measures. Consider the functional form assumed by the neoclassical 
model l • as shown above by equation 2.2 (Gil']' = Gv - la.GK - I.IGt.J). The magnitude and 
nature of the residual growth (Gm .) will depend upon: 
(i) The production function governing the relationship between the inputs and output. 
(ii) The importance of variables omitted from the production function. 
(iii) The proper measurement of output. including adjustments for changes in its quality. 
(iv) The way labour and capital lire measured. and the extent to which adjusnnents are 
made for changes in their quality and degree of utilization . 
J This scclion draws upon Nmiiri (1 <J70) who provides a SIICdlll'1 discussion of tile main theoretical aspects of the 
conventional neoclassical model. Sec also Maddison (1lJX7). 
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Hence, if the assumed functional form relating inputs to output is mis-specified the resulting 
errors will be captured by the TFP measure. Likewise TFP growth will record any errors that 
arise in measurement of the inputs capital and labour. 
Many economists2 have tried to "squeeze down" the residual, by making more precise 
measures of the inputs, capital and labour, in order to "explain" more of output growth. This 
is regarded as providing a better indicator of the "proximate sources" of growth, and implies 
that the remaining "unexplained" residual is much smaller. Broadly, most of these 
adjustments are for changes in the utilisation and quality of the factors. The purpose of this 
chapter is to understand changes in production efficiency, hence, only adjustments for 
utilisation changes will be made in arriving at better indicators of the "proximate sources" of 
growth. However, in chapter five an assessment will be made of the qualitative changes to 
these inputs, but these will be regarded as part of TFP growth itself, since they provide a 
more direct indicator of the "underlying sources" of growth. To the extent that quantitative 
adjustments are possible for qualitative changes to the inputs this will mean that not all of 
TFP growth will be an "unexplained" residual. The distinction between utilisation adjustments 
and qualitative adjustments to the inputs is conceptually useful , since qualitative 
improvements to the factors of production are an important source of improved production 
efficiency, while fuller utilisation is not. Hence, the impact of qualitative changes to the 
factors will serve as a useful starting point when an attempt is made to understand the 
fundamental causes of production efficiency changes. 
l See Denison, E (1984) and Jorgenson, D (198~); allli ror Smul, Mrie". Diieket alll! Fouric (t978) . 
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In practical terms, since individual factors vary considerably in tenns of utilisation and 
quality, aggregating them into one factor index is a significant problem, not only in respect 
of capital: 
"Most of the controversy on aggregation has emerged from the problem 
of aggregating the different types of capital goods; however, the issues lire 
equally applicable to the aggregation of heterogenous units of labour and 
output." (Nadiri, 1970 : 144) 
Partly, this problem is due to the difference between stocks and flows. Usually it is stocks of 
inputs that are aggregated. The problem of valuing heterogeneous units of labour and capital 
to fonn aggregate stocks is that their tme value really depends on the present and future flows 
of services, provided by these stocks, that generate output'. It would be preferable to measure 
the flow of capital and labour services as it is these which really enter the production 
function. However, it is particularly difficult to value the services provided (the work actually 
done) by labour or capital independently of the provider of the services (the machine or 
employee doing the work). This would not be a problem if the value of stocks was closely 
related to the value of the flow of services from these stocks. However, often they are not. 
3.2 Assessing the Impact oj Changes in Capacity Utilisation on Reco,.ded TFP G,.owth 
If there have been no changes in the quality of capital and labour, and no factors have been 
omitted from the production function. then the residual will be solely comprised of changes 
in the degree of utilisation of capital and labour: 
(3.1 ) 
where MK and ML denote the utilisation changes of capital and labour respectively. 
J The asset ' s true value is really the present value 01" the flow oj" services il ge11erates in its economic lifetime. 
which may be very different from what it costs. 
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It is difficult to conceive of a sudden deterioration in the quality of inputs, given rising 
educational levels and the nature of technological change, Hence, a deterioration in TFP 
growth in the short run seems more adequately explained by a slowdown in the utilisation of 
factors, as factors are 'sticky' downwards in the short run" 
There are important short run relations between output growth and the productivity measures, 
as Bernt (1984 : 325) points out: 
"One of the most robust findings of empirical analysis is that both labour 
and multi factor productivity growth tend to be procyclical. As the 
economy reaches peak performance and full capacity, labour and 
multiractor productivity growth all grow at ,'elatively rapid g,'owth rates, 
whereas when the economy experiences a recession productivity growth 
tends to decline," 
Bernt (1984) argues that the most compelling reason for this is that in the short run stocks 
of capital and labour (especially skilled labour) are to some extent fixed and not 
instantaneously adjustable, Hence, when rapid output growth occurs, measured productivity 
growth improves as capacity slack is reduced. Similarly, when output growth is sluggish, 
measured productivity growth will decline because of excess capacity, [n response to business 
cycle influences, the flows of capital and labour services adjust much more quickly than the 
stocks of capital and labour, so that shon run TFP measures will be biased'. Given that the 
periods analyzed in chapter two are fairly short, the actual productivity measures may be 
recording trends in capacity utilisation in periods when output growth fluctuates substantially, 
• See Bruton (1967) who argues that most or the growt h or TFP (the residual ) during the period 1945 ·~.1 ror 5 Latin 
American Countries was due 10 chaT1ges in the ulili~:lIiol1 rates or the factors so 111al 'pure productivity' growth 
appeared to be almost zero. 
S Hence, poor short run TFP growth measures arc more likely to rellcel the u1ldesirable consequence that a busincss 
slowdown nas on exccss capacity, rather thall indicatil1g i.I dccline in production efficiency. 
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Since the aim of productivity analysis is to assess the efficiency of firms and industries, these 
short run cyclical variations in capacity utilisation clearly undermine the usefulness of the 
above productivity measures. Comparing growth patterns between peaks, when capacity 
utilisation rates are perceived as being high, is supposed to reduce the role of cycl ical effects. 
This method of attempting to draw out long term productivity growth trends is dependent on 
the assumption that all peaks represent equal rates of recovery to full capacity. Unfortunately, 
this assumption may be extremely questionable in certain periods. 
One way to assess the importance of capacity utilisation is to examine the short term relation 
between output growth and TFP growth. For this purpose regression analysis was used with 
TFP growth being specified as the dependent variable and value added growth as the 
independent variable'. Since the regression was run across the 26 industries within 
manufacturing the null hypothesis is that there should be no relationship between value added 
growth and TFP growth - ie: if a particular industry experienced above average value added 
growth, a priori there should be no reason to expect this industry to either record better TFP 
growth or worse TFP growth. Table 3.1 presents these regression results which show clear 
evidence of a highly significant positive relation between the variation in output (value added) 
growth and the variation in TFP growth across industries for virtually every single short run 
period analysed'. However, the strength and significance of this relationship is much greater 
in more recent periods. In this respect, for example, in the 19R 1-90 period for all industries, 
regression analysis suggests that 76% (R') of the variation in TFP growth across industries 
, While the neoclassical model does spcciry 1ha1 output growth is dependent (111 TFP growth, the lat1 C'T is assumed 
to occur exogenously am~ lt~C. rcl.atiollshlp i:~ css~nl~ally tl long tCflll olle wil.'l technology .havi~g a par~me\t:i~ cfrect 
on output. Short term vanablhly IT1 the relationship IS more adequatcly explamed by vaTiallons In capacl1Y utIlisation. 
7 The only short term period where Ihis positive relationship is Ilot significant is the 1945-54 pcriod for thc labour-
intensive and intennediatc capital-intensive industries. 
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can be explained by variations 10 value-added growth across industries, and the t-statistic 
indicates that the null hypothesis of no relationship between TFP growth and value-added 
growth can be rejected with a 99.9% level of confidence (ie: at the 0.1'" level of 
significance). Furthennore, this regression equation suggests that if industry X experienced 
a I % faster growth in value-added per annulll than industry Y in the 1981 -90 period then 
industry X will have experienced a 0.66% faster growth in TFP per annulll than industry Y. 
In contrast, the relationship in the 1963-74 period is less significant (the t-stat indicates that 
the null hypothesis can only be rejected at the 99% level of confidence), but more importantly 
it is not as strong. The R2 value of 0.21 suggests that variations in value-added growth across 
industries can only explain 21 % of the variation in TFP growth across industries. 
Furthennore, this regression analysis suggests that for a I % difference in annual value-added 
growth between industries their annual growth in TFP will only differ by 0.22%. 
Hence, although the relationship appears significant in all short tenn periods its much greater 
strength in the two most recent periods suggests that variations in capacity utilisation had a 
much greater effect on recorded TFP growth in these periods than in earlier periods. To some 
extent then, the 'peak' to 'peak' method of calculating growth rates may have provided an 
adequate compensation for the effect of capacity utilisation in periods prior to 1974, but not 
for the two most recent periods". 
Also shown in Table 3.1 are the regression results of the more direct relationship between 
official capacity utilisation measures and TFP growth. However, there are two prohlems with 
S However, sec below where adjusting TFP growth measures rOT capacit y utilisalion improves tl1cm in the 1981-90 
period. but actually slightly worsens them in the 1974-RI period. This anomaly is explamed below. 
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this data. Firstly, the nature of these capacity utilisation measures appears fairly subjective. 
Table 3.1: The regressiol! oj TFP growth Ol! Va lue Added growth al!d Capacity-Utilisation 
Year All Industries Labour-Intensive & 
Capital-Intensive 
S hort Term Periods 
1945-54 Gnp 
-
-4. 19 + O . 31G~, R"= 0.16 G " = -3 . 64 + O.23G" ( 2 . 12) .. (1. 42) 
1954-63 Gnp = 0.08 + O.14Gv R'= 0.19 G . - 0 .14 + 0. 14 G .. (2 . 38) .. (2.19) .. 
1963-74 Gnp 
-
- 1. 39 + 0 . 22G , R' - 0.21 G. , ' 
-
-0 . 97 + 0 . 20G .. 
(2.53) ... (2.52) .. 
1974-81 Gnp 
-
-2.35 + 0.81G., R'- 0.23 G· -2 .38 + O. 99Gv (2.65) . .. (6.21) .... 
1981-90 GTFP 
-
-0.68 + 0 .66Gy R' - 0 .7 6 G .". - 0.14 + O.67G\. 
(8.76) .... (9.18) .... 
Medium and Long Term Peri ods 
1945~60 G rFP = -1.91 + O.13Gv R'- 0 . 07 G" l' -1. 72 + O. 09G\, (1. 30) (0.86) 
1955-73 GTFP - 0.35 + 0.12G" R' - 0.09 G · 0.09 + o . 16G •. (1. 57 ) (1. 90)' 
1945-75 Gnp 
-
-0.4 4 + O.04Gv R'= 0 . 02 G. , ;. -0 . 34 + O. 04GI' 
( 0 . 63) (0 .44 ) 
1972-90 GTfP 
-
- 1. 06 + O. 56Gv R' - 0. 4 5 G . . , = -1 . 09 + O.67G,. (4.41) .... (6 . 08) .... 
Using Capacity Utilisation as the independent/explanato ry variable 
197 4-81 GTF, -= 21.16 - 0.23 cu (1.00) 
198 1 - 90 Gnp - -22.3 4 + 0.25 CU 
( 2 .4 3)'" 
1972-90 GTFP - 13.03 + 0.16 CU (1. 78 )' 
Sou r ce: Oata from Table 1.3 . 
R'· 0 . 04 G .. • = -4.09 + 0.07 CU 
(0.39) 
R 7~ 0.20 G' l r z - 19.50 + 0.21 CU (2.03) . 
- -16.60 + 0.20 CU 
(2.71) .. 
Intennediate 
Indust r ies 
R7= 0.10 
R' : 0.21 
R'- 0 . 26 
R'- 0.68 
R'- 0.82 
R'-- 0 .04 
R2= 0 . 17 
R)= 0 . 01 
RJ= 0 .6 7 
R 7,.. 0 . 0 1 
R2_ 0 .1 9 
Note: These regress ion results show the relationship between TFF' growth and Value Added Growth 
and the relat i onship between TFP growth and the averag E'! Capat;ity Ut.ilisation rate for the period 
across industries. The t-s tat istics for the coefficient s of the independent va r iablen are shown 
in parenthesis below these coeff ic ients, and where sig ni ficant are indicated by ast"risks: 
Level of Sign i ficance: . 90\, .. 95 %, ... 99\, .... 99.9'. 
Secondly, the measures are only avai lable from IlJ72 onwards', Generally the regression 
results of the re lationship between average capac ity utili sa ti on and TFP growth do support the 
findings of the other regress ion analysis. but the evidence is much weaker and less significant. 
9 Fortunately, it is the periods since 1974 that capad ty utilisation seems 10 have had its greates t crrccl. 
38 
One important difference however, is the fact that there is no significant relationship between 
average capacity utilisation and TFP growth (the relationship is actually negative) in the 1974-
81 period even though the relationship between value-added growth and TFP growth across 
industries was fairly strong and highly significant. This discrepancy does present a problem 
since if an adjustment is made for capacity utilisation changes on the basis of these official 
measures then little allowance will be made for the effect of excess capacity that is indicated 
by the TFPIValue-added regression results'·. 
In summary then, the regression results provide strong evidence of a positive correlation 
between value-added growth and TFP growth in the short terln. However, this evidence needs 
careful interpretation. While cO'Telation implies causality, it does not prove it or exclude the 
possibility that the causality may actually be the reverse. Hence, it is quite plausible that the 
correlation may run from TFP growth to value-added growth. Indeed, neoclassical theory, 
embodiment theories and other theories of technological change suggest that the causation is 
from TFP growth to output growth. However, there is almost universal recognition that this 
is a long tern1 relationship with efficiency improvements facilitating output growth. Hence, 
a more adequate interpretation of a positive correlation between TFP growth and value-added 
growth (in the short term) is that depressed demand means slower value-added growth which 
results in excess capacity and so reduces measured TFP growth. This interpretation implies 
that those industries worst effected by slow value added growth record the worst n ;p growth. 
This interpretation seems highly plausible in the two most recent periods where there is highly 
significant evidence of a strong positive relationship between TFP growth and value added 
10 Altcmativcly, it could be argued Ihal while excess capacity was all important factor undermining recorded TFP 
growth in the 1974-81 period thIs excess capacity was largely soaked up in the hoom of 1981. Thi~ illustrates a 
weakness with the 'peak-lo-peak' method evell when fLlll capacity is almost attained at the end of Ihe period. 
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growth. Thus, it appears that the effect of variations in capacity utilisation have clearly 
undermined the usefulness of the TFP growth measure as an indicator of trends in production 
efficiency, particularly in the two most recent periods. 1974-H 1 and 1981 -90. However, the 
usefulness of these TFP growth measui'es as indicators of production efficiency can be 
improved if an adjustment is made for capacity utilisation. 
3.3 Adjustillg fo,. the Effect of Changes in Utilisation 011 TFP Growth 
3.3.1 Capital 
The flow of capital services may not correspond very well with the growth in capital stock: 
"What enters the production function is not the stock of capital, but the 
flow of capital services, and substantial changes can take place in the flow 
of services from a given plant. A plant can operate three shifts seven days 
a week, or eight hours a day for five days_" (Baily, 1981 : 17) 
One way to get a more accurate indication of the flow of capital services from capital stock 
is to multiply the capital stock by the rate of capacity utilisation. This should provide a better 
indication of capital actually used in production. Since capacity utilisation data is only 
available for the period 1972 to 1990 this method of adjustment is only applied to the two 
most recent periods. As discussed above, these happen to be the periods where the effect of 
capacity utilisation appears strongest. Table 3.2 shows the effect that such an adjustment 
makes to TFP growth measures for manufacturing as a whole. For the 1981-90 period the 
effect is clear and practically all-pervasive across industries (see Appendix F), with TFP 
improving by 0.44% per annum for manufacturing as a whole when an adjustment is made 
for capacity utilisation. What this means is that excess capacit)' accounts for almost all of the 
measured decline in TFP for this period. 
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This period (1981-90) provides a clear illustration of the failure of the peak to peak method 
of calculating growth rates to adjust for capacity utilisation. This is borne out by the fact that 
capacity is unlikely to have recovered to the level attained at the previous peak (In 1) by 
1990 since value-added actually deciined ' (Gv = -0.3% per annum) in the 19R1-90 period. 
Table 3.2: Total Manu[acturing TI'P Growtll Measures, Adju.<led [or cllal/ges to capacity utilisation and work 
hours (% per annum). 
1963-74 1974-81 1981-90 
TFP - Unadjusted 0.28 0.32 -0.50 
Effect of capac ity utilisation changes -0.04 0.44 
TFP - Adjusted for capacity utilisation 0 . 28 0.28 -0.06 
Effect of work hour changes 0.0 1 -0.05 0.08 
TFP - Adjusted for both 0.29 0.23 0 . 02 
Sources: TFP measures from Appendix D; Capac 1 ty llt t lisation meas ures from Sou:h African 
statistics; data on work hours from s o u t h Africa n Statlsti cs 19 7 6, 1992. 
Not e; Hours worked refer only t o ordinary hours workan by production and related w0ckers. 
However, with regard to the 1974-R 1 period the adjustment for capacity utilisation is small 
and actually reduces TFP growth. In this respect, capac it)' utilisation measures were higher 
in the boom year of 1981 than in the upswing of 1974. despite the fact that regression 
evidence suggests that variations in value added growth. across industries, had an important 
influence on TFP growth in this period. This discrepancy was discussed above and seems 
most likely due to the fact that although there was much excess capacity during the period, 
it was largely soaked up in the 1981 upswing". 
3.3.2 Labour 
The best way to measure the effective flow of labour services provided by the stock of 
employed workers is to make an adjustment for hours worked. Table 3.2 above also shows 
the effect of an adjustment to work hours on TFP growth for manufacturing as a whole. Work 
11 Alternatively the discrepancy may be due to inUl.:curalC capacity t1liliSilIiOll measures . 
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hours decreased only marginally in the 1963-1974 period , meaning that labour's effective 
contribution to output is slightly smaller and the contribution by TFP growth is slightly 
greater. However, in the 1974-8 I period working hours rose moderately, so that the 
unadjusted TFP measures tend to overstate productivity growth. In the 1981-90 period 
working hours declined again, but this time more significantly, so that the adjusted TFP 
growth measures suggest that the TFP decline was not quite as severe as indicated by the 
unadjusted TFP growth measurel2. 
In addition to the fairly small measured decrease in ordinary hours worked between 1963 and 
1990 there are other factors which are likely to have led to fewer hours being spent actually 
working (ie a gap arising between hours ordinarily paid for and hours actually worked). 
Longer vacations and sick leave are likely to have caused this gap to widen over time in 
South Africa - as they appear to have done in the U.S. and elsewhere (see Denison, 1984). 
Hence, such effects should reduce the effective contributions of labour growth and increase 
the contribution by TFP growth to output growth (ie TFP growth measures should be better 
than the adjusted measures in Table 3.2 indicate). Denison (1984) does make an adjustment 
for these factors, and the evidence for the U.S. indicates that overall work hours have fallen 
over time. Denison argues that shorter work hours may to a certain extent reflect the benefits 
of progress (technical and organisational), enabling more work to be accomplished in less 
time. Hence, although a fall in work hours may directly reduce output growth , there is likely 
to be an offsetting effect which raises the productivity of those hours worked and so raises 
11 Notc that this data refers only to hours \"larked by production workers and !lot all manufacturing workers. 
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output growth13. In this respect, it does seem plausible that if more time was spent at work 
more work might not actually be accomplished 14• 
Another factor that is likely to have influenced the gap between hours ordinarily paid for and 
hours worked is the effect of strikes and stay-a ways. Data on work hours are for ordinary 
working hours and so do not take into account hours lost through strikes and stay-a ways. 
The figures on work stoppages in Table 3.3 clearly indicate a rising trend with the exception 
of the 1954-63 period. This rising trend in work stoppages would have meant that using 
employment numbers, adjusted for normal working hours, to measure labour input will have 
provided an increasingly biased estimate of labour's effective contribution to output. One 
should not exaggerate the importance of this effect however. While businesses may have 
suffered from the strikes and stay-aways of the 1980s. the slow demand that characterised this 
period may have meant that some firms experienced excess capacity and so partly benefitted 
from not having to pay absent workers. 
Overall then, normal work hours and other factors , such as vacation and sick leave and the 
effect of strikes and stay-aways serve to reduce labour' s effective contribution to output 
growth and increase TFP growth in almost all periods. Hence, these adjustments suggest that 
the actual (unadjusted) TFP measures are understated. 
13 In the light of this, Denison (1984) argues Ihal an allowance should hc mmlc ror this orrsclling effect in arriving 
at the true contribution of labouT. However, following Maddison ( 1987), JlO allm .... ancc is made since the true source 
of this offset is technological improvement which facilitates more being accomplished in less lime. 
14 As in one of Parkinson 's laws that claims Ihm work cxpand~ 10 rill Ihe lime available. 
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Table 3.3: The effect of strikes alld stay-a ways (work stoppages) 011 /rours worked, 1945 to 1990. 
Period Stoppages Persons Man Days Lost 
194 5 to 1954 47 17 484 176 323 
1954 to 1963 75 7 456 17 303 
1963 to 1974 179 23 008 44 732 
1974 to 1981 211 38 168 83 503 
1981 to 1990 664 241 656 1 398 134 
Source: south African Stati stics, 1964, 1970 , 1980, 1990, Table 7.3.3: Industria l Di sputes . 
Note: These figures are not just for the manufact uring sector. All col umns show aVel"age annual 
numEers for the period . Man days lost refer only to persons involved. 
333 Conclusions 
Overall then, it appears that, for all the periods. in which quantitative data was available or 
where trends were apparent from a more qualitative perspective. adjustments to both labour 
and capital for changes in the utilisation of factors increased the contribution of TFP growth 
to labour productivity growth and correspondingly decreased the contribution of capital 
deepening. Nevertheless, these adjustments do not appear to have been substantial. except 
in the most recent period (1981-90)". Hence. it seems that capital-deepening has been the 
major "proximate" source of labour productivity growth. with TFP growth playing a minor 
role in almost all periods except the 1981-90 period where the unadjusted TFP measure is 
understated and capital deepening is overstated because of the effect of capacity utilisation. 
15 While lllcrc also seems to be evidence of excess capacity ill the 1974-R I period Ihe official capacily utilisation 
measures presenl a different picture making the siluation less dear al1d less <1mcnahlc to adjustmenl. 
Chapter 4 
Recent Growth Theories and The Causes of Productivity Growth 
4.1 Introduction - The Need For A Theoretical Chapter 
We have just seen in chapter 3 that with careful interpretation, the neoclassical approach can 
provide a useful methodology for measuring the proximate sources of growth in addition to 
providing a useful indicator of production efficiency trends. Unfortunately, neoclassical 
theory has little to say about the fundamental detemlinants of productivity growth. It is for 
this reason that this chapter examines some more recent theories of growth. These theories 
largely arose to overcome deficiencies with the neoclassical model. 
Readers may prefer to lllove on directly to chapter five. However, it should become apparent 
in chapter five, that the analysis there, of the fundamental determinants of South Africa's 
industrial productivity growth, does not rely entirely on the neoclassical model, but in fact 
incorporates a number of important insights from some of the more recent theories of growth. 
As such, this chapter aims to highlight the essence of these theories for those who are not 
familiar with them. 
The newer theories of growth try to overcome the problems that arise because of the way 
neoclassical theory models technological change and the relationship between technological 
change and investment. In essence, the neoclassical model treats technical change either as 
an allocative decision, or as an 'exogenous' technological advance. As a technological 
advance occurs, the production function is shifted by some fixed and known amount. The 
model detemlines the ' new ' equilibrium growth path that arises as a consequence of this 
'exogenous' advance, but provides no explanation for the causes of this technological change, 
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or any basis with which to analyze the process by which technology is diffused. 
Technological change is essentially viewed as a "black box". The problem with this is that 
the quality of labour and existing machinery, as well as the nature of work organisation 
methods, are highly relevant to how effectively new technology is diffused and implemented 
into production. Furthermore, the neoclassical model takes no account of the market's role 
in transmitting stimuli to change. This role may he very different from, even conflict with, 
the market's role of allocating resources according to present scarcity values. 
Thus, the neoclassical model appears of little use as a theory that purports to explain. 
Basically, the model provides little insight into how social. institutional, political or economic 
structures, the education system or labour relations might influence an economy's growth, 
efficiency and welfare. As Nelson (1981 : 1(29) emphasises: 
"the theoretical model underlying most research by economists on 
productivity growth is superficial and to some degl'ee misleading regarding 
the following matters: the determinants of productivity at the level of the 
firm and of inter firm differences; the processes that generate, screen, and 
spread new technologies; the influences of macroeconomic conditions and 
economic institutions on productivity growth," 
It is these deficiencies in the neoclassical theory of growth that the newer theories have been 
developed to overcome. Three "new" theories of growth are outlined in this chapter: Romer's 
"endogenous" growth theory, Scott's "new view" of growth and the evolutionary theory of 
economic growth. The examination of these theories will highlight the insights they provide 
into the underlying causes of productivity growth. The last section of this chapter will try to 
use these insights to build a coherent framework within which the fundamental causes of 
productivity growth can be assessed. This framework will then be used in chapter five to 
supplement the neoclassical framework in the analysis of the fundamental causes of South 
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Africa's industrial productivity growth. Furthel1110re, this framework, together with the 
analysis in chapter five, will prove useful in chapter six, where policy implications are drawn 
and the policy proposals of other South African authors are assessed. 
4.2 Romer's "Endogenous" Growlh Model 
The model of long run growth that Romer (1990) specifies is an attempt to account for 
important empirical regularities. In thi s regard , he notes that empirical data show a positive 
correlation between the investment share and the growth rate, but that in addition increased 
investment appears to exhibit diminishing returns, as increases in the rate of investment do 
not cause a one for one increase in the rate of technological change. The neoclassical model 
argues that there should be no relationship between investment and productivity, as 
technological change is exogenous, so that an increase in the rate of investment should simply 
result in a decrease in the marginal product of capital. In Romer's (1990) view, the precision 
of the estimates does not warrant such a conclusion. Rather, Romer (1990) argues that the 
estimates could be interpreted as showing that increased investment does not seem to induce 
enough technological change to completely offset the diminishing returns associated with 
increased capital accumulation. 
In the light of this evidence, Romer (1990) argues that there is something else (which does 
not vary one for one with investment) that is decisive for long run productivity growth. 
Romer (1990) argues that this 'missing factor' is the stock of knowledge possessed by a firm 
or society. Hence, although investment may be a necessary condition for growth it may be 
insufficient without an adequate stock of knowledge. This contrasts with models that rely 
exclusively on capital accumulation to generate long run growth. 
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Staying within the neoclassical framework, Romer (! 990) utilises the notion of a production 
function. However he makes a significant improvement in temlS of the way he incorporates 
technological change into the model. Technological change is no longer an exogenous 
parameter occurring as an unexplained residual. Rather, explicit attention can be focused on 
the process by which technological progress is generated, as it is the stock of knowledge that 
determines technical progress. By admitting knowledge as an endogenous input into the 
production function it is recognised that knowledge is not costless, but entails an opportunity 
cost in terms of forgone current consumption. This allows for the possibility of increasing 
returns in the traditional sense, since if all inputs (including knowledge) are increased by a 
certain proportion then output will increase more than proportionately. 
The specification in Romer's (1990) model is: 
Y = g(Hy,L) J x(i)Ydi = g(H"L)A(K/UAlY (4.1 ) 
Here Hy is human capital, L is labour, K is capital stock valued in terms of the materials that 
go into making each capital good x;, and A is the stock of new designs (technology). It seems 
that there is little difference between this and the simple neoclassical formulation of Y = 
f(K,L,A). Indeed Hy and L grouped together could be thought of as quality adjusted labour 
(as is often done in empirical applications of the neoclassical model). The way capital is 
treated is slightly different from the usual neoclassical approach, and essentially entails 
allowing different types (vintages) of capital goods to have different marginal products. 
However, the major improvement involves the treatment of technological change (A). In the 
orthodox model, technological changes occur exogenously (and, as such are seen as public: 
costless, automatic and passive). In Romer ' s (1990) model however, technological change is 
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endogenous, being dependent on how quickly the fiml expands its stock of new designs (A). 
Hence, the set of capital goods available at any point in time is determined endogenously by 
the current stock of new designs (A). To further clarify his model , Romer (1990) 
distinguishes between three sectors': 
[I) The final output production sector 
(2) The capital goods production sector 
[3] The R&D technology generating sec tor 
Within this framework, the final output sector is treated as in the orthodox neoclassical model , 
but the capital goods sector no longer produces new goods according to the whims of science. 
Rather, new goods are produced in the capital goods sector as a result of new technology that 
is developed by firms in the R&D sector. The R&D sector in this model differs substantially 
from the orthodox depiction since monopoly rents provide the incentive to innovate. Hence, 
monopoly barriers are seen as being crucial for generating technological change. 
4.2 .1 The Research Sector 
In the research sector the production of new designs is assumed to be a deterministic function 
of the inputs used in research: 
(4.2) 
A is the rate of increase in new designs , HA is human capital in research. and A is the stock 
of new designs possessed by the finn. The main features of thi s model are that: 
1 Although conceptually 115CfullO make the dislincLioll hClwC.Cll C3\JUbilitics in these different activities. in practice 
it may be very dirticult to do so (especially in the LDC c011\cxl \V lcrc most \cdmologicai change may be of the 
evolutionary type which makes it even morc difricullLO distinguish whaL activities shoulil be classified under R&D). 
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(1) The growth rate of production of new designs (AlA) is increasing in the amount of 
human capital in research (AlA = oH A) . This makes technical change depend 
positively on the amount of human capital in research. This is a fundamental 
assumption of Romer's model. Clearly then. technological change is endogenous to 
the model because increased research effort is assumed to have a positive effect on 
the rate of production of new designs. 
(2) The productivity of a unit of human capital (A/HA) is increasing in the total number 
of designs that currently exist (A/H" = oA). By specifying the productivity of human 
capital in research as an increasing function of A, the model also captures the 
cumulative nature of knowledge and takes cognisance of important complementarities. 
Like orthodox neoclassical theory, Romer (1990) treats designs as idealized goods which are 
not tied to any physical good. It is this disembodied assumption which basically gives them 
their non-rival characteristic. Romer (1990) is correct in emphasising that it is this aspect of 
technology that is the key to the understandi ng of how to model change. Once the cost of 
creating a new design has been incurred, its non-rival characteristic means that it can be used 
over and over again at no extra cost. Given this public good characteristic. there are clear 
externalities which in theory will be socially optimised with the widest possible dispersion 
of the design. To ensure this, the neoclassical model relies on perfectly competitive behaviour 
in all markets, so that for profit maximisation all firms would be forced to adopt the best 
technology. This latest technology in perfectly competitive markets is deemed to be costless, 
since its non-rival nature means that the marginal cost of dispersion of the design is zero. 
With orthodoxy's commitment to the assumption of perfect competition in all markets, there 
is no other possibility than to assume that technological change arises exogenously to the 
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model. There is no way to explain why rational agents would incur the fixed cost of 
developing new and better designs if they had to give away the designs afterwards. 
In contrast, Romer (1990) starts from the premise that technological change arises largely 
because of intentional actions by people who respond to market incentives. A questioning of 
orthodox assumptions is clearly required if this premise and the non-rival nature of technology 
is accepted. Romer (1990) argues that what cannot be supported in an endogenous modelling 
of technological change is price taking behaviour on the part of the research sector. Rather, 
it is partial excludability that is required to enable finns to capture rents for incurring the 
fixed cost of developing new and better designs. Hence, unlike the orthodox framework where 
knowledge is viewed as a non-rival , non-excludable good, Romer (1990) views knowledge 
as a non-rival, partially excludable good. 
In Romer's (1990) model, the degree to which new knowledge is excludable will determine 
the extent of the rents the research sector is able to extract, and this in turn will determine 
the allocation of human capital between the research sector and the final output sector. This 
allocation of human capital is crucial in Romer's theory, as the level of human capital in 
research determines technological progress (A/A), and thus the growth of the economy. In 
Romer's (1990) model, designs are only partially excludable. Designs are patentable, and if 
a firm does not own the design for a durable good it cannot produce it. However, new designs 
also contribute to the general stock of design knowledge which researchers can make use of 
for creating newer designs. While the fomler benefits are excludable, the latter are not. 
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4.2.2 The production of intermediate producer durahles 
Romer (1990) maintains the perfectly competitive market assumption for all other markets 
besides the market for new designs. It is in modelling the capital goods sector that the 
separability (disembodiment) of technological change from investment becomes apparent. 
Once a durable already has a design, units of the durable can be produced at a constant unit 
cost in terms of forgone output. Hence, capital goods are valued in terms of the cost of 
materials (apart from the rental accruing to a new design) that go into making them. A firm 
that owns a design and sells a new durable thus charges a price for the good that is higher 
than the constant price of producing that good. This is how the firm recoups the investment 
in the research that is necessary to create the design. Thus, the firm basically earns a rent over 
and above the market price of producing the good. 
Departing slightly from orthodox treatments of capital stock. Romer (1990) argues for the 
need to distinguish between all the different possible types of capital inputs: x = {X;};=I' Each 
good is measured in common units of production cost. In this conceptualisation, different 
types of capital goods have additively separable effects on output. This avoids having to 
assume that all the different types of capital goods are perfect substitutes for each other. 
Despite this novelty, the way Romer (1990) treats capital essentially stays within the 
neoclassical fold, since he argues for distinguishing growth in total capital that arises from 
adding units of the existing set of capital goods and the growth in capital that arises from 
bringing new types of capital goods into use. As is usual, the former type of capital 
accumulation is associated with diminishing returns to capital accumulation, whereas the latter 
is not. Romer argues that capital goods should be valued according to the value of the inputs 
used to produce these goods. Hence, Romer wishes to make the distinction where the former 
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is merely an expansIOn of capital stock, while the latter involves the payment of a rent. 
Hence, despite making technological change endogenous, Romer (1990) still essentially 
maintains the distinction between movements along a unit isoquant and shifts of that unit 
isoquant. However, this distinction is coilceptually more plausible in Romer 's (1990) scheme 
of things than in the simple neoclassical model. This is because the knowledge and human 
capital in the research sector influences the return on investment. Hence, investment can lead 
to productivity growth, so long as this investment is applied to research , rather than involving 
an expansion of the firm 's productive capacity. Romer's (1990) model suggests that 
investment is necessary for growth, but that its return will depend on the complementary stock 
of knowledge and capabilities possessed by a finn, industry or country. However, it seems 
that problems have been encountered in making the model empirically operational as Scott 
(1993) points out that he is not aware of any empirical studies that have used Romer's model. 
A likely reason for this is that in reality there is no neat distinction between the research and 
production sectors. New technology actually often evolves through the interaction between 
production and research' in accordance with the particular production context. Furthermore, 
it is innovation and minor adaption (applied research) rather than invention (basic research) 
that is most important to developing countries that are not at the cutting edge of new 
technology. As such, the sharp distinction between the research sector and other sectors is 
particularly limiting in the developing country context. Having said this though, Romer's 
(1990) model does provide a useful way of analyzing the process by which technological 
change is generated and so makes the causes of productivity growth more easily understood, 
even if not quantifiable. 
:% This process may cvell be vital in facilitating lcaming and Iccimological capabilities of the rirm nnd its workforce 
through tlIe complcmcntarilics of mulliskilling and the coordination and interaction of difrerent divisions, 
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4.3 Scott's "New View oj Growth" ? 
In contrast to Romer (1990), Scott (1989) argues that the neoclass ical model should be 
discarded because the model's attempt to separate investment from technologica l change and 
productivity growth is unrealistic and serves no practical analytical purpose. He argues that 
even with vintage models it does not seem possible to separate that portion of investment 
spent on generating new assets from that portion spent on replicating existing assets. 
In Scott's (1989) view then , there is no room for the neoclassical distinction between the 
elasticity of substitution within a given technology and the bias of technological change, since 
he argues that there is a significant interaction between relative price changes and 
technological changes'. Instead, SCOII (19R9) advances an investment-led growth model. He 
argues that any attempt to improve performance requires some change to economic 
arrangements, which can only be achieved through investment. Scott's (1989) basic model is: 
g = aI/a + ,..gl (4.3) 
This model essentially decomposes output growth (g) into two proximate sources: the rate 
of investment (a) adjusted for its efficiency (1/), and the rate of growth of quality adjusted 
employment (gl)' So, rather than TFP, the efficiency of investment (1/) becomes the criterion 
for evaluating production efficiency. In this equation a and,.. are, respectively, the output 
elasticity of efficiency adjusted investment growth and the output elasticity of quality adjusted 
employment. 
3 The chicken and the egg slory (whether IcclmoJogicaJ t.:hangc causes, or is caused by rclalivc pri ct.! changes) is 
essentially assumed away by the neoclassical model. 11 assumes Ihal it is ch.l11gcs in [Helor endowments that cause 
changes in relative factor scarcity values (prices): while Icdl1lologicai change is assumed to he neutral or of a constant 
(predictable) bias. 
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Scott (1989) avoids the problems inherent in the artificial neoclassical distinction between 
investment and technological change by treating all investment as involving some 
technological change. Scott (1990) therefore specifies the causality as nlllning from 
investment to technological change arid then to growth, in contrast with the orthodox 
specification where, although technological change drives growth, it is essentially independent 
of investment. 
In Scott's (1989) view, all past investment is relevant to determining the total sacrifice that 
has been made by an economy to bring it to its present state. In effect then , what one is 
assessing is how well the countries/industries/firms have performed for a given level of 
sacrifice in terms of forgone consllmption. Hence, it is not jllst the rate of investment that is 
important for growth, but also the efficiency of this investment. 
However, as is the case with the TFP measure, Scott (1989) emphasises that the isolation and 
measurement of gr and Q is only the start of an explanation of economic growth. The 
underlying determinants of these still need to be explained, and in Scott's (1989 : 177) view 
they are likely to depend upon: 
"The knowledge, intelligence, originality, commonsense, and effort of 
businessmen, inventors, and scientists are all highly relevant, as are the 
economic institutions that influence their perceptions and choices, 
including the degree of competition, taxes and subsidies, the credit 
systems, and product and factor markets generally ..... Decision makers' 
motives are obviously important." 
4.4 Evolutionary TheOlies of G,.owth 
The evolutionary theorists have been the most critical of orthodoxy ' s disregard of the 
importance of complementarities between inputs and technological change: 
"The spirit of evolutionary theory is that inputs come in complementary 
packages associated with the use of particular' techniques and that it is not 
meaningful to parcel out credit for output or output changes among the 
different inputs." (Nelson, 1989 : 329) 
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The sources of growth approach ignores the crucial role of complementarities. Nelson (1981) 
emphasises the inaccuracy of this neoclassical growth decomposition by drawing an analogy 
with a cake recipe. To make the cake, all ingredients in the recipe may be necessary, and in 
order to try and make a better cake it may be useful to analyze the effect of altering each 
ingredient a little at the margin while keeping other ingredients constant, but it makes no 
sense to divide up the credit for a good cake among its various ingredients, In the presence 
of important complementarities between the three factors (capital. labour and technological 
progress) Nelson (1991) argues that it makes little sense to divide up the credit among them. 
For example, the value of specifically trained employees is undermined if these employees 
are not complemented with appropriate equipment. In the light of such complementarities, 
Nelson (1981) questions the usefulness of the neoclassical distinction between movements 
along a production function and movements between production functions. Hence, it has been 
suggested by Nelson (1981) that the growth of labour and capital should merely be viewed 
as descriptive of the characteristics of output growth, rather than explaining it. It is underlying 
factors that are regarded as simultaneously affecting the rate of growth of labour, capital and 
technological progress'. 
The advantage of evolutionary theories is that they focus on the process by which 
technological change arises and diffuses and thus generates productivity growth. As such, it 
" For this reason qualitative changes to the factors arc anaJysed as "uJlderlying" sources of prodUClivily growth 
(in chap!er 5), rather than as "proximate" sources of productivily growth as is normally done in conventional 
neoclassical analyses. 
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is the only theory among the ones analysed here, which specifically tries to relate the micro 
workings of firms to their overall performance and the performance of the industry and the 
whole economy. However, the main weakness of the evolutionary theories is that they provide 
no formal alternative to the neoclassical inodel. Despite this, their approach proves useful for 
understanding what causes technological change and productivity growth. 
In particular, evolutionary theory focuses on the process by which firms, industries and the 
economy evolves. As such, they reject the orthodox assumption of a representative firm and 
regard it as hazardous to assume that all finns are in a system of competitive equilibrium. 
Rather, they stress the importance of the idiosyncrasies of individual firms, and point out that 
the fact that some firms have high costs and others low costs, with some expanding and 
others contracting, illustrates the dynamics of the evolution of particular industries. 
Evolutionary theorists argue that individual and organisational behaviours are selected, 
penalised or rewarded. Organisations (and individuals) are selected ex ante on the basis of 
their capabilities: in terms of the competence of employees, the organisational stmcture within 
which these employees interact and establish work norms, and the quality of managerial 
decisions about the future. However, organisations are also selected ex post through 
mechanisms which cannot always be predicted or controlled for. 
Lall (1992), amongst others', extends the mainstream evolutionary theory to the developing 
country context. Lall (1992) argues that what is imponant for productivity growth is the 
5 Also see Fransman and King (1984), Dosi et al. (1988) for two collections of articles by evolutionary economisls 
who have focused on the developing counlry context. 
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indigenous technological capabilities (lTCs) possessed by firms in LDCs. Along these lines, 
an instructive growth model in the evolutionary spirit, is Fagerberg's (1988). He emphasises 
the importance of technological capabilities for a nation's productivity: 
Q = ZDoN'C' (4.4) 
Here, Q is the productivity of a country (as proxied by GDP per capita), D is the level of 
knowledge (stock of designs) diffused from abroad, N is the level of knowledge created in 
the country (its technological activity) and C is the country ' s capacity for exploiting the 
benefits of knowledge. Fagerberg (1988) uses this specification as a basis to undertake a 
cross-country empirical investigation of the relationship between a nation's technological 
activity (N) and its productivity (Q). He uses patents and/or R&D expenditures as a proxy for 
a nation's technological activity. His regression results confirm the existence of a positive and 
significant relationship between productivity (Q) and national technological activity (N). 
Fagerberg's framework helps to highlight crucial technological determinants of a firm's or 
nation ' s productivity perfomlance. These are the nation ' s (or finll 's) existing capabilities (C), 
the extent to which deliberate efforts are undertaken to enhance technological capabilities (N), 
and the extent to which knowledge is diffused frol11 abroad (0). 
However, Lall (1992) argues that these capabilities do not arise in a vacuum. Rather, the 
development of a nation's technological capabilities should be analysed in terms of the 
interplay of incentives, capabilities and inslitutioll.l. Institutions are seen as setting the rules 
of the game, which can alter capabilities and affect incentives by influencing attitudes and 
expectations. Capabilities are seen as defining the best that can be achieved with given 
resources, while incentives influence the use of capabilities and stimulate their expansion, 
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renewal or disappearance. This helps to emphasise the interaction between demand and supply 
factors:- capabilities constrain a firm or country's ability to grasp opportunities confronting 
it, while these same opportunities act as incentives to improve capabilities. 
Parker (1990), an evolutionary economic historian, provides two useful schematic diagrams 
(see Figure 4.1) which help emphasise Lall ' s (1992) point about the interplay of incentives, 
capabilities and institutions. Figure 4.1 (a) illustrates that firms do not simply follow the 
static dictates of the price network. Rather, the dynamics of the system requires firms to 
respond to stimuli from various institutions and a changing external environment. Figure 4.1 
(b) illustrates the historical evolution of individuals, institutions and organisations. Individuals 
are "culturally matured" into society by various institutions which have an important influence 
on the attitudes and skills of individuals. This figure also emphasises the internal dynamics 
of organisations whose behaviour is dependent on the response of economic agents to the 
incentives and penalties generated by institutional and other environmental influences. 
On the demand side, Lall (1992) regards the following factors as the most crucial incentives 
influencing firms to enhance their technological capabilities: 
(I) An inherent need by firms for sufficient development of new skills and information 
as a prerequisite to the adoption of new technology. 
(2) External factors such as the macroeconomic environment, competitive pressures, and 
the trade regime influence firm 's perceptions regarding the benefits of efforts to 
develop their capabilities. In this respect though, Lall (1992 : 169) notes that: 
" ••. international competition lis] probably the most potent inducement 
to skill and technology upgrading. Competition is, however, a double 
edged sword, and given the necessary costs of learning, can stifle 
capability building in newcomers when certain mal'kets failures ex is!." 
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(3) Technological change at the world frontier is seen by Lall as stimulating developing 
countries to catch up. Although competition is seen to mediate the incentive for firms 
to improve technological capabilities, recognition of the potential gains from the 
adoption of more efficient available technology may also induce firms to invest in 
improving their technological capabilities. 
On the supply side, the extent to which fimls can improve their technological capabilities are 
regarded as depending on: 
(1) The firm's size - which will constrain (or facilitate) their ability to utilize complex 
technologies or highly skilled or specialised labour, where these inputs may only be 
justified on a large scale. 
(2) The local market for skilled labour, both technical and managerial. Here the nature of 
a nation's education and training systems are clearly important as are a nation's ability 
to keep or attract such personnel. 
(3) The flexibility of firms, in so much as they are able to restructure and absorb new 
methods and technologies. 
(4) Access to external technical infonnation and support. 
(5) Access to appropriate "embodied" technology. 
Lall (1992) emphasises that one can conceIve of national differences in technological 
capabilities, since such factors will mean that countries will differ in their ability to assimilate 
technologies, which will show up in their long run productivity and trade performance. 
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However, an important insight of evolutionary theory needs to be stressed: the idiosyncrasies 
of firms. Evolutionary theory rejects the orthodox micro-economic notion of a representative 
firm, which is based on an identical response by firms to the macro-institutional environment 
they face. All firms do face the same policies, markets and institutions, and so have the 
incentive to respond in similar ways. However, they are unlikely to respond in identical ways, 
given uncertainty, imperfect information and the reality of their peculiar internal structures, 
which reflect the evolutionary outcome of past idiosyncratic behaviour. 
"Thus, there are factors which are firm specific (leading to micro level 
differences in FTC (firm-level technological capabilities( development and 
to "idiosyncratic" results) and those that are common to given countries 
(depending on their policy regimes, skill endowments and institutional 
structures.)" (Lall, 1992 : 169) 
In the evolutionary theory, fimls are seen as usmg technological change, by improving 
products and/or processes, as a major weapon in their competitive struggle - either offensively 
through innovating or defensively through imitating their rivals. Hence, the outcome of such 
behaviour is a continual disequilibrium situation as change and adjustment to change occurs. 
Contrary to orthodox theory, individual and finn behaviour diversity is central. It arises 
largely from idiosyncratic responses to the uncertainty of technological changes. Micro-level 
analysis of technology in LDCs has drawn inspiration from the evolutionary theories. The 
central theme of this approach is firm idiosyncrasies: 
"Technological knowledge is not shared equally among firms, nor is it 
easily imitated by or transferred across firms. Transfer necessarily 
requires learning because technologies m'e tacit. and their underlying 
principles are not always clearly understood. Thus. simply to gain mastery 
of a new technology requires skills. effort and investment by the receiving 
firm, and the extent of mastery achieved is uncertain and necessarily 
varies by firms aCI'oss these inputs. Furthermore, firms have more 
knowledge of their 'own' technology. less about similar technologies of 
other firms and very little about dissimilar alternatives. even in the same 
industry. They operate, in other words, not on a production function hut 
at a point, and their technical progress, building upon their own errOl'ts, 
experience and skills, is (to varying degrees) 'localised' around that point 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969). The extent to which firm-level differences in 
technological effOl·t and mastery occur may val'y by indush'y, by size of 
firm or market, by level of development or by trade/industrial strategies 
pursued. There is little doubt that as a description of reality, in developed 
or less developed countries, the evolutionary approach is far more 
plausible than the production function approach," (Lall, 1992 : 166) 
4.5 A Framework for Allalysillg the FUlldamelltal Causes of Productivity Growth 
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The National Productivity Institute (NPI, 1990 : 9) emphasises that productivity measures 
merely demonstrate an association between various factors and not a causal relationsh ip·: 
"The act of measu.-ing productivity can be compal'ed to taking a patient's 
temperature. Having established that the patient is running a temperature, 
the doctor only knows that the pel'son is ill and that the errect of the 
illness is manifested in a high temperature. He then has to find the calise 
of the illness" 
These causal determinants of productivity growth are critical because they are of fundamental 
importance to a nation 's long run growth and welfare prospects and therefore should not be 
ignored simply because the neoclassical model fails to deal with them adequately, However, 
the task of quantifying productivity detemlinants should not be underestimated, Indeed, the 
fact that no simple prescriptions exist for improving productivity is precisely because many 
of its fundamental determinants are intangible, Hence, claims that the causes of productivity 
can be quantified and explained in a simple way should be treated with considerable 
scepticism, As Denison (1984 : 23) notes with regard to the productivity growth slowdown 
that occurred in the U,S, and elsewhere in the early 1970s: 
, The problem with the analogy in thi s quote is that it implies that measuring productivity is just as easy and 
accurate as measuring temperature on a thermometer. However, it has been emphasised that there arc many problems 
with productivity estimates, which suggests the need for grealer scepticism in interpreting derived productivity 
measures as definitive indicators of efficiency. 
"The causes of the slowdown in the residual remains a mystery to me, 
although others do not hesitate to state it." 
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While it may not be possible to quantify the causes of productivity growth, and so explain 
the "mystery", this does not mean that no attempt should be made to understand these 
fundamental determinants. In this respect, it should be recognised that our lack of knowledge 
regarding the fundamental determinants of productivity growth is partly due to the way 
productivity has been conceptualised by the neoclassical model, which essentially treats 
technological change as a black box. 
In this respect though, as was seen above, recent alternative theories have arisen largely in 
response to the defects of the simple neoclassical model and their theorising is facilitating a 
greater understanding of the underlying causes of productivity growth. Evolutionary theory', 
Scott (1989) and Romer (1990) all stress the overriding importance of viewing increased 
production efficiency as the result of deliberate efforts to improve technology. While the 
specifics of these theories are different, they share a common framework which recognises 
that new technology does not arise passively, automatically or costlessly (as is the case in the 
neoclassical model). This suggests that to understand the fundamental detemlinants of 
productivity growth, what is needed is an analysis of the processes by which new technology 
is generated, diffused and implemented in production. 
While the quantification of the underlying causes of productivity growth appears to remain 
elusive, a coherent conceptual framework can improve our understanding of some of the 
7 See Nelson and Winter (19R2), Nclson (1981) and, as applied to the development context, Fransman and King 
(eds) (1984), Fransman (1985), Fagerberg (19RR) and Lall (1992). 
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processes that generate productivity growth. Such a framework can benefit from the insights 
of the three theories discussed above, particularly evolutionary theory. This framework will 
focus on the processes involved in technological change. Romer's model stresses the 
importance of disembodied knowledge and the human capital that complements this 
knowledge. Evolutionary theory stresses the importance of fiml idiosyncrasies in their 
acquisition of technological capabilities, but argues that it is not possible to separate the 
knowledge and capabilities of a fiml from the employees who possess or control this 
knowledge. Scott's model argues that while investment is crucial for growth, the efficiency 
of this investment is dependent on deliberate actions to improve technology. While these 
models differ, there is much common ground and they do provide important insights with 
which to construct a conceptual framework for understanding the fundamental causes of 
productivity growth. 
Overall then, these theories suggest that it is the knowledge and capabilities possessed by a 
firm that govern the firm 's scope for productivity growth. Furthernlore, these theories all 
recognise that to a large degree these capabilities do not arise passively, automatically or 
costlessly - rather they require active and deliberate efforts which can be extremely costly. 
The rest of this chapter will de devoted to outlining a framework within which the causes of 
productivity growth can be assessed, while the next chapter will apply it to South Africa in 
order to assess the relative importance of various fundamental determinants of productivity 
growth in the manufacturing sector. 
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The neoclassical model provides a point of departure for addressing the "underlying sources" 
of growth. In this respect, it was argued in the previous chapter that it seems conceptually 
useful to view qualitative improvements to the factors (a better educated and trained 
workforce and technologically more sOPhisticated machinery) as "explaining" part of TFP 
growth because they clearly improve production efficiency". Hence, although recognising 
neoclassical weaknesses, its familiar structure (which distinguishes between the different 
inputs capital and labour) provides a useful starting point for building a framework with 
which to begin to assess the underlying causes of growth9. As such, a useful conceptual 
framework can be built around the following questions: 
* What compositional changes have taken place to the quality (skills and experience) 
of the workforce ?; 
* What changes have occurred in the technological sophistication of machinery?; 
* What organisational changes have been implemented in production ?; 
However, in order to gain a comprehensive assessment of the causes of productivity growth 
an analysis of the forces behind these changes is required in each case, as well as the extent 
to which these changes have been complementary. 
Before providing a deeper conceptual framework that draws on the insights from these new 
growth theories, a case study will be considered. This case study analyses the technological 
development of an archetypical successful firm (USlMlNAS) which is an integrated steel 
producer in an LDC (Brazil). This case study helps to emphasise some of the critical issues 
! This would leave only part of TFP growth "unexplained" (exogellous). and what remains will (apart from 
measurement error) be due to disembodied technological progress SUdl as work organisational changes. 
9 It can only ,serve ~s ,a start since the model ~as no theory of how, inputs, arc qualitatively impr,()vcd ~nd how this 
affects production effICiency. The model also Ignores the faci lilal 111 rcalll)' the process by which TFP growth is 
generated is crucially dependert on the complementary nature of skilled labour and technology. 
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discussed by Romer, Scott, and , In particular, the evolutionary theorists. The authors 
conclude from the case study that: 
"This description shows that successful technological development depends 
on a long term effort to build systematically on foreign technological 
inputs and on accumulated · experience." (Dahlman, Ross Larson, 
Westphal, 1987 : 8) 
Initially the firm had to rely entirely on foreign practice and advice in designing and operating 
the plant. However, from the start of designing and establishing the plant, locals worked 
closely with foreigners and received extensive training prior to operation, so that locals 
accumulated knowledge on many aspects of the design, equipment selection, installation, start 
up and operation of the plant. This helped facilitate improvements in the understanding of the 
technological package so that as production proceeded the finn's personnel proceeded from 
the stage of knowing how to operate the plant to analysing the contents of the package. Hence 
the firm was able to 'unbundle' the package by studying and understanding different elements 
of its technology, so that it was able to uncover its deficiencies and correct for them. 
Hence, the firm did not lock itself into a reliance on foreign technological assistance, but 
rather emphasised the need for an understanding and assimilation of foreign technology as it 
was purchased. Through a gradual learning process the fillll developed technological 
proficiency over its technological purchases so that the type and nature of foreign assistance 
moved to higher and more specific levels. 
As this case study elucidates, the transfer of technology is not simply a usual product 
exchange transaction , but there is an element of tacitness involved in the transfer that needs 
to be carefully managed if the purchaser of the technology is to realise the full benefits from 
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it. Given this, the authors argue for a more insightful conceptualisation of technology, where 
technology is seen as being characterised by its key elements: 
(1) The technological means to undertake the transformation 
(2) Technological information about the method 
(3) Understanding how and why the method works 
The first element simply relates to the fact that a particular machine has a particular 
technology embodied in it. This element of technology is most readily assimilated as it just 
requires an operating knowledge of the machine. Such operating knowledge merely indicates 
that the technology embodied in the machine has simply provided a means to undertake a 
specific transformation. The second element relates to the technical details of the design (the 
blueprint) of technology that comprises this machine. Hence. this element provides a technical 
description of the technology involved, but since most technology is tacit these details often 
do not aid an understanding of the processes involved or why these processes work. This 
understanding is the third element of technology and is the least easily articulated. 
An appropriate technological means to undertake the transformation and understanding how 
it operates is necessary. However, acquiring technological information about the method, and 
understanding how and why the method works, are clearly more crucial to the enhancement 
of a firm's technological capabilities. 
Using these key concepts as building blocks Figure 4.2 attempts to provide a framework for 
analysing how a firm manages technological change and improves its technological 
capabilities. It seems that the neoclassical assumption that technology is public has obscured 
Figure 4.2 : Learning Mechanisms in a Firm's Management a/Technological Change 
INTERACTION WITH 
SUPPLIERS: 
(1) TECHNOLOGY 
(2) INPUTS 
~~ 
+-;cc ( SUBCO~~T~~ 
~\ 
DEGREE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
~« 
WORK 
ORGANISATION 
a, 
QO 
~' 
" 
SKILLS OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
SUPPLIER 
'~ 
LEARNING - BY -
HIRING AND 
CONTRACTING 
PERSONNEL , 
(1) MANAGEMENT I" 
(2) TECHNICAL ' 
(3) WORKERS 
LEARNING - BY -
USING 
(INTERACTING 
OUTSJDE THE FIRM) 
"~ 
~I>-,,\\ON 
~o<?' 
~ 
~l' 
I~CI-;, 
Itto(o 
LEARNING - BY -
INTERACTING 
WITHIN THE FIRM 
\ 
PRODUCT Hi----+-
~ 
.s? g 
Q-o 
>(- DESIGN ~ 
PROCESS 
TECHNOLOGY 
~ 
»>--- ~ 
,,/ 
6 
z 
::r: 
o 
ul 
r-
LEARNING - BY -
TRAINING 
e-- FIRM -] 
INDIGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL 
CAPABILITIES (ITC) 
l'!:c ----------- 0/'0 
i'iNOLOGIC{>.'-- v.\:: 
t \, r 
LEARNING - BY - S:-;C:IN~I 
t 
~ 
INTERACTION WITH 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AT THEI 
WORLD FRONTEIR 
~ 
o 
rn 
:D 
en 
;! 
& 
~ o 
CONTINUOUS 
~/ 
t; 
LEARNING - BY -
DOING: 
(1) BY OPERATING 
(2) BY CHANGING 
~f(BATCHl 
~ 
'-;' 
SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION 
(1) PRODUCT DIVERSITY 
(2) STANDARDIZATION 
69 
a recognition of the fact that technology is not simply a means to undertake a transfomlation, 
but that the other elements: technological information about the method and understanding 
how and why the method works, are also crucial to the effectiveness of technological choice 
and use. 
Figure 4.2 emphasises the importance of the various learning mechanisms in the build up of 
a firm's technological capabilities and illustrates the importance of managing technological 
change to realise its benefits. This figure should help to provide the basis of a conceptual 
framework for analysing the fundamental causes of technological change and productivity 
growth. To make the figure more easily understood and to clarify this framework it is 
necessary to discuss the nature of the learning processes that underscore improvements in a 
firm's technological capabilities. 
Martin Bell (1984) points out that some economists tenninologically link productivity growth 
and 'learning'. Performance trends are supposed to be the observable 'effects' of 'learning'. 
Hence the efficiency of task performance rises because additional skills and knowledge have 
been acquired ('learning' has taken place). However, Bell (1984) emphasises that this 
terminological identification of cause and effect is potentially quite misleading, since it 
provides no framework for analysing how this skill and knowledge is acquired (thus no way 
of assessing the nature of the learning process itself). 
Bell (1984) argues that it needs to be recognised that there are many different learning 
mechanisms, and some are more effective than others. Hence, this means that productivity 
growth improvements may be caused by very different learning mechanisms. This suggests 
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that to understand the underlying causes of productivity growth perfornlance requires an 
examination of the various different learning processes by which technological capabilities 
are built up. 
From this perspective, Bell (1984) usefully distinguishes the process where ITC is acquired 
simply through 'learning by doing' as opposed to other learning mechanisms which require 
more deliberate attention to improve ITC. This distinction is conceptually useful because the 
two kinds of learning processes function in quite different ways and the relative importance 
of the two has important implications for explaining productivity growth and suggesting 
policy measures. The USIMINAS case study highlighted the important role of such deliberate 
learning mechanisms for improving the technological information and understanding aspects 
of a firm's ITC. 
Dosi, G and Orsenigo, L (1988) argue that orthodox economics treats doing-based learning 
as being characterized by the following elements: 
[1) Passiveness: no explicit effort or resources are required to capture the benefits. 
(2) The learning process is automatic since after a given period of doing (level of 
cumulative output) a certain amount of learning will have taken place. 
(3) Costless: since learning is acquired as a free by-product from carrying on with 
production. 
If all learning was doing-based, improved technological capabilities would simply require 
increased doing, with fairly obvious implications regarding returns to scale and policy. 
However, other learning mechanisms do not have these passive, automatic and costless 
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properties and so to the extent that they are important sources of improved technological 
capabilities (and productivity growth) conceptualising all learning as being doin&-based will 
provide an inaccurate depiction of the learning processes that caused productivity growth. 
Hence, Bell (1984) emphasises the importance of identifying the extent to which doing-based 
learning, as oppose to other kinds of learning, has contributed to the improved technological 
capacity of firms. Therefore, in order to clarify the sources of improved ITC he suggests 
further subdi viding these learning processes into: 
Doing Based Mechanisms: 
LEARNING BY OPERATING 
LEARNING BY CHANGING 
Other (Deliberate) Mechanisms: 
SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK 
LEARNING BY TRAINING 
LEARNING BY HIRING 
LEARNING BY SEARCHING 
These are relatively self explanatory, but do serve to emphasise the processes by which 
indigenous technological capabilities can be effectively built up. Figure 4.2 tries to indicate 
the importance of the various learning mechanisms for a firm's indigenous technological 
capabilities. The reason why most of the focus has been on learning-by-doing is that other 
learning mechanisms are regarded as largely a matter of management discretion which is 
supposed to be overcome in a sufficiently competilive envirollment. However, as Lall (1992) 
emphasises, in reality there are many other incenlives and institutions influencing the learning 
undertaken by firms. As such, there may be important market failures undemlining the 
effectiveness of these learning mechanisms. Specific skill shortages and inadequate training 
institutions may undermine the effectiveness of learning-by-hiring and learning-by-training 
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mechanisms; poorly developed subcontracting markets may limit the scope for learning-by-
using; poor international relations, limited access to the latest technological information and 
the weak bargaining power of local finns may undemline the effectiveness of leaming-by-
searching processes; and cultural and/or institutional factors that affect industrial relations may 
undermine what can be achieved through learning-by-interacting within the firm . 
The USIMINAS study helps clarify the distinction between these different types of learning 
mechanisms. Initially USIMINAS relied on learning-by-hiring and learning-by-training in 
addition to doing-based learning mechanisms. Later USlMINAS was able to deepen its 
capabilities through other deliberate learning mechanisms such as systems perfomlance 
feedback and learning-by-searching. Further, this case study illustrates that the advancement 
of LDCs or fillTls is not a simple matter of technology transfer. Rather technological 
capabilities are built up in a slow process that follows a sequence of building on strengths, 
so that normally a firm in an LDC will develop by proceeding from accumulating capabilities 
in production to investment and innovation capabilities'"' 
From the distinction made by the case study it seems apparent that although doing-based 
learning processes may be sufficient to build up capabilities in production, they may be 
insufficient to serve as a base upon which capabilities in investment and innovation are built 
up (these requiring more deliberate learning mechanisms to improve the quality of their 
capabilities). Here, learning-by-doing may improve a fi ,TIl ' s ability to use a given 
technological means (' Know How') such that task level perfonnance improves as employees 
10 In Katz's (1984) discussion of the sequential nature of the k'amillg process he argues that from the rims (in 
Latin American metalworking industries) surveyed. ly\)ictJlly product desig.n capa~ilities develop at an earlier stage 
than process enginccring capabilities. This suggests \lal the former arc easier to acquire than the latter because 
changes to the process arc likely to involve morc 'know why' than 'know how' . 
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gain experience. However, total reliance on thi s type of learning process is unlikely to assist 
the firm in understanding why what is being done works (' Kllow Why') and whether what is 
being done is the most effective way of doing it. Hence, as Bell's (1984) distinction 
highlights, more deliberate learning mechanisms (which are costly and entail effort) are 
possibly the only way a firm will be able to find out more about how and why things are 
done and how and why they work and whether better ways of doing things exist; and, in this 
way enhance their investment and innovation capabilities. 
This framework suggests that depicting the learning process as simply doing-based is most 
unrealistic. In reality the technological capabilities acquired by individuals - and through 
them, firms - are the result of sequential learning processes that begin in schools and continue 
in the workplace. The effectiveness of schools significantly influences an individual's skills 
and their foundations for subsequent learning. Furthenllore, the technological capabilities 
acquired in the workplace will depend to a large extent on the many deliberate learning 
processes a worker undergoes, or is exposed to. The technology and infonnation, as well as 
the skills and experience of other employees are all highly relevant to what an individual 
learns and the technological capabilities they acquire and contribute to the firm. 
What is important though, is that these deliberate learning processes are not always simply 
a matter of management discretion. Managers can make a substantial difference to the 
productivity perfonnance of individual finns through deliberate efforts to improve 
technological capabilities. However, they may encounter various environmental constraints 
in the form of market failures which will limit what they can achieve. 
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In terms of delineating the scope for policy it seems useful to distinguish between three 
categories of national environmental factors: 
(i) Exogenous factors such as the weather and natural resources of a country. 
(ii) Economic and institutional factors which the government can influence. 
(iii) Cultural and institutional factors peculiar to a particular nation's social system and 
which the government has only limited influence over. 
While there is not much that government policy can do about the first or third category of 
factors, the government can play an important role in overcoming market failures arising from 
the second category of factors which may undernline the efforts of firms to improve 
technological capabilities. However, it is important that the state does not, in attempting to 
correct market failures, undemline the competitive environment that provides a powerful 
incentive for firms to deliberately engage in efforts to enhance their technological capabilities. 
At the start of chapter five, the neoclassical framework will be used as a basis for outlining 
trends that have taken place to the quality of inputs in South African industry. However, the 
framework that has been developed here, will also he used to gain a deeper insight into the 
institutional and other environmental factors that have been responsible for these trends. 
Hence, an attempt will be made to analyse institutional and other factors that have impinged 
on the effectiveness of the various learning mechanisms of South African firms. An important 
part of this analysis will be to examine the role played by the state - assessing in what cases 
it has helped to overcome market failures and in what cases its actions have militated against 
the enhancement of technological capabilities. 
Chapter 5 
The Underlying Causes Of Productivity Growth in SA Manufacturing 
5.1 Introduction 
Having built up a framework that improves our understanding of the fundamental causes of 
productivity growth we are in a much better position to assess and understand the past 
productivity growth performance of the South African manufacturing sector. Overall, it seems 
that what is required is an analysis of how South Africa's capabilities have changed over time 
in terms of what qualitative changes have taken place to labour, machinery and work 
organisational practices as well as the incentive mechanisms and institutional factors that have 
had an important impact on these developments. 
5.2 Qualitative Improvements to Labour 
Typically labour quality adjustments are made for compositional changes in the level of 
education and age of the workforce. These are regarded as a good proxies, the former for the 
skills and the latter for the experience of the workforce , Data availability limits our ability 
to assess the effect of education and training on the quality of manufacturing employment' . 
Nevertheless, it is possible to gauge the impact of changes in the education profile of the 
workforce in a fairly qualitative way by considering broad trends in the education system 
itself as well as changes to the educational attainment of the economically active population, 
The human capital model argues that the function of education is to impart knowledge and 
skills which improve the productivity of workers. Hence, increased educational attainment of 
1 Similarly, lack of data prevents an a~scssmcnt of tile impact or age compositional changes on the quality of the 
workforce over time. 
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the labour force should improve the production efficiency of finllS. thus making an important 
contribution to TFP growth. In South Africa there has been rapid educational expansion in 
recent years, particularly for blacks'. Fallon (l992) points out that there has been a 
substantial improvement in black educaiional attainment, while Pillay 
(1992 : I) emphasises that: 
" Although educational inequality is still pervasive, education since the mid 
1970s has been characterised by a rapid quantitative expansion of 
resources for black, particularly African, education. Consequently, there 
has been a dramatic increase in the number of black students emerging 
from the school system with a matriculation certificate." 
Unfortunately, there is no official data available on changes in the education profile of the 
manufacturing workforce. However, Table 5.1 shows data on the education level of the whole 
economically active population. This indicates that there has been a general rise in the 
educational level of the workforce since 1970. In 1970 only 33.7% of the workforce had 
attended school up until at least standard 6, and only 10.2% had completed secondary school 
(attended school up until at least standard 10). In 1980 however, 44.2% of the workforce had 
attended school up until at least standard 6, and 15.4% had completed secondary school. By 
1985 these percentages had increased to 48.6% and 18.6% respectively. The data also 
suggests that the education level of the workforce grew slightly faster between 1970 and 1980 
than between 1980 and 1985, since the proportion of the workforce that had attended school 
until at least standard 6 (standard 10) grew at an average exponential rate of 2.8% per annum 
(4.2%) between 1970 and 1980, but only at a rate of 1.9% per annum (3.8%) between 1980 
and 19853• 
, See Appendix G. 
3 However, see Pitlay (1992) who notes that the mean years of schooling of the workforce grew faster between 
1980 to 1985 then from 1970 to 1980. 
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Table 5.1: Education 1-... els of the Economically-Active Population, 1970, 1980 and 1985 
Year 1970 1980 1985 
Number Share Number Share Number Share 
Level of Education (' 000) (%) (' 000) (%) (' 000) (%) 
No ne - Std 1 2 894 35.7 2 577 29.7 2 420 23 . 7 
Std 2 - Std 5 2 478 30.6 2 206 25. 4 2 784 27 . 3 
Std 6 - Std 9 1 913 23.6 2 504 28.8 3 066 30.0 
Std 10 514 6 . 3 748 8.6 1 013 9.9 
Diplomas & Degrees 312 2.9 591 6.8 885 8.7 
Unspecified 65 0.7 42 0.4 
Total 8 111 100.0 8 691 100.0 10 210 100.0 
Sources: South Africa , Population Census es, 1910, 198 5 and south African Labour Statistics, 1980. 
To the extent that these trends hold for manufacturing', qualitative changes to labour, in the 
form of increased educational attainment, have made a positive contribution to increased 
productivity growth, with the effect being greater in the 1970s than the early 1980s'. 
In the above analysis, labour quality has only been adjusted for years of education which 
takes no account of the quality of education received duIing these years . This issue is 
particularly important in South Africa since cognisance needs to be taken of the deficiencies 
of the apartheid education system. Apartheid education and labour market policies adversely 
effected the skills of the workforce and thus the productivity growth of firms. Essentially, 
these policies will have reduced the effectiveness of any deliberate learning initiatives 
undertaken by firms. In particular, these policies will have affected learning-by-hiring, 
leaming-by-training and learning-by-interacting within the firm. Restricted access to, and poor 
quality of, black education in earlier periods, coupled with job reservation and influx controls 
undermined the skill enhancement of black workers and their prospects for geographical and 
4 However, since manuracturing employmelll usuall y comprises under 15(;r, or the economically acLiv\! population, 
it is quite a strong presumption to assume lhallhc same tretlds hold for IlWlluracturing on its own. 
S See footnote 3 above, whic11 implies lhat if imacad education is adjusted by mean years of schooling then the 
contribution to productivity growth would rather be greater ill the early 19ROs than in the 1970s. 
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occupational mobility, Rather than leading to any changes in productivity growth over time, 
these policies are likely to have had an adverse effect on productivity growth up until the mid 
1980s when the effects of expanded educational opportunities began to be felt in the 
workplace, and job reservation policies increasingly became a thing of the past. With respect 
to these issues Fallon (1992 : 5) argues that: 
"The main era of job reservation was between 1967 and 1974 ... Virtually 
all forms of job reservation had disappeared by 1984 ... Although controls 
of this kind never affected more than 2 percent of wage employees, it has 
been argued that, even in establishments in which reservations were not 
applied, the perception of the legislation among employers was that 
administrative and supervisory positions were reserved for whites. The 
dismantling of job reservation and other regulations helped open up access 
of qualified blacks to higher jobs." 
While the rapid expansion of government expenditure on black education in the 1970s has 
led to an increase in the number of years of schooling of the workforce, it appears that, to 
some extent, this expansion has been accompanied by a deterioration in the quality of 
education", While there is little direct evidence on the quality of education in South Africa, 
the following qualitative problems with the black education system have been emphasised: 
"Black education ... is characterised by an inequitable allocation of 
resources, overcrowded classrooms, high drop out rates and insufficient 
and poorly qualified teachers" (PiIIay, 1992 : 2) 
"Curriculum differences between black and white schools on paper are 
minor and concern mainly the language of instruction. In general it 
appears that in black education the same knowledge and skills are 
imparted as in the white system, but in a severely watered down form 
with lower examination standards and expectations and far fewer material 
inputs." (Archer and Moll, 1992 : 23) 
• See Moll (1991), 
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Fallon (1992) argues that the consequence of this seperate provision of education to racial 
groups and the limitations on the provision of training to Africans was to create very large 
gaps in racial skill levels. 
While the current educational expansion is a positive feature stimulating productivity growth, 
the quality of education and training is equally vital for improved production efficiency. In 
this respect, an assessment of the effectiveness of a nation' s education and training system 
requires an analysis of the nature of the learning process by which skills are acquired and 
deepened'. Although this is difficult to assess, it appears that the performance and capabilities 
of schoolleavers are crucial if subsequent learning processes in the workplace and in training 
institutes are to be effective. From the perspective of industrial achievement, the main 
function of schooling should be to ensure that pupils learn to learn'. In the context of rapidly 
changing technology, the general skills and basic mathematical and scientific prollciency of 
workers are important attributes for ensuring their flexibility in learning new skills. In this 
respect though, there is little evidence on the average mathematical attainments of South 
African pupils, apart from those who allege that very few students study maths or science for 
very long, with the result that most students are not very proficient in these areas. 
Prais (1987: 210) summarises the lessons that can be drawn from the comparative analysis 
of Britain's and Japan 's schooling systems as follows': 
1 Sec Wright (1992) for a more detailed discussion of these education quality issues as well as the effect of labour 
market innuences on skill deepening. Also sec Archer (1992) . 
'From the training pcrsl?cctivc see Archer ~1992), who argues that this same function is cruciaJ , both to learning 
on the job and in traming Institutes, for ensuring the suitability of workcr"s skills and their ncxibility. 
9 This article is the last in a series of comparative assessments of schooling, training systems and industrial 
capabilities of matchcd plants. Mostly Germanx and tllC UK are compared, but some articles do compare the UK to 
Japan (as in this article) and Francc. The aim of Prais's studies was to examine the extent to which the UK's recent 
poor relative industrial perfomlallCC was due to the structure of her education ~Uld training systems. 
"from the present comparisons we see that Japan's extraordinary 
industrial success is strongly based on (a) foundations laid during 
compulsory schooling, till the age of 15, by way of substantially higher 
attainments in mathematics by average pupils than in Britain ... ; and (b) 
these standards make possible more advanced vocational preparation - up 
to Technician level - at full-time Secondary Technical and Commercial 
Schools, at ages 16-18, for at least three times as many as attain that level 
here. Virtually all aged 16-18 in Japan continue to study mathematics and 
sciences, as part of non-compulsory full-time schooling, even if not on 
technical or scientific courses. Any training given subsequently in the 
course of employment in Japan is able to build on those foundations laid 
during full time schooling; training within industry can thus be more 
specialised, more effective and more worthwhile to the employer." 
80 
The quotation emphasises that it is the effectiveness of learning processes in schools, training 
institutes and on the job that are crucial for enhancing learning capabilities. Furthermore, 
these learning processes should not be considered in isolation, but as a sequence: 
"It is crucial to see the achievement of educational capacity not just as a 
school or college product, but rather as a school or college product 
affected by informal learning in family or group, altered by post school 
training, and altered by learning on the job." (King, 1984 : 59) 
It could be argued that the black education system under apartheid was not a central 
constraint on productivity growth because whites were afforded access to a high quality 
education and training system which enabled them to become highly skilled workers. 
However, this was more a weakness than a strength, since a few highly qualified professional 
and technical experts is not sufficient for continual production efficiency improvements. Prais 
(1987 : 199) emphasises this point strongly in his comparative assessment of Japanese and 
English learning systems: 
"Yet there remains a need to examine closely how attainments in schooling 
and the vocational preparation of their workforce compares with this 
country - particularly in relation to the average member of the workforce, 
rather than the university trained elite." Emphasis Added. 
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This issue is even more important in a developing country context like South Africa, which 
has to rely more on the effective assimilation and adaption of foreign technology than on its 
own inventions. As such, the whole workforce needs to be well educated and trained, not just 
a few professionals and technical experts who would rather invent and create. In terms of the 
framework discussed in chapter four, it seems that the South African education system and 
various apartheid labour market policies constrained productivity growth. The nature of the 
education and training system reduced the effectiveness of leaming-by-hiring and learning-by-
training mechanisms, while apartheid labour market policies also discouraged such processes 
in addition to imposing a significant constraint on learning-by-interacting within the firm. 
Overall, there seems a fair degree of consensus among South African analysts that education 
and training deficiencies in South Africa have had adverse consequences for industrial 
productivity growth. Indeed, from the evidence available, Joffe et al. (1993 : 37) conclude'·: 
"We thus observe a relatively uneducated population, a problematic 
schooling system, underinvestment in relevant training within the 
productive sector ... This suggests considerable market failure in the 
education and training systems." 
5.3 Qualitative Improvements to Capital 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Capital stock is defined as gross investment less depreciation, where conventional depreciation 
methods estimate an asset's lifetime in terms of how fast it deteriorates physically. The 
question is whether or not this provides an accurate valuation of the "true" capital stock. In 
the absence of technological change the measure of capital stock derived will be accurate if 
10 Atso see Archer (1992), Archer and Moll (1992) and Lall (1993). 
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the asset does in fact deteriorate at the assumed rate. However, as was seen above, Scott 
(1989) argues that an asset's true value is affected more by obsolescence in the face of 
technological change. Hence, to arrive at a "tme" capital stock requires adjusting capital stock 
according to the technological sophistication of different assets. Scott (1989) argues that 
cumulative gross investment (rather than investment less depreciation) provides a better 
measure of "true" capital stock". Baily (1981 : 17) concurs with Scott (1989) on this issue: 
.. A factory that is scrapped, extensively modified, or is put on reduced 
hours of operation has probably not worn out, it has become uneconomic. 
Individual components need replacement, and certainly maintenance costs 
rise over time. But obsolescence is usually more important in determining 
economic value. The standard IV.S.) data on capital stock takes no 
account of variations in scrapping rates, utilization rates, or the extent to 
which capital spending is used to modify old plants because of changes in 
factor price or product mix." 
The real problem then, is that providing an accurate value of an asset requires anticipating 
the asset's future worth, which may be both uncertain and unpredictable, since it will depend 
on how quickly superior new technologies appear to render the asset obsolete. This highlights 
the practical difficulty of separating technological change from capital accumulation . It may 
be impossible to distinguish between that portion of investment spent on replicating existing 
assets (maintaining them in the face of physical deterioration) from that spent on new and 
better technologyl2. According to the neoclassical model , technological change occurs 
exogenously according to the whims of science and will be adopted automatically and at no 
cost by rational firms seeking to maximise profit s. Ilowever. these assumptions effectively 
11 Scott (19R9) recogni ses lhal a1iscls wi ll require maintenance 10 ofrset physical deterioratioll, but argues that this 
effect on an asset's value will be minor compared 10 obsolcsccl1l.: t'. However, Scott argues that this devaluation of 
an asset 's value through obsolescence should 1101 reduce the value or IOtal capi tal stock. ln his view, a rirm wi ll only 
inves t in a new a1isel If this perfomls at leas t as well as the a1isct it replaces. Hence, a new asset should bring about 
an appreciation in the capital stock which will at least orrsel the depreciation in the capital stock from the 
obsolescence of the old a<scl. 
" More importal1lly though, Scoll (1989) argue.< Ihal Ihere may he lillie poinl in doing so s ince inveSlme11l is often 
necessary for the generalion and diffusion of technologicat change. 
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deny any role for investment, either as a generator or diffusor of technological change. In 
other words, the neoclassical theory essentially postulates that there will be no relationship 
between investment and productivity growth. However, even Solow (1988) recognises the fact 
that most new technology makes its way into production through investment in new 
machines13. This "embodiment effect" implies that slow investment may undermine 
technological change and so slow down productivity growth. 
The rapid capital accumulation that characterised most industries in South African 
manufacturing in the first three periods, 1945-54, 1954-63 and 1963-74 (see Figure 2.2 and 
Appendix D) suggest that slow investment cannot be held responsible for the relatively slow 
TFP growth in these periods. However, in the two most recent periods, 1974-81 and 1981 -90 
it is quite possible that slow investment - as indicated by the minimal capital-deepening 
occurring in almost all industries in each period - may have been responsible for the poor 
absolute TFP performance in these periods'4. The continued slow investment in almost all 
manufacturing industries since the 1970s is a particularly disturbing feature, in terms of the 
embodiment hypothesis, and can be expected to have fairly long lasting adverse consequences 
for TFP growth'S Learning-by-using, learning-by-searching and learning-by-doing processes 
tend to be undermined in period of slow investment. 
13 Solow (1988) argues though, that vinlage models should provide a more accurate value of capital stock by 
facilitating a more precise distinction between technological change and capital accumulation. However, the age 
classificatIOn used by most of these models may nol correspond very well with the liming and extcnl of technological 
change, so that they do not overcome the capital valuation problem noted by SCOti (1989) . 
14 A significant exception is the Industrial Chemicals industry in the 1974-R l period where massive capitaJ-
deepening was undertaken (12.7% per annum), but was matched by an equally significant decline in productivity 
(12.1% per annum). 
" See capital deepening trends in Appendix D. 
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5.3.2 Investment Efficiency, Technological Trends alld Foreign Investment 
It is commonly asserted that the manufacturing sector has become excessively capital 
intensive to the detriment of efficiency'". The simple neoclassical model specifies no 
relationship between TFP and investlnent, but suggests that as investment increases 
diminishing returns set in and an inefficient capital intensification process occurs. While 
capital-deepening has been the major source of labour productivity growth in all periods prior 
to 1974, it is not clear from a casual inspection what effect this characteristic feature of 
labour productivity growth has had on TFP growth. Regression results provide some support 
for the conjectures regarding the adverse efficiency effects of increased capital intensity. 
Table 5.2 summarises these results. They show a negative and significant relationship 
between TFP growth and capital-deepening across industries in all periods except the most 
recent period (1981-90), where the relationship was positive but not significant. 
This suggests that those industries in which capital-deepening was greatest tended to 
experience the worst TFP growth. While the most obvious interpretation of these results is 
that excessive capital-deepening has had an adverse effect on production efficiency. a number 
of qualifications need to be made to such an interpretation. Although correlation implies 
causality, it does not exclude the possibility of reverse causality or the effect of a third factor. 
Also, there is a need to assess the extent to which this relationship holds for all industries, 
and, for those that it does hold, there is a need for careful interpretation. With regard to this 
latter point, the capital-intensive industrial chemicals and basic metals industries are often 
singled out as prime examples of excessive and inefficient investment. The TI'P growth 
I' See Levy, B (1981) who argues that by suitable intemational comparisons South Arrica's manufacturing sector 
is heavily orientated towards capital intensive seclors. He argues t1mtthis oriental ion partly reneets govemment policy. 
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performance of basic metals in the 1963-74 period and industri al chemicals in the 1974-81 
period do tend to support these notions. However, the improved TFP growth performance of 
industrial chemicals in the 1981 -90 period does not support the following conclusion of Joffe 
et al. (1993 : I I), even if it may be applicable to the 1974-81 period: 
" . .investment in the chemicals sector was driven by strategic factors. 
Obtaining petrol from coal is a high-cost operation. Moreover, the attempt 
to tap offshore deposits has proved to be extremely costly. The strategic 
investments in the 1980s were estimated to have cost RI3-RI4bn in 1990 
prices, equivalent to half of total investment during the 1980s ... The 
consequence of these strategic investments has been to severely dampen 
capital and total factor productivity, particularly during the 1980s." 
Table 5.2: The relatioll be/ween TFP grow/II alld Capi/al-f)eepellillg 
Ye a r All Industries Labour-Intensive & Intermediate 
Capital- Intensive Industries 
Short Term Peri ods 
1 9 45-5 4 Gr;p . 0 . 00 - 0 . 67 (a GlCll.l R'· 0.16 G~ .·r 
-
- 0 . 97 - 0 . 28 (aG" /! '> R1...,. 0 . 01 
( 2.2 9) .. (0 .4 9 ) 
1 95 4-63 GrFP - 1. 4 1 - 0.36 (aGKII. ) R'- 0 . 11 G I l l> 1.13 - 0.32 (o.GI(I! ) R'- 0.06 (1. 73 ) ' (1. 04) 
1 96 3 - 74 Gr;p 
-
1.37 - O. 49 (aGI(/L ) R' - 0 . 15 G: .. p 0.06 + 0.36 (nGKIL ) R'- 0 .0 6 (2 . 06) .. (1.12 ) 
197 4-81 Gnp 
-
2 .1 7 - 1 . 1 1 (a.G" /I ) R' - 0 . 68 G· 1. 8 1 - O. 99 (nGIl If.l R'= 0 . 23 (7 . 19 ) .... (2 . 31 ) .. 
1 981-90 Gr • p - -1 .14 + 0.2 1 (aGI( J) R'- 0 . 0 1 G.;"" - -2 . 19 + 1 .01 (aG!(Il) R J._ 0 . 11 (0 . 5 1 ) (1. 47 ) 
Very Sh o r t, Medium an d Long Term Period s 
1985-90 GTrp 
-
1. 1 8 - 0. 8 3 (aGI(/!. ) R' · 0. 15 G1rr - - 0 . 08 - 1. 52 (aG,o,) R' · 0. 3 1 (2 . 06 ) .. (2 . 8 0 ) .. 
1945-60 GTFp - 0 . 23 - 0 . 57 (aGK /L ) R'- 0 . 20 G: FP - - 0.36 - 0.34 (a.Gk fL ) R'· 0 .0 4 (2 .46) . .. ( 0 . 89 ) 
1955- 73 GTFp . 1. 2 0 + 0 . 05 (aGKIL ) R J.= 0.00 G 1rr - 0.78 + O. 35 (aGIf! I) R' · 0.0 3 (0 .13) (0 . 69 ) 
19 4 5-75 Grrp 
-
- 0.15 + 0.01 (aGI(It) R'- 0 . 00 Gorp - - 0 . 54 + 0 . 28 (ClGI( /d R'- 0 . 03 ( 0 . 05) (0 . 74 ) 
1972-90 Gnp 
-
0 . 60 - 0.43 (aGl(/l ) R' - 0.09 G , - 0.23 - 0 . 28 (a GIC /1) R7._ 0 . 02 ( 1. 5 3 ) (0.63 ) 
Sourc e : Data f rom Tab l e 1.3. 
Note : These regressions results show the relati onsh i p bet\<leen TFF growth and Capital deepen ing 
across industr i es. The t-stati s tics for the coefficients of capital deepening ar~ shown in 
pare n t hesis b e low these coeff i cie n t s , and whe re s i g nifi c ant are indicated by asteri s ks : 
Level of Sign i ficance: . 90'k, .. 95'k, .. . 99%, ... . 99 . 9~. 
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However, it should be borne in mind that past investments in the capital-intensive industries 
have tended to be long term and lumpy in nature. Hence, the consequences of these 
investments will extend far beyond the period lengths of the short term regressions. And, as 
such, for longer term regressions the strength and significance of this relationship disappears. 
Hence, while there appears to be some support for the contention that the increased capital 
intensity of manufacturing has adversely affected TFP growth, the evidence is generally weak 
once it is carefully interpreted. It is possible that the seemingly heavy reliance on capital 
deepening by South African manufacturing is indicative of a serious malaise. However, it 
should be pointed out that heavy reliance on capital deepening is not unique to South Africa. 
International studies indicate that larger contributions from capital accumulation are a 
common feature of the growth pattern experienced by developing countries in contrast to 
developed countries17. Hence, for developing countries in particular, capital-deepening may 
be an important source of output and productivity growth to the extent that technological 
progress is facilitated through the embodiment effect. 
Besides the embodiment effect there are other factors that are likely to influence the quality 
of capital (the efficiency of investment). In this respect, as was discussed above, Romer 
(1990) addresses evidence from the U.S. and claims that it appears to show no systematic 
relationship between capital accumulation and TFP growth. He argues that this evidence is 
best explained by the fact that other factors (particularly knowledge) have a crucial influence 
on the relationship between capital accumulation and TFP growth. This does not deny the 
17 See Chapter 2, where inlcmalioml TFP comparisons arc made and commellls by Pack (1988) amongst others 
are noted. See also Brulon (1967), Chenery (1983) and Havrylysyn (1990). 
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importance of the embodiment effect, but emphasises that capital deepening can be excessive 
(inefficient) if it there is not an adequate, complementary stock of knowledge. The 
embodiment hypothesis, like the simple neoclassical model, suggests that technological change 
occurs exogenously (although slow investment can hamper the diffusion of technological 
change). In contrast, Romer's (1990) model suggests that there is scope for deliberate efforts 
to improve knowledge and technology. Following this view, while slow investment does have 
adverse consequences for TFP growth, rapid investment/capital-deepening need not be 
inefficient (leading to diminishing returns) so long as it is accompanied by deliberate efforts 
to improve knowledge. Where it appears that knowledge improvements are slow, implying 
a lack of deliberate learning efforts, there is a need to assess whether this is simply due to 
management slack, or, if in fact there are important institutional or other environmental 
factors restraining such learning efforts. 
An alternative interpretation (following Romer (1990)) of the rapid growth in capital-
deepening, and the negative short run correlations between capital-deepening and TFP growth 
in South African manufacturing prior to the 1970s, is that efforts to improve knowledge did 
not match the rate of capital accumulation, and it is because of this that diminishing returns 
set inl8 , What needs to be considered is the extent to which institutional and environmental 
factors present in the South African economy limited the ability of South African firms to 
1earn-by-searching and learn-by-using. In this respect, Joffe et al (1993) analyse data on R&D 
expenditures and argue that, at the national and sectoral level, investment in enhancing 
technological capabilities is low by international standards and currently declining. 
" In support of Romer's hypothesis, note that in the long run (sec Table S.2) there is no systematic relation 
between capital-deepening and TFP growth. 
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Since South Africa, like most developing countries, relies to a large extent on foreign 
technology, this interpretation might mean that the technology embodied in new technology 
from abroad is inappropriate for South Africa. Or, more importantly, it could mean that local 
firms are not devoting enough effort and resources to ensuring that foreign technology is 
effectively assimilated and adapted in this country. In other words, firms may be deriving few 
net benefits or rents from this technology given the terms of the technology transfer. It is 
quite possible that South African firms do not have the technical expertise to conduct 
effective searches, or that the nature of international relations may serve to thwart the 
effectiveness of such searches. 
As the earlier discussion of recent theories emphasises, production efficiency improvements 
require deliberate efforts to enhance technological capabilities: 
"Trained labour and physical capital are only fully productive when 
combined with efforts by productive enterprises to assimilate and improve 
upon the relevant technology ... it is evident that different countries devote 
different levels of effort to technology. Apart from domestic technological 
effort, the extent and nature of a country's reliance on foreign technology 
is also directly relevant to NTC [National Technological Capabilities). All 
countries need to import technology, but different modes of import have 
different impacts on local technological development." (Lall, 1992 : 170) 
Hence, there is a need to be sceptical of arguments that South Africa's productivity will 
improve so long as foreign investment is forthcoming. While foreign investment is crucial, 
the benefits of such investment needs to be evaluated in ternlS of the extent to which firm and 
national capabilities are enhanced. However, this does not imply that the other extreme of self 
sufficiency be adopted. As Dore (1984 : 76) says: 
"The brave posture of scorning any help from foreigners (from the foreign 
multinationals who have the rights in a lot of technology) is appealing. In 
reality it takes more patriotism and self confidence to grit your teeth in 
all humility, negotiate with the multinationals, driH an intelligent bargain 
and be damned to those who impugn your integrity." 
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This argues for a pragmatic approach, along the lines pursued by USIMINAS. Foreign and 
local capabilities should be combined in ways that progressively develop local capabilities in 
areas where they can be more efficient. In this regard the knowledge and bargaining skills of 
the purchasers are most important. Manoeuvrability in bargaining with multinationals should 
be sought in the dynamic elements of technological infonnation and understanding rather than 
in the technological means as it is the former two that are most crucial for facilitating a firm's . 
technological maturity". 
The fact that LDC firms can capture technological rents in this way is emphasised by the 
reluctance of multinationals to transfer these elements of technology for fear, that in so doing, 
they will undermine their ability to appropriate the full rents from their innovation: 
"there is evidence that these firms are more hesitant to send overseas their 
process technology than their product technology because they perceive 
that the diffusion of process technology once it goes abroad, it is harder 
to control." (Mansfield, 1985 : 223 fn 10) 
In purchasing from multinationals it may be difficult or prohibitively expensive to acquire the 
technological understanding and information with the means. Hence, in certain cases the best 
option may be for firms to create their own technology. However, the costs and constraints 
to achieving technological maturity in this way also need to be borne in mind. 
In this respect, India is noted for its strategy of technological self-sufficiency and Bruton 
(1989) argues that there is evidence of genuine 'kllow-why' being achieved, and technological 
maturing occurring. However, the dismal TFP performance by India (see Table 2.3) suggests 
" See Chapler 4 and Figure 4.2 in particular as well as Ihe discllssion oflhe USIMINAS case sludy. 
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that the short run costs of such a strategy have been high . However, potential dynamic long 
term productivity returns to such a strategy may to some extent justify the costs. In contrast, 
while there is evidence that Korea lags far behind India in technological maturity it has 
clearly recorded impressive TFP growth performance. 
By all accounts, the South African manufacturing sector has undergone significant growth and 
structural change so that it is now both diversified and fairly large in comparison with other 
sectors and countries20. However, the extent to which it has technologically matured is less 
clear. Trends in the size, nature and performance of a country's capital goods sector is 
sometimes taken as an indicator of the country's technological maturity. Table 5.3 helps put 
some of these issues in context. What is most disconcerting is the relatively small contribution 
made by machinery and transport equipment to value added in the manufacturing sector in 
South Africa compared to other countries, in addition to its comparative export and import 
propensities in these industries. 
These trends may reflect a dependence on foreign technology. If a country possesses a high 
degree of knowledge and understanding about technology, then the decision to import 
technology, in preference to creating it, may not indicate a dependency relationship. As 
argued above, this is especially important from the dynamic perspective of possessing the 
capabilities to capture technological rents by assimilating and adapting foreign technology. 
However, in a situation where a host nation's technological capabilities are weak, the decision 
to import technology is likely to indicate a dependency relationship. While South Africa's 
technological capabilities remain to be clarified, in comparisons to other countries, the nature 
20 Sec Archer (J 987), McCarthy (1988) 
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and significance of South Africa's machinery and transport equipment industries does not 
present a reassuring picture of the technological maturity of manufacturing. 
Overall then, in South Africa there is litile evidence on either domestic technological efforts 
or the impact that foreign technology has had on ITe. Without much supporting evidence, the 
Kleu study group (J 983) merely notes that most technology is transferred to South Africa in 
a packaged form. Similarly, Fransman (1982 : 254) emphasises the paucity of information on 
technology transfer, but notes that what information there is indicates: 
" ... a manufacturing sector that undertakes little research and 
development expenditure and imports foreign technology through licensing 
and other know-how agreements." 
Joffe et al. (1993) also argue that local fimls tend to rely upon the acquisition of technology 
from abroad. Additionally, Joffe et al. (1993 : 45) emphasise that licence agreements: 
" •. are characterised by high levels of royalties and frequent and wide 
ranging restrictive clauses, including typically on exporting." 
The penetration of foreign direct investment into South Africa appears to be of a similar 
magnitude to other developing countries (see Appendix H). However, the extent to which 
a country is dependent on foreign technology is not easily resolved by recourse to indicators 
of foreign direct investment. Given the evidence just considered it is quite plausible that the 
nature of technological transfer has been a dependent one in which South African firms have 
failed to enhance their own technological capabilities in the process, with the result that 
production efficiency gains have been small. Hence, the nature of this technology relationship 
may have undermined the effectiveness of learning mechanisms in South African firms. 
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Table 5.3: The Manufacluring and Capital Goods Sector ill Selected CoulIl";es. 
South South Brazil India UK West 
Korea Africa Germany 
l. Manufacturi ng as % of GOP, 1960 12 23 26 14 32 40 
Manufacturing as % of GOP, 1977 25 22 16 25 38 
Manufacturing as % of GOP, 1985 28 23 17 22 3 1 
2. Machinery & transport equip as • 
, 23 17 30 12 32 33 
of manufacturing value added, 1975 
Machinery & transport equip as • ~ 29 20 18 19 33 41 
of manufacturing value added, 1984 
3. Machinery and transport equip as a 4 1 H 44 
% of merchandise exports, 1960 
Machinery and transport equip as a 17 5 10 6 .j 0 48 
% of merchandise exports, 1976 
Machinery and transport equip as • 36 2 14 4 32 47 % of merchandise exports, 1985 
4 . Machinery and t ran sport equip .s a 12 37 36 30 8 10 
% of merchandise imports , 1960 
Machinery and transport equip as a 27 55 29 19 21 18 
% o f merchandise imports, 1976 
Machinery and transport equip as a 34 55 15 25 32 23 
% of merchandise imports, 1985 
Sources: Fransman, 1982, p245, Table 12.7 and Wo r l d Deve l opment Report, 1987. 
5.3.3 The Impact of Trade Policies 0 11 the Quality (if Capital 
Much theoretical and empirical work has focu sed on the relationship between trade orientation 
and productivity growth2l . The practice of making development aid conditional on trade 
liberalisation exemplifies the prevailing, though widely disputed, wisdom that nations who 
adopt neutral, or outward orientated trade regimes will outperfonn those who pursue more 
endemic policies which protect domestic producers from foreign competition. 
At the theoretical level , few di spute the orthodox l'Onclusion that free trade is optimal for 
static efficiency. The fundamental quest ion however, is whether this result has any 
11 It should be emphasised that this focus by economists on the trade regime has tended to detract from the 
importance of other national characteristics important to indusl rialisation and productivity, especially issues of 
technological capabilities on the supply side. 
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implications for a particular nation 's long term growth and welfare. 
The relation between degree of openness and efficiency is at the centre of the case for trade 
liberalisation. The main arguments used to justify this notion can basically be broken down 
into two categories. Firstly, the benefits of a larger market and secondly, the incentives that 
foreign competition brings22: 
1 a) Openness leads to specialization in internationally competitive goods which allows for 
greater economies of scale. 
b) Specialization and the opportunities for export growth helps contribute to greater 
capacity utilization. 
c) Access to larger markets that openness ensures is supposed to facilitate 'learning by 
doing' as is postulated by Verdoorn' s law of a positive relation between productivity 
growth and cumulative output. 
Hence larger scale and a greater intensity of input use are seen as being major 
efficiency benefits of an open trade policy. While the benefits of a larger market 
offered by the international market are obvious, it is not at all obvious how easy it is 
to penetrate these markets. With regard to emerging industries, the argument about the 
benefits of increased capacity utilization, economies of scale and the scope for 
learning by doing could just as easily apply to the benefits that protection affords to 
import competing industries, in terms of assuring them of a larger share of the 
domestic market. In fact, one of the main justifications for promoting infant industries 
was the belief that with time and a larger market they would be able to learn by doing 
"See Pack (19R8:349) and Havrylysyn (1990). 
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and so become internationally competitive. 
2a) The pressure of international competition should ensure the elimination of X 
inefficiency which is argued to characterize local firms who exist behind trade barriers 
and are able to pursue the quiet life. 
b) Similarly, the pressure of international competition should force fimls to stay up to 
date with technological advances and incorporate them as and when they occur. 
c) Interaction in foreign markets is regarded as exposing firms to information about new 
technological products and processes". 
The pressure of international competition can certainly have a positive effect on 
productivity by eliminating unnecessary slack within the firm. However, it may also 
have the negative effect of preventing firms from investing in the technological 
capabilities necessary to compete successfully in the future. In other words it may 
force the allocation of resources in accordance with static rather than dynamic 
considerations. Given linkages and public good attributes (such as partial 
excludability) of technology, competition may act as a disincentive on firms to commit 
resources to the enhancement of technological capabilities. This criticism applies also 
to the notion of the role of 'learning by doing'. As was emphasised earlier, it is 
insufficient to rely on this passive, costless and automatic learning mechanism to 
generate the capabilities needed to compete successfully in the future. Also, the 
assumption that the mere interaction in foreign markets is somehow sufficient to 
"Edwards (1991 : 5), specifies a Romer type model where he postulates a: 
.. 'Iearnin,&-by-Iooking' type of process where the mere contact with newer commodities and 
technologies Increases the efficiency with which innovations are absorbed." 
95 
ensure the diffusion of appropriate technology is highly questionable. The nature of 
interactions and the technological capabilities of those interacting in foreign markets 
are pertinent to the costs and benefits of the technology that is transferred. 
At the most general level, all these arguments require significant qualification. Nishimizu and 
Robinson (1984) argue that it is quite plausible that the causation runs from productivity 
performance to output and export growth rather than the reverse that is suggested by this 
analysis. Furthermore, most of the arguments ignore the crucial role played by technological 
capabilities. As Lall (1992 : 171) argues: 
"Most of the conventional arguments are not couched in terms of the 
impact of trade strategies on technological capabilities, but the implicit 
assumptions made about technological capability (Te) development are 
very relevant to the issue." 
This point is just as applicable to the arguments used to justify protectionist trade strategies. 
As was noted earlier, the passive learning-by-doing justification for infant industries is likely 
to be of little importance to technological capability. At the heart of the impact of trade 
strategies on technological capabilities is the fact that international competition can be either 
a stimulant or a retardant. International competition can provide a powerful incentive for firms 
to deliberately enhance their technological capabilities. Lall emphasises that it is because of 
this that many of the barriers which governments erect to such competition may retard 
technological development, efficiency, export growth and structural change, precisely because 
they are made in a sweeping, irrational and prolonged way. 
That many countries which adopted import substitution policies have experienced many 
problems is by now fairly well established. In these cases though it is not always clear that 
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the policy of import substitution was responsible for the problems. In this respect, in a study 
of the objectives and achievements of import substitution, Bruton (1989) argues that much 
of the lambasting of the strategy is unwarranted and frequently focused on the wrong issues. 
He argues further that protection should be viewed as an investment in the economy's future-
a future in which the economy is more independent and productive: 
"More specifically, the objective is to establish a flexible, responsive 
economy that can take advantage of opportunities generated in the world 
at large and, more importantly, that can generate its own opportunities. 
Behind this protection, new activities are created that modify the structure 
of the economy and induce learning. The achievement of both these 
objectives is necessary if import substitution is to accomplish the intended 
objectives. Learning is reflected most clearly in total factor productivity 
growth and in the emergence of an indigenous technological capacity. This 
latter notion is admittedly fuzzy and TFPG is also open to severe 
measurement and conceptual problems." (Bruton, 1989 : 1637). 
Hence, it seems more appropriate to assess the merits of various trade regimes on the basis 
of their impact on technological capabilities24 . The incentive structure of a particular trade 
regime will have an important influence on the deliberate efforts of firms to enhance their 
technological capabilities. It should also be emphasised that protection and export promotion 
need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, it is quite possible that protection may be a necessary 
phase in which technological capabilities are built up so that cost reductions and quality 
improvements facilitate the achievement of international competitiveness and ensure the 
successful penetration of foreign markets by exports. 
The above analysis has examined some of the causal connections used to justify the link 
between trade orientation, output and productivity growth and technological capabilities. Is 
there any evidence to support these arguments and how strong is it ? Havrylyshyn (1990 : 7) 
examines the evidence regarding the link between productivity growth and trade policy and 
24 The meriLs of various Lrade regimes should also be coosidered from Lhe perspecLive of Lhe staLe's abiliLy and 
willingness to implement Lhese sLraLegies in accordance with Iheir aims. 
concludes that empirical studies of productivity that do make a reference to trade policy: 
"generally support the hypothesis of a positive relation between degree of 
openness and efficiency gains. The conclusions are generally weak, 
however, and based as much on qualitative as quantitative evidence." 
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Edwards (1991) emphasises that the major problem encountered in attempting to test the 
hypothesised link between trade orientation and productivity growth is the difficulty In 
constructing adequate indicators of trade orientation. There are basically two approaches that 
have been adopted to deal with this problem. Neither of them fully resolve the problem 
however. The one approach25 constructs a subjective index of trade orientation, but as 
Edwards (1991 : 3) emphasises the results of these studies depend: 
"upon whether Korea and a few other countries are classified as 
'Iiberalised' or 'unliberalised' economies." 
The second approach essentially uses exports'· as an indicator of trade orientation". The 
weakness of this approach is that strong assumptions are required if the results are to be 
interpreted conclusively. Interpreting a positive relationship between exports and TFP growth 
as indicative of the benefits of an outward orientated trade policy requires assuming that 
liberal trade regimes do facilitate export expansion. However, the association between exports 
and productivity can be interpreted in a number of ways. It is just as plausible that 
productivity growth from other sources facilitates export growth"'. Nishimizu and Robinson 
" See Wortd Development report, 1987. 
2' Edwards (1991) approach uses Leamer's index of trade orientation, but it appears that this index is constructed 
from trade nows and mtensity and so may not be significantly different fTOm uSlllg exports. 
" See Feder (1983) and Nishimizu and Robinson (1984), 
23 It is also quite possible lhat a bias against exports arises hcca usc slow productivity leads domestic producers to 
prcssuri7.e the slate to implement protectionist mcm;urcs. In this case protectionist measures do not stern from a 
coherent strategy based on economic rationality. 
(1984: 191) note: 
"One must be very cautious ... in implying the direction of causality in the 
relationship. For example, it is just as plausible that higher rates of 
exogenous TFP change lead to rapid growth in demand through lower 
costs and prices." 
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Hence, while there is little doubt that a country that is experiencing rapid productivity, output 
and export growth is in an extremely fortunate situation, it is not at all clear that the 
fundamental cause of this association is due to the trade regime per se. It is simplistic to 
assume that the mere adoption of an outward orientated trade regime is sufficient to ensure 
either rapid productivity growth or rapid export growth . 
In a review of alternative trade strategies Pack (19Rg : 372) concludes that: 
"Export orientation ... does not appear to yield higher total factor 
productivity than does import substitution. Comparisons of total factor 
productivity growth among countries pursuing different international 
trade orientations do not reveal systematic differences in productivity 
growth in manufacturing, nor do the time series studies of individual 
countries that have experienced alternating trade regimes allow strong 
conclusions in this dimension. . . .it seems unlikely that the absence of the 
expected pattern stems primarily from deficiencies in the data." 
This lack of conclusive evidence regarding the link between the trade regime and productivity 
growth leads Pack (1988) to conclude that there may be no short cuts to industrial 
proficiency. It may in fact be technological capabilities that are the missing explanation of 
productivity growth differences rather than data deficiencies that account for the poor 
explanatory power of conventional models. It might easily be the case that there is no 
systematic relationship between the broad characterizations of nations' trade orientations and 
their technological capabilities. However, technological capabilities are not easily quantified 
satisfactorily, so empirical evidence on the fundamental determinants of productivity is likely 
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to remain inconclusive. In this regard, Pack's conclusion may be partly correct insofar as 
technological capabilities are not easily acquired, and do require lengthy deliberate learning. 
What implications does this analysis have for the link between South Africa's trade 
orientation and its productivity performance? To answer this question it is first necessary to 
provide a brief description of the structure and trade orientation of the South African 
manufacturing sector. 
The present structure of the South African economy owes its foundations to the discovery and 
exploitation of gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century. A manufacturing sector 
emerged to satisfy the needs of the mines and the mining communities. Mining interests were 
closely tied to British commercial interests and the power of their opposition to protection for 
local manufacturing is evident in the Customs Tariff Act (no 26) of 1914 which clearly comes 
out in favour of a policy of free trade. It is apparent that up until the end of world war one 
the structure of the manufacturing sector evolved mainly from the natural protection that 
transport costs and wartime disruptions afforded, rather than from any explicit attempt to 
shape its evolution. However, the Nationalist-Labour PACT government ushered in a new 
phase for industrialisation in South Africa. This coalition was essentially an alliance of white 
labour interests , nationalist white farmers and manufacturing capital (against mining and 
commercial interests). The strategy of active economic industrialization was viewed by the 
government as necessary to ensure greater economic independence, and also partly a reflection 
of the desire to develop a solid industrial base to replace the wasting gold mining industry. 
Since then South Africa has pursued a fairly active protection policy to promote 
industrialisation. The state has also actively participated in the establishment of large 
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induslries. Officially this has been viewed as a way to advance the process of import 
substitution, given the reluctance of private local or foreign investors to commit themselves 
to such large undertakings. Despite the recommendations of government commissions, since 
the Reynder's commission (1972), for South Africa to pursue a more neutral or outward 
orientated trade strategy, in practice trade policy has continued to focus on import 
replacement. Nevertheless, Belli et al. (1993 : l) point out that: 
"since the early 1970s .. the trade regime has undergone substantial 
modifications that have made exports more profitable and the trade 
regime less protective." 
Bell (1992) argues that important import-liberalisation steps in this period included the 
replacement of quantitative restrictions with tariffs and the switching from a positive to a 
negative list of goods requiring import permits. However, it is only as recently as 1990, when 
the General Export Incentive Support Scheme (GEISS) was implemented, that the move in 
official thinking began to be put seriously into practice. The scheme does not attempt to 
discriminate, as it entitles all exporters to a subsidy. In this regard, apart from state 
intervention and subsidised interest rates, which favour more capital intensive industries, there 
is little evidence of a coherent attempt by the state to target industries for (import or export) 
promotion". Nor has there been any attempt to draw out the implications of these policies 
for the technological capabilities of firms or industries. This is not surprising as the 
government does not really have a technology policy. as finance minister Keys makes clear: 
"The last thing we could claim is that we are in any position to be arbiters 
of what kind of development should go on, or that we are able to develop 
some kind of master plan which would result in an optimal development 
of technology in South Africa." (Financial Mail, 1992 : 41) 
" This is even though orricial documents claim II,at the principle or customs tarirrs in South Arrica is to provide 
moderate and selective protection. See McCarthy (1988 :9) 
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Import substitution has clearly played an important role in the growth and diversification of 
the South African manufacturing sector. However, given the productivity performance of the 
South African manufacturing sector many have questioned the efficacy of the import 
substitution policy pursued in South Africa. Despite inconclusive theoretical and empirical 
evidence regarding the link between the trade regime and productivity growth, the dominant 
view in South Africa still comes out in favour of a more liberal trade regime. Against this 
background various authors have argued that the state's policy of import substitution is an 
important part of the explanation for the poor productivity performance of the South African 
manufacturing sector. Becker and Pollard (1990 : 9) argue: 
" .. it is apparent that the mere threat of sanctions has already forced 
South Africa to take costly evasive action that reduces its dependence on 
the outside world. The consequence has been to greatly curtail South 
Africa's productivity growth .. " 
Similarly, Moll (1990) argues that the Nationalist governments adoption of import substitution 
was one of the most important factors responsible for the poor productivity performance of 
the South African economy. Moll's "opportunities missed hypothesis" claims that South 
Africa missed out on a golden opportunity to penetrate export markets in the 1950s and 60s 
phase of worldwide prosperity'°, with the result that it under-achieved in respect of its 
productivity growth potential. However, the measures in Chapter 2 indicate that while South 
Africa's productivity performance was not exceptionally good - in comparison to other 
countries - in the 1950s and 1960s, it was not exceptionally bad either. More importantly 
though, it IS not at all clear that South Africa possessed the capabilities, especially 
JO Joffe et al. (1993) reach similar conclusions aflcr comparing Soulh Africa's industrial exporl record wilh the 
records of various Newly industrialised countries: 
"There is little doubt that by comparison with many LDCs, South Africa has missed out on 
significant export opportunities." 
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technological, necessary to successfully penetrate export markets. In this respect, Moll (1990) 
uses catch up theory to argue that by the start of the 1950s South Africa had acquired 
substantial infrastructural and social capabilities and so had the potential to realise its 
"advantages of backwardness". His conclusions regarding this potential were reached despite 
quoting Abramovitz regarding the difficulty of describing social capabilities. In addition, Moll 
(1990) does not adequately assess the technological capabilities that South Africa possessed 
at the time. As the framework in this thesis emphasises, these issues are vital, and any 
account which attempts to explain without a careful consideration of them is likely arrive at 
unwarranted conclusions. 
Belli et al. (1993) suggest that the modifications to the trade regime seem to have had some 
effect. Although manufacturing export growth remained slow in the 1972-83 period, it was 
moderately high in the 1983-90 period. Belli et al. (1993) estimate that TFP growth, for 
manufacturing as a whole, increased from 0.05% in the period 1972-83 to 0.55% in the period 
1983-90. In contrast, estimates in this thesis and those of Moll (1990)31 suggest that TFP 
growth worsened between 1974-81 and 1981-90, even though all estimates suggest that it 
appears low in absolute terms in both periods. While Belli et al. (1993) argue that they find 
this poor TFP growth performance a puzzle, they do suggest that the import substituting 
industrialising policies pursued in South Africa are partly responsible. They try to address this 
issue by examining the relationship between TFP growth and the sources of output growth 
in South African manufacturing in the periods 1972-83 and 19R3-90. They conclude from 
their analysis that there was a positive and significant association between export expansion 
and TFP growth in both periods. However, Joffe et a!. (1993) are reluctant to accept Belli et 
3\ See Appendix A for a comparison of the different eSlimales. 
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ai's (1993) argument that export expansion can cause productivity growth improvements given 
international evidence which finds no significant relationship between export expansion and 
productivity growth. Furthermore, from their detailed sector analysis, Joffe et al. (1993) find 
little evidence of production efficiency' improvements by firms who expanded exports. 
However, they did find that export expansion enabled many firms to operate at higher 
capacity levels. This may provide an alternative explanation for Belli et ai ' s (1993) finding 
of a positive association between TFP growth and export expansion. While the benefits of 
higher capacity utilisation are clear, what it is not encouraging is the tendency of firms to 
only pursue export markets in times of sluggish domestic demand32. However, if firms that 
were previously geared to the domestic market are able to sustain export volumes, this may 
suggest that their export success is partly due to past import protection measures that 
facilitated their technological maturity. 
It should also be emphasised that Belli et ai's (1993) analysis provides little support for their 
other conjecture about the association between import substitution and productivity growth. 
While the relationship between import substitution and TFP growth was negative in the 1972-
83 period, the relationship was not statistically significant. Furthermore, in the 1983-90 
period, the relationship between import substitution and TFP growth is positive and 
statistically significant. Hence, their overall empirical analysis does not provide strong support 
for their argument that the import liberalisation and export expansion trends, in the 1970s and 
1980s, helped improve TFP growth in South African manufacturing. 
Jl See Bell (1992), Holden (1992) and Lall (1993) . 
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It needs to be emphasised that trade policy is only one factor, among many, which influences 
productivity growth and so should not be regarded as the simple panacea for improving 
productivity growth. 
5.4 Other Factors 
5.4.1 Work Organisationallllfluences 
This section essentially takes cognisance of the human dimension of production. Figure 4.1 
(b) emphasised that individuals are role players in organisations. How individuals behave and 
interact in an organisation has important implications for the effectiveness of the organisation. 
Like technology the neoclassical model treats the internal workings of a firm as a black box. 
The essential assumption is that management has full control and adopts the cost minimising 
solution in the face of perfect competition. In reality, a firm is not a unitary actor, and its 
performance does depend on the actions, decisions and efforts of its personnel. Behavioural 
and evolutionary" theorists emphasise that in reality there is no simple global function to 
be optimised as rationality is bounded. Rather, fimls satisfice in an attempt to satisfy the 
divergent interests of the different groups that comprise a finn . 
Hence, the structure of an organisation is vital to a finn's perfonnance. A particular structure 
entails a particular combination of penalty and reward mechanisms which influences the 
discretionary behaviour of individuals. The structure of a firm's organisation also determines 
how individuals interact within the finn and so will also influence the degree to which 
knowledge and capabilities are transmitted through the organisation. Hence, the particular 
structure of a firm will have an important impact on the extent to which leaming-by-
JJ Nelson and Winter (1982), Simon (1955), eyert and March (1%3). 
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interacting takes place within a firm. However, it should be emphasised that the particular 
structure of a firm is not simply a matter of management design, but will be influenced by 
worker-manager relations as well as external institutional and other environmental factors . 
Recent literature" suggests that fundamental technological changes are taking place, in the 
form of radically new products and production processes. They emphasise that the benefits 
of this new technological paradigm require radical changes to institutions and the social 
relations of production. They argue that the Taylorist era has become obsolete. In this era 
work was organised to mass produce a standardised product with an extreme division of 
labour which made workers highly specialised at very routine tasks. The new technological 
paradigm has facilitated a work organisation system based on the standardised production of 
differentiated products (flexible specialisation) which require more skilled and flexible 
workers. In terms of the work extraction function this technological paradigm shift has 
orchestrated a change in the social relations of production away from surveillance and divide-
and-rule strategies (the stick) and in favour of improving the skills, control and participation 
of workers. This relies more on organisational aspects and monetary rewards (the carrot)". 
Japanese work practices such as lifetime employment, job rotation, quality circles and 
participative management are all highly reliant on worker cooperation36• In the context of 
these organisational forms for the present technological paradigm it suggests that worker 
unity, in the form of peer group determination of worker norms, may be more effective than 
owner control via divisive divide and rule strategies. 
"Piori and Sabel (19R4), Percz (19RJ), PereT. and Freeman (l9RR) and Boyer (I'lRR) 
" For a discussion of some of the training implications of these organisational forms sec the next section (3.4) and 
Archer (1992). 
36 Cooperalive workcr-manag"cmcnt relations may also be necessary, though not sufficient, for the effectiveness of 
such practices as Just in time (JIT) management and subcontracting. 
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In South Africa the increasing power and militancy of national trade unions, such as 
COSATU and NACTU may undermine the efforts of individual firms to improve productivity 
through work organisational change. Job reservation. which characterised apartheid labour 
market policy militated against the foimation of work organisation systems based on a 
cooperative management labour relationship. Since social and institutional structures lack 
inertia, the effect of these policies is likely to be felt for some time. In addition, this policy 
together with other aspects of apartheid is likely to have reinforced the strength of trade 
unions, especially at the national level. However, Joffe et al. (1993) argue that with the 
dismantling of apartheid and the introduction of new forms of work organ isation in 
production, unions are likely to moderate industrial action. If this materialises it could 
generate significant improvements to productivity. 
Some argue that businessmen cannot be relied upon to make the substantively rational 
decisions that are required for the improvement of technological capabilities necessary for 
international competitiveness37• As a result, apart from the pursuit of wage restraint by a 
strong state, the only way substantive rationality will dominate is if a national union takes the 
lead in designing and pursuing an industrial strategy". However, on the basis of the 
conceptual framework used in this thesis, it is rather argued that the nature of emerging 
technology requires a cooperative relationship between labour and management if 
technological capabilities are to be improved. Such a cooperative relationship seems unlikely 
in a situation where a strong national union is perceived as telling management its job. Joffe 
et al. (1993) also advocate the active involvement of organised labour in industrial strategy. 
11 See Higgens (1993) . 
• 38 Even ira nalional union-led iniliative is fairly successful ill forcing substantial rationaliLy 011 business, il is highly 
likely that the unemployment situation will worsen. 
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However, they seem to argue that the state should be able to broker the cooperation of 
management and organised labour. 
5.4.2 Cultural and Institutional Factors' 
As with technology, conventional economics prefers to treat cultural and institutional factors 
as exogenous, to be explained by other disciplines. However, institutional economics is a 
growing subject" that has arisen from a number of different lines of analysis and schools 
of thought. 
Figure 4.1 emphasises the importance of cultural and institutional factors for regulating the 
way individuals, firms and the state behave and interact. The nature of this environment is 
likely to be different in different countries with implications for productivity performance. 
Institutions have been taken to mean a number of things to different people. Nabli and Nugent 
(1989 : 1334) argue that institutions can best be understood either from: 
"a behavioural perspective, in which 'institutions are complexes of norms 
of behaviour that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes' 
(Uphoff, 1986 : 9), or from a rules perspective where institutions are the 
rules of a society or of organisations that facilitate coordination among 
people by helping them form expectations which each person can 
reasonably hold in dealing with others." 
The former can be regarded as entailing the cultural values of a society that governs the 
relationship among its individual and group members. A society's culture involves a high 
degree of permanence that essentially has to be taken as given, for the purposes of designing 
,. See amongst others: Doeringcr and Streeten (1989), Nabli and Nugelll (1989), Ranis (1989), Perez (1983) and 
Boyer (1988). 
108 
a development strategy. However, the rules perspective indicates that, within a given culture, 
the set of rules a society adopts are not inimical to change. While institutions can be changed, 
their ability to regulate coordination is largely achieved by the understanding of permanence 
and predictability. This ability is also dependent on the perception that the rules (whether 
legislative, cultural norms or private market contracts) will actually be enforced. 
Government's do have an important role to play in the formation and operation of institutions, 
but there are many other rules outside the realm of government that characterise a nation's 
institutions. In this respect institutions should be regarded as contracts governing the relations 
between parties to a contract. Th,e parties to a contract may be the state and its citizens, but 
they can just as easily be a union and its members, a firm and its employees or two persons. 
There is no doubt that institutions playa fundamental role in a nation's performance. How 
institutions are fonned'· is clearly important, but beyond the scope of this analysis. 
In contrast to other commentators, Ranis (1989 : 1443) regards the success of the East Asian 
NICs, in their transition to modern growth, as being due to: 
"the role of institutional/organisational changes orchestrated by a 
government which was both sensitive to these systems initial conditions 
and to the importance of setting the stage for the fullest participation, 
through markets, of a large number of dispersed private actors." 
40 It could be argued that (government) institutions merely rence! the most powerful parties - or interest groups -
to a contracl. From this perspective the formation of the institution of apartheid by !11C Nationalist government in 1948 
may be belter understood as renecting the enormous power of white workers rather than being a simple unilateral 
decision by the government as Moll (1990) appears to argue. 
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He sees this success as being comprised of three ingredients: secularism, egalitarianism and 
nationalism'I Ranis regards secularism as entailing the attachment of a high priority to 
economic attainment rather than political, ideological or religious notions. He sees 
egalitarianism in terms of a society thaI is committed to equality of access and opportunity 
rather than equality of outcome. Lastly, organic nationalism is seen as a common purpose and 
allegiance of individuals and groups of a society that is based on a common heritage: 
"While economists are understandably loathe to put too much weight on 
cultural factors, there can be little doubt that the felt need to create a 
synthetic type of nationalism when facing marked regional, ethnic or 
religious disparities among groups pulling in different directions all too 
frequently lead new LDC governments to overpromise and overcommit 
and, as a consequence, to be both unable to carry out the major 
development functions and in danger of losing their credibility early in the 
game." (Ranis, 1989 : 1445) 
Drawing on Olson's (1982) analysis, Pack (1988) argues that the East Asian success stems 
from the willingness and ability of the state to pursue institutional change in spite of the 
power of interest groups opposing such change. This ability and willingness may not simply 
reflect the power of a strong state, but may also reflect the degree of consensus between the 
state and its citizens which recognises a mutual obligation to pursue national rather than group 
interests. Institutions can help to restore confidence in a government by limiting its discretion 
to satisfy the rights of powerful interest groups before the national interest. In South Africa, 
this can partly be achieved through greater equality of opportunity and access - especially in 
the education and training system and in the workplace. 
" Authors such as Perez (1983), Freeman and Pere7. (1988) or Boyer (1988) focus on the applicability ofa given 
social structure for the emerging technological paradigm. While Ranis abstracts from this technological dimension 
his analysis does help emphasise the importance or coopcration alld consensus which many see as vllal to the latest 
technological paradigm wnere nexible specialisation is an important component or work organisation and requires 
a greater degree of skills, flexibility and participation by workers. which can only be achieved through labour-
management coopcratlon and tmst. 
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Moll (1990) argues that apartheid had an 'ossifying' effect on economic growth in South 
Africa. He argues that an important part of this is that black education and job reservation 
policies constrained the occupational mobility of blacks which ultimately resulted in a skills 
shortage. This skills shortage, together with the higher price for the "skilled" whites are seen 
to have had an adverse effect on productivity performance. Fallon (1992 : 2) also supports 
this interpretation: 
" .. as strong labour market discrimination accompanied by enabling 
legislation effectively reserved middle and upper-level jobs for whites, the 
supply of whites may have acted as an effective constraint on the 
productive capacity of the economy. Declining growth in white labour 
supply during the 1970s and early 1980s may then have had the effect of 
reducing .. economic growth. II 
In the long run the removal of these inequalities should overcome this productivity growth 
restraint. However, the time that these apartheid pol icies have been in operation" does not 
bode well for encouraging a more cooperative relationship between workers and management. 
Such a relationship appears to be important for the future perfonnance of the manufacturing 
sector where the emerging technological paradigm suggests the optimality of a work 
organisation system based on flexible specialisation. 
Ranis's (1989) analysis helps add a note of scepticism to those attempting to emulate the 
success of the East Asian NICs. He argues that for cultural reasons the possibilities are remote 
that the NIC strategies can be successfully adopted in deeply divided societies such as South 
Africa. However, his analysis does point to areas of institutional change that can help to 
restore confidence in the government's ability to act for the common good. 
42 It is of course recognised that firms did 110t always comply with joh reservation regulations. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
6.1 Theory and Policy 
It has been stressed in earlier chapters that the neoclassical model is of limited use for 
assessing the fundamental causes of productivity growth. Most of the current proposals for 
enhancing the productivity growth of the South African manufacturing sector are mainly 
based on neoclassical principles. Hence, the relevance of these proposals is limited. These 
proposals espouse free markets, locally and internationally on the basis of a static theory of 
comparative advantage. It is far from clear whether such a recommendation is relevant to, let 
alone optimal for dynamic. long run growth. In the light of the problems with the neoclassical 
proposals, some recent alternative theories have been considered. As was discussed earlier, 
these theories provide a useful basis for the construction of a coherent framework with which 
the fundamental determinants of the productivity performance of the South African 
manufacturing sector can be analysed. 
Following Denison (1984), it is argued that to a certain extent the fundamental causes of 
productivity growth will remain a mystery, as they cannot be ljuantified. The inconclusiveness 
of the evidence on the link between productivity growth and trade policy supports this general 
conclusion of Denison's. It is clear then , that any attempt to provide a definitive explanation 
of the performance of South African manufacturing should be treated with a certain amount 
of scepticism. Accepting this, a framework has been constructed for analyzing the processes 
by which technological capabilities are built up that facilitate improvements in production 
efficiency in the long term. Rather than trying to provide a definitive explanation of 
productivity trends then, such an analysis seeks to examine the processes involved in the 
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generation of productivity growth. 
This conceptual framework suggests a very different interpretation of the fundamental 
determinants of SOllth Africa's industrial performance than is currently in vogue. The policy 
implications of this analysis are also markedly different in certain respects. 
6.2 The South African Debate on Policies to Improl'e Industrial Prodllctil'ity Crowth 
It is apparent from chapter five that there have been various interpretations of the fundamental 
causes of South Africa's industrial productivity growth perfonnance to date. In this section, 
the various policy proposals that have been advanced to improve this perfonnance are 
outlined. In the next section, the specific proposals advanced by these different approaches 
will be discussed and contrasted with the policy implications drawn from the analysis in this 
thesis. 
6.2.1 The World Bank Alld Other Liheral R~forl11ers 
The World Bank's position has been made clear in two recent documents. Belli et al. (\993) 
is concerned with the trade regime, while Fallon (1992) is concerned with the labour market. 
In general, Belli et al. (\ 993) identify the past trade regime as an important factor underlying 
South Africa ' s poor productivity growth performance and advocate a greater emphasis on 
export promotion and import liberalisation. They argue that immediate measures should be 
taken to encourage exports and remove the anti-export bias, but suggest that tariff reductions 
should be phased in more gradually. Others have also argued for the need for more liberal 
trade policies. In this respect, as was discussed in chapter five, Moll (1990) regards the policy 
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of import substituting industrialisation as partly to blame for South Africa ' s poor industrial 
productivity growth performance and advocates a policy of export promotion. The state's 
"Normative Economic Model" (1993 : 261) also favours a more liberal trade regime: 
"Low productivity in South Africa's manufacturing sector presents a 
major problem. An outward orientated development plan could make a 
significant contribution towards increasing efficiency ... " 
The main distinguishing feature of Belli et ai's (1993) policy proposals to Improve 
productivity growth is the reliance placed on a reformed trade regime. 
Fallon (1992) focuses on the South African labour market and education system and mainly 
argues for inequalities to be redressed. Fallon's (1992 : 31) general policy proposals would 
have fairly obvious stimulator effects on industrial productivity growth: 
"In the immediate future, encouraging the acquisition of jOb-related skills 
by blacks could be of immediate benefit, while a closing of interracial 
educational standards would be beneficial over the longer term." 
At the general level, these sorts of policy proposals are not very controversial. Indeed, 
although the government 's Normative Economic Model does not mention the need to 
overcome inequalities, they do propose that school leavers should be made better prepared for 
work, and that training should be designed so as to make employees more mobile. However, 
when it comes to formulating the best specific education and training policies to meet these 
general objectives consensus is absent. In this respect, neither Fallon (1992) nor the 
government 's Normative Economic Model really consider these specific policy issues. 
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6.2.2 A Technological Capabilities Framework: Lall and The Industrial Strategy Project 
In general LaB (1993) is in broad agreement with Belli et aI's (1993) assessment of the need 
for trade reform. In particular, Lall (1993 : 21) stresses that: 
"the complexity, ad hoc nature and unpredictability of the protective 
regime are clear disincentives to firms in terms of long-term investments 
in capability development and restructuring." 
Likewise, the Industrial Strategy Project (Joffe et al. (1993)) also agree with most of the 
World Bank's proposals for trade reform. However. in contrast to Belli et al. (1993) who 
advocates a uniform tariff schedule, Lall (1993) and Joffe et al. (1993) favour a certain degree 
of selective intervention. 
Furthermore, Lall (1993) and Joffe et al. (1993) emphasise the need for policy measures to 
address various supply side factors influencing the development of technological capabilities. 
Joffe et al. (1993) are adamant that the strengthening of South Africa's international 
competitiveness is not simply a matter trade reform as Belli et al. (1993) seem to imply. 
Hence, Joffe et al. (1993 : 35) argue: 
" ... we have identified four major areas in which we feel that policy 
attention should focus - building human resources for production; 
strengthening small, medium and microenterprises; and the more effective 
organisation of production, work and inter-institutional linkages." 
Similarly, Lall (1993) identifies skills deficiencies and the paucity of research and 
development as two factors undermining the development of technological capabilities in 
South Africa. 
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6.2.3 The Policy Proposals of this Thesis 
It is argued here that the overall purpose of industrial policy should be to encourage the 
development of a more independent, flexible and technologically mature industrial base. In 
this respect, the state has an important role to play in designing education and training 
policies, labour market policies as well as technology policies that promote the development 
of technological capabilities in South African firms. 
It seems that often policies are advanced with narrow objectives, such as the promotion of 
exports or expanding education access. What is emphasised here is that the various policies 
should recognise their shared purpose of enhancing technological capabilities. Hence, policies 
should rather be designed with this specific aim in mind. 
There are several advantages to this general approach. Firstly, it should help highlight policies 
which lack any rational objective. Secondly, it should help point to areas where different 
policies are having conflicting impacts. Thirdly, it helps to emphasise that the central 
objective of industrial policy should be to improve overall industrial productivity growth. This 
last point is often lost with the focus on achieving "international competitiveness". It is 
possible to assess the international competitiveness of a particular firm , given ruling wage 
rates and the exchange rate. However, it makes little sense to talk of a nation as a whole 
being "internationally competitive", since it should be recognised that nations trade on the 
basis of comparative and not absolute advantages. In reality, although any industry can be 
made internationally competitive if the exchange rate is low enough, it is not possible to 
maintain an artificially low exchange rate for any prolonged length of time. Also, although 
firms can also be made internationally competitive through wage repression, this really 
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involves a decline in living standards and is also not sustainable in the long term. It is 
productivity growth that generates rising living standards for a nation , and thus it is only 
productivity growth that can really ensure that individual finns maintain their competitiveness. 
Hence, the focus of industrial policy must be predominantly concerned with productivity 
growth and not "international competitiveness". 
South Africa is fortunate to be endowed with large deposits of gold. However, thi s is not as 
advantageous as it may seem since this tends to make for a fairly strong currency by 
developing country standards, which means that the productivity levels of firms need to be 
correspondingly high if they are to be internationally competitive. Hence, the only way for 
South Africa to reduce its reliance on gold is to pursue the fundamental task of improving its 
industrial productivity growth. 
What is of fundamental importance is that this task cannot be achieved by simply 
implementing trade policy reforms. Trade policies can provide useful incentives that 
encourage the development of technological capabilities. However, a reliance on trade policy 
initiatives disregards the substantive issues. As was discussed in chapter four, finms need to 
undergo difficult and complex learning processes in managing their technological 
development. The effectiveness of these learning processes in tllrn depend on the education 
and training system, the market for knowledge and new technology as well as other 
institutional effects. In many of these areas significant market failures may undermine such 
learning processes and it is these that are in most need of policy attention. 
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6.3 Specific Policy Implications for South African Manufacturing 
From the perspective of the framework used in thi s thesis, the performance of the South 
African manufacturing sector should be explained in temlS of those factors that have. enhanced 
technological capabilities and those factors that have undermined them. 
While it seems that there is a large degree of consensus at the general level between the 
various approaches, important specific differences remain (even between Lall (1993) and Joffe 
et al. (1993)). Obviously there are also important differences between these approaches and 
the policies advocated in this thesis. All these differences should become apparent from the 
examination of policy proposals on specific issues. 
The specific avenues in which policy can playa role and are worth further investigation 
include the structure of the education and training system, trade policy, regulations governing 
technological transfer in addition to technology and competition policies. However, it should 
be emphasised that specific policies need to be pursued in a coordinated way for overall 
policy to be effective. 
6.3.1 International Competitiveness and Trade Policy 
There are two parts to Belli et aI's (1993) policy proposals: exchange rate management and 
trade reform. With regard to exchange rate management, Belli et al. (1993) recognise that the 
dominance of gold exports means that the gold price can, under a flexible exchange rate, have 
a major influence on the value of the rand to the possible detriment of other expol1S. Hence, 
Belli et al. (1993 : 50) argue that: 
"Appropriate incentives for manufactured exports would entail: (il fixing 
the value of the rand at a level that is probably lower than the market-
clearing rand, and (ii) keeping it at a level that maintains the 
competitiveness of South Africa's manufactu.-ing exports." 
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Joffe et al. (1993) also argue for an exchange rate devaluation to help make South African 
industry more competitive. However, the problem with this approach is that it assumes that 
the adverse effects of the gold price can be effectively overcome by making the exchange rate 
a policy variable. In reality it will prove impossible to maintain the exchange rate at an 
artificially low level for any prolonged length of time. 
With regard to South Africa's current trade regime Belli et al. (1993 : I) conclude that it: 
" .. is not overly protective, but too fluid and complex, and also biased 
against exports ... (and) the dispersion of the tariff schedule is far greater 
than in most countries." 
Given this, they advocate a strategy of export-led growth that should provide exporters with 
free access to inputs at world prices and that removes the anti -export bias that is associated 
with continued import protection. They also argue that the tariff schedule needs to be 
rationalised and protection eventually reduced. 
Lall (1993) also emphasises the advantages to the rationalisation of the tariff schedule. Such 
a rationalisation should make it more transparent and predictable and thus provide finns with 
much clearer signals on which they can fomlUlate long term strategies. 
Belli et al. (1993) only advocate a gradual reduction in tariffs. They do however argue that 
the highest tariffs should be dropped immediately to a maximum of 150% or so. Joffe et al. 
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(1993) interpret this proposal of gradual import liberalisation as an acknowledgement by the 
World Bank that import liberalisation may be neither a necessary or sufficient condition for 
export expansion. 
Overall, Belli et al. (1993) are advocating a concerted strategy of export promotion coupled 
with a degree of import liberalisation. The justifications for these prescriptions are however 
weak. Basically, the proposals seem to stem only from a belief that this is the only way to 
reap the benefits of international competition. As such, Belli et al. (1993 : SO) argue that: 
"Countries that attempted to follow a more classic infant industry strategy 
- achieved first the lax standards of the protected domestic market, then 
move on to export promotion from that base - were much less successful. 
Having installed capacity and technology that met only the local standal'ds 
of competition, the owners of this capacity and technology - along with 
their workers - became an entrenched interest against adjusting to the 
more rigorous international standard." 
Belli et al. (1993) provide little evidence that changes in South Africa's trade regime have 
had any effect on industrial productivity growth performance (see chapter five) . Hence, it 
seems that their policy of export promotion is, in fact , mainly based on the standard liberal 
position that poor productivity growth is largely due to slack managers who have been 
sheltered from international competition. 
Despite noting their scepticism for the causal link between export orientation and productivity 
growth, Joffe et al. (1993 : 12) seem to believe in this challenge-response theory: 
"It is neither desirable or practical to continue insulating domestic 
producers from these international competitive pressures if productivity 
growth is to reach the levels which are required ... to achieve sustained 
income growth. A more effective outward orientation of the industrial 
sector is thus an important component of the strategy to increase 
productivity growth within the industrial sector." 
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This challenge-response mechanism is the second part of Belli et al.'s (1993) prescription for 
improving the international competitiveness of firms. If the exchange rate devaluation does 
not make firms competitive then these fimls are required to eliminate their slack under the 
pressure of international competition. Viewed in this light, what makes this challenge-response 
mechanism so questionable is that it is difficult to envisage how the extent of managerial 
slack can possibly be related to the gap between the actual exchange rate and an exchange 
rate at which a particular firm would be internationally competitive. It is largely for this 
reason that the focus needs to be on productivity growth and not international 
competitiveness. The fallacy of the international competitiveness approach is that it avoids 
the substantive issues and presumes that growth and development are natural and automatic 
processes. If the focus is on productivity growth, an analysis of the learning processes by 
which technological capabilities are developed provides a more useful indicator of the actual 
factors influencing a firm's performance. 
A credible threat of exposure to international competition can provide a powerful incentive 
for firms to engage in costly and difficult learning processes. However, there may be 
important market failures that undermine such efforts by firms. In some cases state 
intervention in the form of protection or export promotion may provide the necessary time 
for firms to overcome various impediments, as in the case of infant industries. However, there 
are many other spheres in which market failures may undennine the learning efforts of firms. 
Hence in the case of skill deficiencies or poorly functioning technology markets trade policies 
will be of little help and policy really needs to address the source of these market failure 
directly. Lall (1993 : 36) emphasises this point: 
"Most developing countries, possibly including SA, have granted 
protection without ensuring that their enterprises had access to the new 
skills and information they needed to become competitive." 
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With regard to the debate between uniform versus selective protection, Belli et a!. (1993) 
seem to favour uniformity, while Lall (1993) and Joffe et a!. (1993) view a degree of 
selectivity as desirable. The reason for favouring selective intervention is that some industries, 
activities or firms are likely to possess superior growth potentials, linkages or other 
externalities. However, the ability of the South African state to identify such activities and 
to pursue a policy that keeps protection temporary and without favouritism needs to be 
questioned. In this regard, Lall (1993 : 36) argues that: 
" .. thel'e are some governments today that are capable of mounting 
effective selective interventions at a fairly complex level. .. many .. are at 
best confined to functional policies, or the most general levels of 
selectivity. " 
An important point that Archer (1987 : 44) emphasises with regard to selective intervention 
concerns the fact that while the NICs have tended to take a proactive approach the South 
African approach has been more reactive: 
"It appears that in Japan, Korea and Taiwan .. once an industry was 
selected and accorded assistance, .. this was provided thoroughly and 
generously on the plausible grounds that a minimum 'critical mass' was 
required to initiate sustained development. ... the policy attitude in South 
Africa, by contrast, appears as one of minimal and tardy provision of help 
consonant with survival of the industry, and then allowing such low-level 
assistance to continue indefinitely." 
Taking all this into consideration then, although selective intervention seems appealing, the 
practicalities suggest that it is not feasible except if there are very strong grounds for 
believing that a particular industry should receive support. If an activity, such as mineral 
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beneficiation, is considered for targeting, then a detailed analysis of the activity's long term 
fundamentals should be conducted in addition to analysing the nature of linkages, externalities 
and other market failures which may be discouraging private initiatives. Where such 
protection measures are instituted, care should be taken to ensure that they are perceived as 
temporary and that they do not act as a serious disincentive to the development of 
technological capabilities by firms. 
The last point to note is that there do not seem to be any particularly convincing arguments 
for favouring export promotion over protection and. in fact it is not clear that they are 
necessarily mutually exclusive policies. 
6.3.2 Regulation of Foreign Technology alld Investment 
LaB (1993) acknowledges the fact that South African industry has relied heavily on foreign 
technology and argues that as a result sanctions and disinvestment are likely to have retarded 
the assimilation and development of new technologies. This suggests that with the removal 
of sanctions and the return of foreign investment this obstacle to technological development 
will be removed. 
Foreign investment is often regarded as the panacea to South Africa's problems, and that it 
will be forthcoming once a democratically elected government is in place. While foreign 
investors may be encouraged by the prospects of stability that a future government holds, 
most foreign investors are likely to be guided more by the economic fundamentals of this 
country. In South Africa's present economic and political circllmstances there is a need to 
question the terms under which foreign investment will be forthcoming. In this respect, 
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foreign investment should not be regarded as unequivocally a good thing. Similarly, as was 
seen in chapter five, there may be many hidden costs and contingencies associated with the 
purchase of foreign technology. 
In addition to improving capital accumulation, foreign investment may facilitate the diffusion 
of new technology. However, consideration is needed of the real price of technology transfer 
and its benefits. Technology transfer between the parent and subsidiary of a multinational 
corporation is not an "arms-length" transaction. As such, the price of the technology may be 
artificially high. More importantly though, little technological information and knowledge may 
be transferred with the means, and the local subsidiary may be restricted from capturing the 
rents from local innovations. While this type of technology transfer is possibly the most 
difficult to regulate (especially without being accused of discouraging foreign investment) it 
is probably the most important from the perspective of its impact on the development of local 
technological capabilities. However, the state's control over technology transfer that occurs 
through market transactions should prove more effective. 
The main issue is that the regulation of technology transfer may improve a domestic firm's 
bargaining power and so enable it to capture more of the rents of a particular technology and 
so enhance the firm's scope for creating subsequent rents. 
Joffe et al. (1993) support this general proposal that the state should try to regulate the terms 
of technology transfer. They argue that this can best be achieved by policy designed to 
strengthen the power of local licensees through limiting restrictive clauses and requiring 
training on the part of the licensor in an effort to provide local firms with access to the "core 
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technology" (the technological infonnation and understanding). Overall though, Joffe et al. 
(1993 : 49) emphasise that the regulation of technology transfer: 
" .. should be less concerned with the cost of transfer and more directed to 
ensuring technological assimilation and learning" 
In conclusion then, although sight should not be lost of the importance of foreign technology, 
the question should not be whether or not South Africa is getting enough of it, but what South 
Africa is getting for what it pays. It is not simply a matter of utilising appropriate technology 
effectively. Rather the underlying principle should concern the extent to which foreign 
technology enhances South Africa's indigenous technological capabilities and at what cost. 
6.3.3 Competition and Domestic Technology Policy 
While competition in factor markets may be desirable for efficient resource allocation, given 
the public attributes (non-rival, partially excludable) of technology, private investors may 
underinvest in technology when competition is too severe. This clearly illustrates that public 
support may be needed to encourage innovation, adapt ion and capability building. To this end, 
Joffe et al. (1993) propose that there should be a greater direct commitment from the state 
to support research and development (R&D) and that the state should also strengthen 
incentives for firms to invest in their own R&D by tax incentives. 
Dore (1989) emphasises that the main purpose of government R&D funding is to enhance the 
international competitiveness of local firnls. Dore (1989 : 1667) also argues that: 
"Yet, for all the retreat of western governments from providing consumer 
goods and services, when it comes to providing research and development 
... the movement is all the other way." 
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These governments clearly recognise the benefits of government support for R&D - especially 
for large projects which do make long term sense to a country. Since South Africa is a 
follower country the assimilation of foreign technology is more important than attempts to 
create new technology. Hence, more attention should be given to facilitating the adaptation 
of foreign technology by local firms. 
Hence, care should be taken to avoid R&D projects, undertaken by scientists and politicians, 
for prestige rather than economic reasons. More attention should be focused on making 
important adaptations of foreign technology. The international competitiveness of firms is 
more likely to be enhanced by directing the R&D energies of South African scientists towards 
these more mundane matters that involve learning from others. Furthermore, technology 
policy needs to be well formulated and coordinated with other policies. 
With regard to competition policy, Joffe et ai. (1993) argue that the highly concentrated 
market structure of the manufacturing sector promotes collusion rather than competition. 
Hence, Joffe et ai. (1993 : 21) recommend the promotion of competition by: 
"the strengthening of the authorities responsible for regulating market 
structure and conduct." 
However, an important point that needs to be emphasised is that, as with international 
competition, if competition in the domestic market is too severe it can just as easily stifle 
innovative, imitative or technological capability building efforts as promote them. 
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6.3.4 Education and Training Policy 
Lall (1993), Joffe et al. (1993) and others have pointed to the education and training 
deficiencies in South Africa. Archer (1987 : 44) helps to emphasise these issues: 
"Of all the factors that distinguish South Africa from the more successful 
industrialisers, this one promises to be the most vital. The right mixture 
of industrial policies is obviously critical, but if the right inputs of labour 
are lacking because of deficiencies in basic education, skills, aptitudes and 
the capacity and opportunity to learn-bJ'-doing, then the potential for 
growth may simply be negated. So the absence of widespread good quality 
schooling, .. may yet prove the major deficiency in South Africa's 
industrial conundrum" 
From the perspective of improving the flexibility and learning capabilities of the South 
African workforce, education and training policy needs to focus more on qualitative aspects. 
It will not be easy for a future government to disregard the pressure for educational 
expansion. However, in the face of limited resources, this is likely to involve a trade-off 
between quality and quantity. Hence, cost effective ways of responding to educational 
expansion need to be sought in areas which are least likely to jeopardise quality. Joffe et al. 
(1993 : 37) also emphasise that: 
" .. an unfocused increase in educational investment will be an insufficient 
response to the challenges of international competitiveness." 
Fallon (1992) advocates a narrowing of interracial educational standards. However, it should 
be recognised that the real problem with this objective lies in the trade-off between increased 
educational access and improved educational quality that arises from a limited budget. 
Technically, at the microlevel, it is the ability of individual schools to provide the sort of 
teaching that allows pupils to "learn how to learn " that is important to South Africa's future 
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industrial achievement. Socially and politically however, the most important role for the state 
is to structure institutional mechanisms that foster equality of opportunity. Not just in schools 
and training institutes, but most crucially in the workplace. Only in such an environment, 
where achievement is valued and seen to' be rewarded, can a culture of learning develop. 
With regard to training and job related learning, the state can playa crucial role. As with 
technology there are many externalities to training. Since private firms will be unable to 
appropriate the benefits/externalities of training they will tend to underinvest in training. 
Firms will also tend to train employees in job specific skills to undermine employee mobility 
and so capture the skill benefits of these employees. The state can overcome some of these 
market failures by subsidising and coordinating training initiatives at an industry level. 
Further, they can help to establish generally recognised qualifications by encouraging the 
interaction between firms, industry associations and themselves. 
Joffe et al. (1993) also emphasise the need for greater vocational training. Specifically, they 
argue that there is particularly a need for intra-firm training, supplementary adult education 
and industry-wide training. They also argue for a nationally integrated system of training 
which links different levels of the training and education system and which provides for 
accreditation. The general proposals of Joffe et al. (1993) are not controversial since the 
government's Normative Economic Model (1993 : 164) proposes similar policies': 
"A more co-ordinated system is necessary under which all qualifications 
will be nationally recognised and comparable ... consideration should be 
given to developing a national occupational qualification structure, 
supplementary to the existing qualification stmcture for formal 
education. " 
. 1 Ho?-,cvcr, in reality it is the specific.s of education and training policies where mOSl of the controversial pertinent 
Issues he. 
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In general, it is argued here that education and training policies should be designed with the 
aim of promoting a culture of learning in schools, training institutes and in the workplace. 
Further, given the importance of deliberate learning mechanisms for industrial achievement, 
and the sequential nature of these learning processes the state should place the most emphasis 
on building strong learning foundations in the lower levels of schooling. 
6.3.5 Labour Market Policy 
Some2 see wage repression as an essential component of the NICs industrial success. In this 
respect, Archer (1987) argues that the tight control of the labour movement by the state in 
the NICs facilitated a close relationship between the state and business and ensured that wage 
rates were kept in line with productivity. 
The union movement in South Africa is well organised, national and politically powerful. 
Joffe et al. (1993) correctly emphasise that the current pattern of industrial relations is a 
significant obstacle to the competitiveness of South African manufacturing. Under these 
circumstances then , there is little hope for wage restraint on behalf of the unions unless a 
social contract can be reached between the unions and business. Joffe et al. (1993) do seem 
to envisage a situation where the government brokers a contract between the unions and 
business in which institutions and mechanisms are put in place for the formulation of a co-
ordinated and carefully designed industrial policy. This point is quite important from the 
perspective of those who strongly advocate a policy of selective intervention, since such a 
policy may require some form of wage restraint if the purpose of subsidies or protection is 
not short circuited. 
1 See Fields and Wan (1989) for a considcralion of lhis view. 
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In contrast to those who view wage repression as an important component of the N[C 
industrial success, Fields and Wan (1989 : 1477) rather argue that: 
"A number of analysts '" have commented favoUl'ably on the efficiency of 
the Korean labour market, the responsiveness of Korean workers to job 
opportunities in other locations' and in othel' sectors, and the absence of 
wage distortions owing to trade unions, public sector pay policy, or 
minimum wages," 
While many reasons have been advanced to explain these circumstances, they do not suggest 
the outcome of a wage repressive strong state, and it is quite plausible that a fundamentally 
cooperative relationship between management and labour may have a lot to do with it. 
With regards to labour market policy then, the state should attempt to provide an institutional 
environment in which equality of opportunity is highly respected. This will provide citizens 
with greater confidence in the state and the social structure, and create greater consensus in 
national objectives and cooperative effort. Specifically though, the state should avoid 
succumbing to sectionalist interests. [n this respect, minimum wage legislation should be 
avoided as should inflated public sector pay. Pay and employment practices in the public 
sector should be carefully formulated , as they provide important signals to the private sector. 
Fallon (1992) supports these general points: 
"There are two forms of labour market interventions that should be 
avoided, given prevailing labour market circumstances in South Africa, 
these are: (a) aggressive national minimum wage policies; and (b) job 
security regUlations," 
6.4 Final Conclusiolls 
South Africa 's productivity growth performance, for manufacturing as a whole, has been poor, 
particularly in the 1980s. Even after an adjustment is made for excess capacity the 
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perfonnance still appears poor in this period, and, given the embodiment effect, the slow rates 
of investment in this period seem to be a cause for concern. However, one positive feature 
is that the somewhat comparatively poor aggregate productivity growth performance of 
manufacturing in earlier periods does not appear to be pervasive across industries, since in 
some industries performance compared relatively favourably with achievements in other 
developing countries. 
It must be accepted that the key determinants of production efficiency trends will remain 
something of a mystery. Nevertheless, there is scope for a greater understanding of these 
underlying causes. In this regard however, there is a need to question the presumption that 
"growth is natural"J, which suggests that our poor productivity growth perfomlance merely 
reflect the things we have done wrong. 
It is true that certain policies have had adverse consequences for growth and efficiency. 
Apartheid, an obvious candidate, is certainly to blame, particularly for its effect on education, 
training and skills enhancement in the workplace, and, to a much lesser degree, for the 
adverse consequences of sanctions and disinvestment. Trade policy, a common culprit, may 
have had some adverse effects on production efficiency, but may also have aided 
technological maturity, however, evidence about either is weak. 
It seems unrealistic to blame the government for all our woes. As such, institutional and 
cultural factors are important underlying influences that have a degree of pennanence and so 
are not easily modified in ways that encourages growth. Also, resource endowments are not 
1 See Landes (1990) for an insighlful discussion of these issues. 
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always a good thing from the perspective of trying to build an industrial base. Of utmost 
importance however, there is little reason to believe that growth and development are 
processes that occur naturally and automatically. As the earlier discussion of some of the 
recent growth theories suggests, growth' is actually quite a difficult process and requires 
deliberate and costly efforts to improve technological capabilities. As such, in attempting to 
understand the fundamental causes of improvements in production efficiency more attention 
needs to be paid to those factors that have influenced technological capabilities. 
In conclusion then, in developing countries, like South Africa , policy is of great importance 
as it can assist to surmount structural constraints and market failures which can be immense. 
However, the possibility of government failure should not be taken lightly. Policy can just as 
easily involve excessive and unwarranted interventions or be poorly implemented. While 
industrial policy can be very important in a developing country such as South Africa, a 
prerequisite for the success of such a policy is a govemment's commitment to the pursuit of 
macroeconomic stability. An environment of stable expectations is vital to giving private 
agents the incentive to make the long term investments in technological capabilities that 
industrial achievement requires. Of overriding importance however, is that specific policies 
should not be formulated in isolation, but in a coordinated way, with a common purpose - the 
improvement of technological capabilities in South African industry. 
APPENDICIES 
Appendix A .' Comparison of Productivity Growth Estimatesfor Soulh African Manufacturing 1945-1990, (%) 
1945-54 1954-63 1963-74 1974-81 1981-90 1972 - 90 
As derived in Table 1.1 -1.2 1.0 0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0 . 1 
Moll ( 1990 ) - 0 . 8" 1.9 l.0 0.7 -1.9" 
Belli et al. ( 1993) 0.1<" o . 6" ? 
NPI (1990) o . 1P 
Dockel & Fourie (1976) 1.6 ' 
Joffe et a1. (1 993 ) 1.4 -1.0 
Notes: For various periods the years compared are not exactly the same as are used 1n Table 2.1: 
r-rffi-54 b 1981 -88 c 1972-83 <I 1983-90 ,.. 1970-89 r 1960-72 
Apart from the d i fferent periods used, the different estimates partly reflect dlfferp.nt primary 
data sources and partly reflect different methods. For example the method of weighting factor 
contributions by their factor shares 1n va lue added 1s used here (and by Moll (1 990» 1 s 
reconunended by Denison (1984). In cont rast, Belli et a1 (l993) estimate output-input elast i cities 
using regression analysis. Belli et al (1993) also seperate out the contribution of intermediate 
inputs to gross output growth and adjust capital stock for capacity utilisation . 
Appendix B : Average Anlluallllfernat;onal Product;,,,;ty Grow,1r Comparisons;1l tire Business Sector. /960-90 
Total Factor Productivity Labour Productivity 
Country 1960-73 1973-79 1979 -90 ' 1960-73 1973-79 1979-90' 
U.S.A 1.6 -0.4 0 . 1 2.2 0 . 0 0 .5 
Japan 5 .9 1.3 2.0 8 . 6 2.9 3,0 
W.Germany 2.6 1.8 0 , 9 4.5 3 .1 1.6 
France 4.0 1.7 1.5 5.4 3 . 0 2.4 
Italy 4.4 2 .1 1. 3 6.3 3.0 1.9 
U.K. 2,3 0 . 6 1.3 3.6 1.6 2.0 
Canada 2 , 0 0 . 8 -0 , 1 2.8 1. 5 1.1 
Austria 3.3 1.2 0 , 9 5.8 3 . 2 1.9 
Belgium 3 . 9 1.4 1.5 5 . 2 2.8 2.3 
Denmark 2.8 1.1 1.4 4.3 2.6 2.3 
Finland 3 . 2 1.5 2.5 4.9 3 . ? 3.6 
Greece 5.7 1.5 -0.2 8,8 3 . 3 0,7 
Netherlands 3.1 1.5 0.9 4,8 2 . 8 1.5 
Spain 3 . 3 0.9 1.8 6.0 3.3 2.8 
Sweden 2.6 0.3 0.7 4 .1 1.4 1.5 
Switzerland 2.0 - 0 .4 0 . 5 3. 2 0.8 1.1 
Australia 1.6 0 . 8 0,3 2 . 7 2 . ~ 0 .9 
New Zealand 0 .9 -1. 9 0 , 5 1.7 -1. 3 1.5 
OECD 2 . 8 0 .5 0.7 4.1 1 . 4 1.4 
South Africab n a - 0.2 -0.1 n a 1. 9 1.7 
South Africac 1.2 0 . 2 -0 . 5 3.2 2.1 0 .2 
Sources and Notes: OECD ( 19 92), Table 55 for all countries except South Africa . 
• 1979 -81 for the united States, France , United Kingdom , Canada and New Zealand, 1 979 -89 for 
Greece and switzerland. 
b These south African productivity measures a re from the NPI ( 1990 ) , Tables 35 and 37, p54, and 
relate to the periods 1973-79 and 1979-88 only (na means no data available for the 1960-73 
period), but are estimated for the whole private economy, thus being relative ly comparable to 
other count ries shown here. 
C For South Afric a the periods used are 1960-73, 1973-81 and 1981-90. However, these estimates, 
which a re from Table 2 .1 and 2 .2, relate only to the manufacturing sector not the whole business 
sector and so are not strictly comparable. 
Appendix C: Categorisation of Industries on the basis ~r Capital illtellsity, 1990 
CAPITAL-INTENSlVE~ 
12 Industrial Chemicals 
19 Iron and Steel 
20 Non Ferrous Metals 
INTERMEDIATE-CAPITAL-INTENSlVE~ 
17 Glass and Glass products 
10 Paper a n d Pa per products 
1 8 Other Non Metal products 
1 3 Other Chemicals 
25 Transport Equipment 
2 4 Motor Vehicles 
14 Rubber Products 
23 Electrical Machinery 
LABOtJR- INTENSIVE" 
11 Printing and Publishing 
15 Other Plastic Products 
22 Machin ery 
4 Textiles 
1 6 Pottery, Ch ina , Earthenware 
2 1 Metal Products 
8 Wood 
2 6 Jewellery and Other o.e . c . 
6 Leather Products 
7 Footwear 
9 Furniture 
5 Clothing 
AGRICULTURALLY- BASED' 
2 Beve rages 
3 Tobacco 
1 Food 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
(1) 
Index of 
Capital 
I ntensity 
(K ILl , 
Mfg~100 
501 
72 1 
34 1 
158 
85 
138 
136 
95 
83 
68 
6 4 
56 
55 
30 
40 
39 
38 
38 
31 
30 
2 9 
22 
17 
10 
10 
6 
115 
217 
86 
72 
100 
(2) 
Index of 
Value Added 
per worker 
(V/LI, 
Mfg-100 
256 
323 
1 75 
259 
126 
167 
227 
65 
114 
87 
118 
106 
91 
73 
100 
93 
96 
54 
59 
7 4 
36 
84 
52 
49 
48 
36 
102 
183 
98 
66 
100 
(3) 
Index ':If 
Capi tal Stock 
per Rand o f 
Value Added 
(K/VI, 
Mfg- 1 00 
195 
223 
1 99 
62 
76 
96 
61 
150 
75 
81 
56 
5 4 
62 
42 
41 
44 
40 
72 
55 
42 
8 2 
2 6 
33 
22 
20 
12 
112 
122 
90 
109 
100 
Notes: Data is from t he IDe data base (January 1992 ) . The fi rst column s hows the ranking of 
industries accordi ng to capital intensity except for the agriculturally-based i ndust r ies . The 
l atter t wo columns present some alternative c haracteristics which distinguish the different 
industri es. 
a The se are weighted averages using value added shares from Appendix E. 
Appendix D : Average Annual Rates of Growth of Productivity within Manuf acturing .. ' . 1990, (%) 
1 9 45 - 54 1954 - 63 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1 ) (2 ) (3) (4 ) (5) 
G"" a G!(/ L G", Gv G-rrp / GW L G"" aGKIt. G".. Gv G-rU/GVIL 
CAPITAL-INTENSIV2' 2 . 2 (0 . 2) 2 . 6 8 . 9 118% 2.5 1.5 1.1 8 . 0 44% 
12 Industrial Chemica ls 2.5 3.8 (1. 3) 6 . 3 4.3 4 . 4 (0 . 2) 7.7 
19 Iron and Steel 2.7 (1. 7) 4.4 10.1 163% 2.3 1.7 0.7 6.0 30% 
20 Non Ferrous Metals (1.7) 0.8 (2.4) 6.7 1.0 (3.2) 4.2 16.1 420% 
INTERMEDIATE-CAPITAL-INTENSIVE' 1.9 2 . 7 (0 . 9) 10 . 3 2 . 4 1.9 0.7 7.5 29 % 
17 Glass and Glass products 3 . 4 4.2 (0.8) 10.7 3.5 (0.3) 3 . 8 7 . 1 109% 
10 Paper and Paper products 1.2 1.4 (0 . 2) 15 . 0 5.2 1.9 3.4 11. 8 65 % 
18 Other Non Met al products 4 . 1 3 . 2 0 . 9 9.6 22% 2 . 5 1.2 1.3 4.0 52 % 
13 Other Chemicals 3 . 4 3.3 0.1 8 . 0 3% 4 . 3 5.0 (0 . 7) 8 . 8 
25 Transport Equ ipment 2.5 1.3 1.2 17.3 48% 1.2 0.8 0 . 4 3.4 33% 
24 Motor Veh i cles (1 . 4) 2 . 4 (3.8) 9 . 3 (2.2) 0.5 (2 . 7) 6.8 
14 Rubber Products 3 . 9 2. 6 1.3 12 . 4 33 % 0.8 1.2 (0.4) 3 . 2 
23 Electrical Machinery (2 . 9) 2.4 (5 . 3) 10.0 2 . 0 (1. 0) 3 . 0 10 . 3 150% 
LABOUR-INTENSIVE' 0 . 1 2 .2 (2 . 1 ) 7.1 1.6 0.8 0 . 8 5.0 50% 
11 Printing and Publishing (1. 6) 2 . 0 (3.6) 3.6 1.7 0.2 1.5 5.1 88 % 
15 Other Plastic Produ cts (4.2) (0 . 2) (4.0) 6 . 7 4 . 9 2.6 2 . 4 26.2 49 % 
22 Machinery 0.8 3 . 9 (3 . 1 ) 9.2 2 . 6 0.7 2. 0 7 .4 77 ~ 
4 Textiles (5.8) 3 . 8 (9.6) 9. 7 2.2 1.2 1.0 8.5 45 , 
16 Potte ry, China, Earthenware 4 . 6 3.1 1.4 10.1 3D . 2 . 2 2.1 0.1 3.7 5 " 
21 Metal Products 0 . 3 1.1 (0.9) 9.3 2 . 7 0 . 5 2 . 3 5 . 6 85 '> 
8 Wood 2.9 3 . 2 (0 . 3) 6.0 (1.2) (0.1) (1.0) 1.3 
26 Jewellery and Other n.e.c. (1.7) 0.7 (2.5) 6.4 1.4 1.9 (0.4) 6 . 7 
6 Leather Products (0.5) 3 . 0 (3.4) (1.1) 1.3 1.0 0 . 4 1.7 31 i; 
7 Footwear 3.5 1.3 2 . 2 9.1 63 % 2.4 1.8 0.6 2.1 25 :;' 
9 Furniture (0.2) 1.4 (1.6) 6.2 1.0 1.1 (0.1) 2 . 1 
5 Clothing 1.7 2. 1 (0.4) 6.9 (0.5) 1.0 (1. 5) 0 .9 
AGRICULTURALLY-BASED' (0.1) 3.9 (3.8) 3.7 2.7 1.2 1.5 4 . 7 56 is 
2 Beverages 2 . 0 8 . 1 (6.2) 3.9 0 . 1 (1. 0) 1.1 5 . S 1100 , 
3 Tobacco 3.0 4 . 8 (1. 8 ) 5.5 6 . 4 2. 5 3.9 2 . 4 61' 
1 Food (0 . 9) 2.3 (3 . 7) 3 . 4 2.9 1. 5 1.4 4 . 7 48 : 
TOTAL MANUFACTORING 0.8 2.0 (1.2) 7.2 2 . 5 1. 5 1.0 5.9 40 % 
A ppe1lllix D : Co1llilllltd 
1963 - 7 4 1974- 81 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5 ) 
G"n aGK/L GITp Gv G'I'F,/GVIL G"" aGK/L Gnp G" G'IT,/GvlL 
CAPITAL INTENSIVE' 2 . 8 3 . 8 (1.3) 8.9 2.6 6 . 7 (3.4) 7.1 
12 Industrial Chemicals 4.6 1.0 3 . 5 11. 9 76% 0 . 7 12 . 7 (12.1) 6.1 
19 Iron and Steel 2 . 1 4 . 8 (2 . 7) 7 . 8 5 . 3 0.1 5 . 3 8.4 100% 
20 Non Ferrous Me tals 2.6 5.6 (3.0) 7.2 3.2 (2.3) 5.5 7.8 172% 
INTERMEDIATE-CAP ITAL-INTENS IVE' 3.4 2.4 1.0 9.1 29% 1.6 0 . 4 1.3 4 . 0 81", 
17 Gl ass and Glass products 4.8 3 . 1 1.8 7 . 2 38 % (0.5) 3.4 (3 . 9) (0 . 2) 
10 Paper and Paper products 2 . 7 2.6 0 . 2 6 . 4 H 0.5 0 . 2 0.3 1.7 60 % 
18 Other Non Metal products 4 . 5 2 . 7 1.8 8 . 7 40 % 3.1 2 . 6 0.5 3.3 16, 
13 Other Chemicals 4.0 2.7 1.3 6.7 33 , 2.3 0.7 1.6 5 . 3 70, 
25 Transport Equipment 3.7 2 . 5 1.3 14 . 0 35 . 1.7 0 . 1 1.7 1.8 100% 
24 Motor Vehicles 1.8 2 . 1 (0 . 4) 11 . 8 1.2 (0 . 2) 1.4 5.7 117% 
14 Rubber Products 1.3 2.8 (1. 5) 6 . 1 2.9 (1.8) 4.6 4.1 159% 
23 Electrical Machinery 4 . 2 1.6 2 . 6 12 . 5 62 % 1.3 0.1 1.2 4.6 92, 
LABOUR- INTENSrvE i 2.2 1.3 0 . 9 7 . 9 41\ 1.4 0.1 1.4 4.3 100% 
11 Printing and Publishing 3 . 3 1.6 1.7 7.8 52 ~::; 0.1 (0.5) 0.5 2 . 0 500 % 
15 Other Plastic Products 2.8 2.5 0 . 3 15.6 1H (1.7) (1. 6) (0.1 ) 3.5 
22 Machinery 2. 2 1.1 1.1 9 . 8 SO ":; 0.1 0.3 (0 . 1 ) 4.3 
4 Textiles 1.7 1.4 0 . 3 7 . 9 18 ' 6.2 0.6 5.6 6.6 90 's 
16 Pottery, China, Ea rthenware 3.6 1.5 2 . 2 11 . 5 6 n 0.5 0.2 0.3 3 . 1 60 s 
21 Metal Products 3.5 1.9 1.5 8 .3 43 0 (0 . 5) 0 . 5 (1.1 ) 2.2 
8 Wood 4.2 2 . 4 1.9 6 . 7 45 "- 4.5 0.5 4.0 5.6 89 , 
26 Jewellery and Other n . e . c . (0.5) 0 . 2 (0 . 8) 6 . 6 2. 0 0 . 0 1.9 3.7 95 '. 
6 Leather Products (1. 9) 0.7 (2.5) 1.3 4.5 0.1 4 . 4 6.1 98 " 
7 Footwear (0.1 ) 0.9 (1.0) 3.4 (0 . 2) (0 . 5) 0 . 3 3.1 
9 Furniture 0.3 0.4 0.0 5 . 5 O· , 3.8 (0 .2) 4 . 0 6.2 105 '; 
5 Clothing 1.1 (0.3) 1.4 6.2 127 4.6 (1.0) 5.6 8.0 122 
AGRICULTURALLY- BASED' 1.8 2.2 (0.4) 5.4 3 .2 1.1 2.0 5.5 63 
2 Be verages 2.2 3 . 7 (1. 4) 7 . 6 5.3 1.0 4 . 3 7.3 81 '. 
3 Tobacco 1.7 1.7 0.0 1.2 0 0.6 3.4 (2 . 8) 2. 7 
1 F ood 1.7 1.9 (0.2) 5.2 2.7 1.0 1.7 5.2 63". 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 2.7 2.4 0 . 3 7.9 1 B 2.3 2 . 0 0.3 4.9 13% 
',1pendb: D .' Condnued 
( 1 ) 
GYIL 
(2 ) 
a G!,\:/1. 
1981 - 90 
( 3) 
13m 
( 4) 
G, 
Notes and Sources 
(5 ) See notes to Table 2.1. The accounting frame work on 
Gn/GVIL whi ch this analysis 1s based 1s presented 1n equation 
____ ~=:~~-:~~~~~------------------------~~~----~~~----~~~------~_:------~_:~-- 2.3 above. CAPITAL- INTENSIVEa 2.2 0 . 4 1.9 1.9 86% Va l ue added growth is G"" Labour productivity 1s GV/L1 
12 I ndustrial Chemicals 1.8 0.2 1.6 2.2 89% capital deepening 1s a.~/L and ~ is total factor 
19 Iron and Steel 1.9 0.1 1.8 0.7 95% productivity growth. For each period, a., the output 
20 Non Ferrou s Metals 4.7 2.0 2.7 3.5 57% elasticity of capital was calculated from data on 
INTERHEDIATE-CAPITAL-INTENSIVE~ 
17 Glass and Glass products 
10 Paper and Paper products 
18 Other Non Metal products 
13 Other Chemicals 
25 Transport Equipment 
24 Motor Vehicles 
14 Rubber Products 
23 Electrical Machinery 
LABOUR-INTENSTVE~ 
11 Printing and Publishing 
15 Other Plastic Products 
22 Machinery 
4 Textiles 
16 pottery, China, Earthenware 
21 Metal Products 
9 Wood 
26 Jewellery and Other n.e . c. 
6 Leather Products 
7 Footwear 
9 Furnitut"e 
5 Clothing 
AGRICULTURALLY-BASED& 
2 Beverages 
3 Tobacco 
1 Food 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
(0.9) 
2.3 
3.2 
(1.1) 
(2.2) 
(5.6) 
(4.3) 
(0.4) 
1.9 
(1.1) 
(0.1 1 
1.2 
(2.01 
(1. 7) 
(5.2) 
(0.51 
(2.9) 
2.1 
(0 .9) 
(0.31 
(4. B) 
(1. 41 
1.9 
3.8 
1.2 
1.2 
0.2 
1.1 
1.7 
2.4 
0.9 
0.2 
0.2 
O.B 
0 . 6 
1.4 
0.2 
0.2 
1.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
(0.1) 
0.0 
0.1 
(0.3) 
(0.5) 
2 . 3 
4.8 
(1. 41 
1.6 
0.7 
(2.0) 
0.7 
0 . 8 
(2.0) 
(2.5) 
(5.8) 
(5.1) 
(1.1) 
0.5 
(1. 3) 
(0.2) 
(0.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.1) 
(5.4) 
(0.5) 
(3.11 
2.2 
(0 . 9) 
(0.41 
(4.51 
(0.91 
0.3 
(1. 01 
2.6 
(0.4) 
(0.51 
(1.3) 
0.7 
4.2 
(1. 0) 
(1. 7) 
(7.71 
(5.3) 
0.4 
0.3 
(1 8) 
1 0 
2 4 
(4.1) 
(3.4) 
(4.91 
(1. 9) 
(2.51 
3.0 
(0.4) 
(0.4) 
(4.4) 
(1. 9) 
2.5 
4.0 
2.B 
1.9 
(0.3) 
30% 
25% 
26 % 
106 '> 
16 
217 ' 
labour's share in value added. 
Constant returns to scale was assumed so that a = 1- &, 
where B 1s labour's share 1n value added. Thus a 1s 
capital's share 1n value added. For the periods 1945-74, 
the employment and earnings data is from the South 
African Statistics (CSS), 1964, 1970 and 1990, while for 
the periods 1974- 90 it is from the IDC (1992) . 
Using an alternative methodology from Dollar and 
Sokoloff (1989, p.319), a was derived for the parameters 
of a modified trans log production function estimated 
over a pooled cross- section of the industry data over 
the years in the specific period. The production 
function was of the form : 
Ln(Y/L) !~ 't ~d ! + B1Ln(K/ L) n + .BdLn{K/L) t~ } 2 
Although the intercepts were allowed to vary across 
industries the parameters fi \ and B~ hold for all 
industries. The estimates of a utilised in the 
decomposition we r e compiled according to the .expression 
a - B: + 8 21n (K/L ) L with the average of each industry's 
capital- labour ratio for each period. Hence the 
quadratic term specifies the extent to which the output 
elasticity of capital, n varies according to the capital 
intensity of industries. These a values are shown in 
Append!;" I. Unfortunately these values appeared most 
unsatisfactory as they we r e clearly significantly 
different from fact o r shares. Hence, this method was 
discarded in favour of assuming factor shares. 
(a ) These industry groupings are weighted averages of 
individual industry growth rates using industry value 
added shares for the relevant period from Appendix 1.2. 
Appendix E: Industry shares (%) in total manufacturing value added an, .:;;lOyment 
CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 
12 Industrial Chemicals 
19 Iron and Steel 
20 Non Ferrous Metals 
INTERMEDIATE-CAP ITAL-INTENS IVE 
17 Glass and Glass Products 
10 Paper and Paper Products 
18 Other Non Metal Products 
13 Other Chemicals 
25 Transport 
24 Motor Vehicles 
14 Rubber Products 
23 Electrical Machinery 
LABOUR-INTENSIVE 
11 Printing and publishing 
15 Other Plastic Products 
22 Machinery 
4 Textiles 
16 Pottery , China and Earthenware 
21 Metal Products 
8 Wood 
26 Jewellery and Other Manufacturing 
6 Leather Products 
7 Footwear 
9 Furniture 
5 Clothing 
AGRICULTURALLY-BASED 
2 Beverages 
j Tobacco Products 
1 Food 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
See notes to Table 2.1. 
1945- 54 
Vi/V, Li /Lc 
10.8 8.3 
2 . 6 2 . 0 
7.2 5.9 
1.1 0.5 
24.1 
0 . 8 
2 . 2 
4.9 
6.1 
1.0 
4.0 
2.3 
2 .7 
42.1 
5.8 
0 . 1 
4.6 
3.2 
0 . .2 
9.0 
3 . 4 
1.7 
1.4 
2 . 2 
3 .3 
7 . 1 
23 . 1 
3.7 
1.~ 
17.5 
22.3 
0.9 
1.9 
8.3 
5 . 1 
1.1 
1.9 
1.4 
1.9 
48.7 
3.7 
0.1 
4.0 
4.5 
0.4 
10 .6 
6 . 1 
1.1 
1.4 
3 . 4 
2 . 9 
10 . 4 
20 . 7 
2 . 2 
1.4 
17 . 1 
100 . 0 100.0 
1954- 63 
Vi/V, Li /Lc 
13 . 1 9 . 1 
2.6 1.9 
8.4 6.2 
2 . 1 1.0 
28.7 
0.9 
3.8 
4 . 7 
7.8 
1.4 
4 . 1 
2 . 5 
3 . 6 
38 . 8 
4.4 
0.5 
4.9 
4.6 
0.2 
9.0 
2 . 6 
1.7 
0.8 
2.0 
2 .4 
5 . 6 
19.4 
3.3 
1.5 
14 .6 
25.0 
0.9 
2.8 
7 . 3 
5.4 
1.4 
2 .6 
1.5 
3.0 
47 . 2 
3 . 2 
0 . 4 
4.3 
6 . 9 
0 . 3 
10.5 
5.4 
1.3 
1.0 
2 . 8 
2 . 5 
8 . 6 
18.7 
2.2 
o.~ 
15.6 
100 . 0 100.0 
1963- 74 
Vi/V, 
13.9 
3.8 
8 . 1 
2.0 
31.7 
0.9 
4.0 
4.7 
8 . 1 
2 . 0 
5 . 0 
2.0 
5.0 
39.5 
4 . 3 
1.5 
6.5 
6.0 
0.2 
9.1 
2.0 
1.4 
0 . 5 
1.4 
1.9 
4 . 3 
14 . 9 
2.9 
1.0 
11.1 
Li /Lc 
9 . 8 
2 . 0 
6.5 
1.3 
26.2 
0.9 
2.9 
6 . 1 
4 . 4 
1.8 
4 . 7 
1.4 
4.0 
49.0 
3.0 
1.3 
5.9 
8.8 
0.3 
10 . 3 
4.3 
1.7 
0 . 8 
2 . 3 
2 . 3 
8.1 
15.0 
2.1 
0.4 
12 . 5 
100.0 100 . 0 
1974- 81 
VJV, Li /Lc 
23.8 12 . 0 
12.9 3 .7 
8 . 2 7 . 0 
2.7 1.4 
30 . 3 
0.8 
4.1 
4.0 
4.4 
2 . 5 
7.9 
1.5 
5 . 0 
35 . 4 
3 . 2 
1.7 
8.1 
4.3 
0.3 
9 . 2 
1.7 
1.1 
0 .4 
1.1 
1.4 
2.8 
10.6 
2.2 
0 . 4 
8.0 
25 . 1 
0.7 
2 . 5 
5.1 
3.0 
2 . 0 
5.5 
1.4 
5.0 
48 . 0 
2.9 
1.7 
6.1 
8.2 
0.3 
10.1 
3 . 8 
1.7 
0 . 7 
2.0 
2 . 1 
8.3 
14.9 
2 . 3 
0 .3 
12 . 3 
100.0 100.0 
1981-90 
VJV, L,/Lc 
27 . 1 12 . 2 
14 .5 4.4 
9 . 1 6 . 3 
3.6 1.5 
28.3 
0.8 
4.8 
3.8 
3.9 
1.6 
7.0 
1.4 
5.0 
32 . 4 
3.6 
2 . 1 
6.5 
4.2 
0.2 
7 .6 
1.6 
1 .2 
0 . 4 
1.0 
1.3 
2.8 
12 .2 
3 . 0 
0.5 
8 . 7 
24.9 
0.6 
2 . 7 
4.9 
3.3 
1.5 
5 . 8 
1.3 
4.8 
47.6 
3.2 
2 . 1 
6.1 
6.9 
0.4 
9 . 3 
3 . 8 
1.9 
0.7 
2.1 
2.5 
8.6 
15.3 
2 . 4 
0.3 
12.6 
100 . 0 100.0 
Vi/Vt is t he percentage share of industry i in total manufacturing value added, expressed as an average f o r the period. 
L1/~ is industry i's share in t c-~l manufacturing employment e~~Lessed as an average for the period. 
Appendix F : TFP Growt" Adjusted Jor Capacity Utilisatioll , 1974-81 alld 1981-90 
1974 - 81 1981 90 
(1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) (1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
Grrl' Grrr(Adj) Difference G ,~ G ", (Adj) Differenc e 
CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 
12 Industrial Chemicals 
19 I r on and Steel 
20 Non Ferrous Metals 
" r'T'l;~RMEDIATE-CAPITAL- INTENS lVE 
. . \ '"'55 and Glass products 
I ~r and Paper products 
18 () l her Non Metal products 
13 Other Chemicals 
25 Transport Equipment 
?4 Motor Vehicles 
14 Rubber Products 
23 Electrical Machinery 
LABOUR- INTENSIVE 
11 Printing and Publishing 
15 Other Plastic Products 
22 Machinery 
4 Textiles 
16 Pottery. China, Earthenware 
21 Metal Products 
8 Wood 
26 Jewellery an d Other n .e . c . 
6 Leather Products 
7 Foot wear 
9 Furniture 
5 Clothing 
AGRICULTURALLY- BASED 
2 Beverages 
3 Tobacco 
1 Food 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
(12.06 ) 
5.26 
5.48 
(3.89) 
0 . 27 
0 . 49 
1. 62 
1. 69 
1. 4 3 
4.63 
1. 22 
0 . 54 
(0 . 14 ) 
(0.12) 
5.64 
0.31 
(1. 06) 
4.00 
1. 91 
4.38 
0.32 
3.96 
5 . 61 
4. 29 
(2.83) 
1. 67 
0.32 
(12.09) 
5 . 29 
5.93 
(3.90) 
0.05 
0.63 
1. 66 
1. 69 
1. 42 
4.77 
1. 4 7 
0.53 
(0.19) 
(0.16) 
5.43 
0.21 
(1. 07) 
3.86 
1. 67 
4 .17 
0 . 1 3 
3.83 
5.59 
4 . 45 
(2 . 34 ) 
1. 75 
0 . 28 
(0.03) 
0.03 
0.45 
(0.01) 
(0.22 ) 
0.14 
0.04 
0.00 
( 0.01 ) 
0 .1 4 
0.25 
(0.01 ) 
(0.05) 
(0.04 ) 
(0.21 ) 
(0.10) 
(0.01) 
( 0.14 ) 
(0.24 ) 
(0.21 ) 
(0.19) 
( 0.13) 
( 0.02 ) 
0.16 
0.49 
0.08 
( 0 . 04 ) 
1. 57 
1.83 
2 . 69 
0 . 65 
0.77 
(2.03) 
(2.47 ) 
(5.83) 
(5 . 06) 
0 . 05) 
0.54 
(0.24 ) 
(0.33) 
(2.44 ) 
(2. 1 1 ) 
(5.41 ) 
(0.54) 
(3 . 09) 
2.23 
( 0.93) 
(0.43) 
(4 . 50) 
(0.93) 
( 1. 01 ) 
2.59 
(0.39) 
(0.50) 
2 . 93 
2. 0 9 
2.39 
1.19 
1.11 
(1. 33) 
(2.29 ) 
(5.65 ) 
(5.18 ) 
(0.54 ) 
1.13 
0 . 07 
0.14 
(2.02 ) 
0.62) 
(4.47 ) 
(0.22) 
(2. 77 ) 
2 . 55 
(0.72) 
(0 . 08) 
(4.23) 
(0.80) 
0 . 02 
2 . 43 
(0.07) 
(0 . 06 ) 
1. 4 4 
0.26 
(0.30) 
0.54 
0. 3 4 
0.70 
0.18 
0 . 18 
( 0.12) 
0 . 5 1 
0.59 
0.3 1 
0 . 47 
0.42 
0.49 
0.94 
0 . 32 
0 . 32 
0.32 
0 . 21 
0 . 35 
0.27 
0.13 
1. 03 
(0 . 16) 
0.22 
0.44 
Sou rce: Appendix 0; Capacity Utilisation measures fro m Sou th African Statisti c s. 
Note : GTFp is as derived in Appendix 0, while G:;-p (Adj) is TFP growth ad j usted f o r c apacity uti l is a tion 
followi n g the method described in the text . 
Appendix G.I : Education Enrolment Ratios (%) for 1960 alld 1985 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1960 1985 1960 1985 1960 1985 
Whites 1 18 115 69 87 18 44 
Coloureds 109 129 15 62 2 7 
As ians 125 106 23 88 4 24 
Africans 77 109 3 49 1 5 
Total 78 111 11 56 4 14 
Source: Pl 11ay (19921, p4, Table 2 
Note: primary refers to sub A - standard 4 a nd the age group 6- 11. Percentages larger than 100 indicate a number of ' 
p up i ls o l der than 11 years attended primary school. Secondary refers to standards 5-10 and the age group 12-1 7. 
TArtiary refers to t he age group 18- 22. 
A,., " ,Iix G.2: South African Matriculatioll Passes by Race Jor 1970, 197:; alld 1987 
Year African Coloured Asian 
1970 
1 975 
1987 
2820 
676 1 
84966 
Sou rce: Pillay (1992 ) , p4, Table 3 
1926 
3920 
11836 
1406 
3048 
12419 
White 
36544 
42985 
62067 
Total 
42696 
56714 
171288 
Note : These figures include Uni versity entrance passes and schoo l leaving passes. 
Appendix H: Share of Foreign Owned or Controlled Firms in Selected tDCs, I'Orious years. 
Enployment Gross Value of Production 
or Sales 
Country % Share Year , Share Year 
Latin America 
Argentina 10-12 1970 31 1972 
Brazil 30 1977 44 1977 
Chile 25 1978 
Columbia 28 1970 43 1974 
Mexico 21 1978 39 1970 
Asia 
India 13 1977 13 197 5 
Malaysia 34 1978 44 1978 
South Korea 10 1978 19 1978 
Taiwan 28 1976 
Singapore 72 1980 81 1980 
Hong Kong 10 1980 16 1980 
Africa 
Kenya 30-35 1975 
Ghana 50 1974 
South Africa (a) 28 1978 
South Africa (b) 18 1990 
'! ·, t:e: - means "not available" 
"· '1 'rcee: For all countries except South Africa : Weiss, 1988, p4S, Table 2.5; for South Africa: Cooper. 
' P, p 43, Table 2.14 . 
' I'pendix I: Alternative estimates of tlte oU/put-capi/al elasticity (n) for //Iollufacturillg as a whole 
1945-54 1954-63 1963-74 1974-81 1981-90 
(1) Values actually used: Factor Shares~ 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.37 0 . 42 
(2) Values estimated from regre ssion analysis!> 0.06 0.38 0.09 0.14 -0.06 
(3) Moll's estimates: Factor Shares" 0.45 0 .44 0.38 0.37 0.41 
Sources and Notes: 
a See Table 1.3 for data sources. 
b The methodology used in Dollar and Sokollof (1989) was used to ca lculate these regn~ssion estimates of 
the capital-output elasticity. See t he notes to table 1.3 for a fu ller description of this method. 
e These are the factor share estimates used by Moll (1990). Note that the periods used differ in the first 
and last period of Moll's analysis (1948- 54 , 1981-88). 
The differences between ( 1) and (3) most probably reflect differing underlying sources. 
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